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Abstract 
The aesthetic functionality doctrine seeks to 
promote competition, but is ineffective in the fashion 
industry because there is not one design that will be 
the most aesthetically appealing to everyone, as 
there is in other industries.  This Article examines 
the various problems with the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine, and will argue that this doctrine, while rel-
evant in other industries, should be eliminated from 
fashion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aesthetic functionality doctrine seeks to 
promote competition by barring trademark protec-
tion when the mark in question would significantly 
undermine competitors’ ability to compete in the rel-
evant market.1  How does this doctrine relate to the 
fashion industry?  Fashion is not only about choosing 
clothes that fit based on size and physical needs; con-
sumers use fashion and their available options to ex-
press their individual style while also following cur-
rent trends.2  This style has important social signifi-
cance and communicates messages about that person 
before others have even had the chance to meet 
them.  Fashion has a symbolic function that provides 
visual cues and is a signifier of identity, personality, 
values, and other social meanings.3  
This Article will argue that because of its in-
herent characteristics, the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine, while relevant in other industries, should 
be eliminated from fashion.  Fashion is not just about 
choosing the prettiest shirt or the most eye appealing 
dress: “[i]nnovation in fashion creates vocabularies 
for self-expression that relate individuals to social 
worlds.”4  People use fashion to communicate every 
day, an element that is not present in other indus-
tries.  For example, when a consumer buys a thermo-
stat, he is looking for something that works and 
something that will look the best on his wall; there is 
no self-expression in that, and therefore the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine will be useful there.  However, 
                                                             
1 Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 
F.3d 206, 222 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2 C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and 
Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1158 (2009). 
3 Id. at 1158. 
4 Id. at 1151. 
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this doctrine is irrelevant in fashion because every-
one is not attracted to the same thing; there will 
never be a single design that is the most aesthetical-
ly appealing in fashion, like there will be in other in-
dustries.  Fashion is a social movement and although 
there are collective tastes,5 fashion also serves to dis-
tinguish people from others.6 
 
I. BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW 
A. Basic Principles 
A trademark includes “any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof” used to 
identify and distinguish goods, “including a unique 
product, from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”7  United States trademark law 
is codified in the Lanham Act of 1946 and its 
amendments.8  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office processes and grants trademark 
applications based on requirements set out in the 
Lanham Act.9  In determining what qualifies as a 
trademark, “it is crucial that the symbol in question 
be so distinctive that it is capable of performing the 
function of identifying and distinguishing the goods 
that bear the symbol.”10  Furthermore, a trademark 
by which the goods of the applicant may be distin-
guished from the goods of others shall not be refused 
registration on the principal register on account of its 
nature unless it is comprised of any matter that, as a 
                                                             
5 Id. at 1158. 
6 Id. at 1163. 
7 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
9 Id. 
10 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1 (4th ed. 2014). 
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whole, is functional.11 
The owner of a federally registered trademark 
may bring a trademark infringement claim under 
Section 32 of the Lanham Act,12 or if the trademark 
at issue is unregistered, under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.13  In order to prevail, the plaintiff must 
show that there is a likelihood of confusion between 
the marks in question.14  The use of a trademark in 
connection with the sale of goods constitutes in-
fringement if it is likely to cause consumer confusion 
as to the source of the goods.15  In determining if 
there is a likelihood of confusion, courts will consider 
a number of factors, including: (1) the strength of the 
mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the two 
marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the like-
lihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, (5) 
actual confusion, (6) defendant’s good faith, (7) the 
quality of defendant’s product, and (8) the sophistica-
tion of the consumers.16  The defendant may raise a 
number of defenses in a trademark infringement 
claim, including the functionality doctrine.17  
 
B. The Functionality Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a 
product feature that is functional cannot serve as a 
trademark, noting that “[t]he functionality doctrine 
                                                             
11 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
14 Goto.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
16 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 
(2d Cir. 1961). 
17 Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 
F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from 
instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing 
a producer to control a useful product feature.”18  
Furthermore, it is the goal of patent law, not trade-
mark law, to encourage invention by granting limited 
monopolies over new product designs or functions.19  
There are two forms of the functionality doctrine: 
traditional or utilitarian functionality, and aesthetic 
functionality.20  “Both forms of the [functionality doc-
trine] serve as affirmative defenses to a trademark 
infringement claim.”21  
 
1. A Brief History of the Functionality Doctrine 
In In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., the 
court famously explained that functionality refers to 
the utility of an object’s design and the issue is 
whether there is a need to copy certain articles, also 
termed as the right to compete effectively.22  The 
court also reasoned that in determining functionali-
ty, it was relevant that utilitarian advantages of 
claimed features were disclosed in an expired utility 
patent.23  However, this factor was not dispositive 
and other factors included: whether the originator of 
the design touts the design’s utilitarian advantages 
through advertising, whether alternative designs are 
available, and whether the design results from a 
                                                             
18 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 
(1995). 
19 Id. 
20 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 219. 
21 Id.  
22 See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. 
REV. 823, 848 (2011). 
23 In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-
41 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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comparatively simple or cheap method of manufac-
turing the article.24  
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Devices, Inc. 
was a response to In re Morton-Norwich Products, 
Inc.,25 and before that case, courts relied on different 
definitions of functionality.26  Some courts focused on 
the product feature’s purpose and effect on the prod-
uct, while others looked at competitive necessity to 
see if others could use alternative designs.27  The Su-
preme Court separated these two views, dictating 
utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality.28  
The test of aesthetic functionality that was endorsed 
in TrafFix is overwhelmingly relied on today in 
courts that attempt to apply the doctrine correctly.29  
The court asked whether exclusive use of claimed 
features would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage.30  
 
2. Utilitarian Functionality 
 A product feature is functional under the utili-
tarian functionality doctrine if “it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or 
                                                             
24 Id. at 1341. 
25 McKenna, supra note 22, at 825. 
26 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Like What You See? A Half-Century 
of the Controversial, Confusing Doctrine of Aesthetic 
Functionality, A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. 2 (2011), available 
at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/intelprop/spring2012/coursemateri
als/docs/TheRiseandFallandRiseofAestheticFunctionality/Like
WhatYouSee.pdf. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 McKenna, supra note 22, at 851. 
30 Id. 
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quality of the article.”31  A design feature is essential 
to the use or purpose of the article “only if the fea-
ture is dictated by the functions to be performed; a 
feature that merely accommodates a useful function 
is not enough.”32  A design feature affecting the cost 
is one which allows the article to be manufactured at 
a lower cost.33  If a product feature is found to be 
functional under this test, the feature will ordinarily 
be ineligible for trademark protection.34  When the 
design is functional under Inwood, there is no need 
to proceed further to consider competitive necessi-
ty.35  However, if the design feature is not functional, 
it still must pass the Qualitex test and “be shown not 
to have a significant effect on competition in order to 
receive trademark protection.”36  
 
3. Aesthetic Functionality 
 Qualitex adopted the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition’s definition of aesthetic function-
ality, which states: 
  
a design is functional because of its aesthet-
ic value only if it confers a significant bene-
fit that cannot practically be duplicated by 
the use of alternative designs.  Because of 
the difficulties inherent in evaluating the 
aesthetic superiority of a particular design, 
                                                             
31 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 
(1982). 
32 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
33 Id. 
34 Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 
F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2012). 
35 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 
24 (2001). 
36 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 220. 
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a finding of aesthetic functionality ordinari-
ly will be made only when objective evi-
dence indicates a lack of adequate alterna-
tive designs.37  
 
Furthermore, the ultimate test of aesthetic function-
ality is whether the recognition of trademark rights 
would significantly hinder competition.38  The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently summa-
rized this doctrine stating that “[i]n short, a mark is 
aesthetically functional, and therefore ineligible for 
protection under the Lanham Act, where protection 
of the mark significantly undermines competitors’ 
ability to compete in the relevant market.”39  Fur-
thermore, it indicated that in making that determi-
nation, “courts must carefully weigh ‘the competitive 
benefits of protecting source-identifying aspects’ of a 
mark against the ‘competitive costs of precluding 
competitors from using the feature.’”40 
 The aesthetic functionality doctrine was most 
famously applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pagliero v. 
Wallace China Co.41  The court found that the de-
signs on china were functional because their attrac-
tiveness was the primary selling feature.42  There-
fore, the defendant was allowed to copy the designs 
and use them on its plates as well because they were 
not indicia of source, and “to imitate is to compete in 
                                                             
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17(c) 
(1995); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 
(1995). 
38 Id. 
39 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 222. 
40 Id. (quoting Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. The Hygenic Corp., 
64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
41 See generally Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 
(9th Cir. 1952). 
42 Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343-44. 
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this type of situation.”43  However, the Ninth Circuit 
has had difficulty applying the doctrine since then, 
and seems to take a different position every time it 
comes up.44  For example, it was recently decided 
that the name and image of the Betty Boop character 
were functional, aesthetic components of the product, 
and therefore not trademarks, and that the features 
could not receive protection.45  However, six months 
later, the court received a petition for rehearing that 
was supported by several amicus briefs.46  In re-
sponse, it vacated and withdrew its opinion and then 
issued a new one that was silent on the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine altogether.47  These actions 
demonstrate an obvious confusion on when and how 
to apply this doctrine that results in inefficiency in 
the courts. 
The aesthetic functionality doctrine, when ap-
plied, if applied at all, is treated differently and in-
consistently among the courts.48  For example, some 
courts have little trouble with the doctrine and have 
been able to apply it appropriately, others accept 
that it exists but are reluctant to declare that any 
features are aesthetically functional, and then there 
are some courts that maintain that there is no such 
thing as aesthetic functionality altogether.49  Alt-
hough courts seem to have differing levels of difficul-
ty with the aesthetic functionality doctrine in gen-
                                                             
43 Id. at 344. 
44 McKenna, supra note 22, at 848. 
45 Fleischer Studios Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011). 
46 McKenna, supra note 22, at 848. 
47 See Fleischer Studios Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
48 McKenna, supra note 22, at 848. 
49 Id. 
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eral, it is especially irrelevant in the fashion indus-
try. 
 
II. AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY IN THE FASHION 
INDUSTRY 
 The aesthetic functionality doctrine is irrele-
vant in the fashion industry because courts either 
apply it correctly but do not find the features at issue 
to be competitively necessary, apply the test incor-
rectly, or apply an entirely different test instead. 
 
A. Significant Non-Reputation-Related 
Disadvantage 
There are many cases in the fashion industry 
that appear to be applying a somewhat accurate aes-
thetic functionality test, but just do not find the fea-
tures at issue to be competitively necessary.  These 
cases seem to be applying the test endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in the TrafFix case that asks wheth-
er the exclusive use of the claimed feature puts com-
petitors at a significant non-reputation-relation dis-
advantage.50  For example, Knitwaves, Inc., a manu-
facturer of children’s clothing, brought claims of cop-
yright infringement and trade dress infringement 
against its competitor Lollytogs, Inc. for similar fall 
sweaters.51  At issue were its “‘Leaf Sweater,’ a mul-
ticolored striped sweater with puffy leaf appliques, 
and its ‘Squirrel Cardigan,’ which ha[d] a squirrel 
and leaves appliqued onto its multipaneled front.”52  
Lollytogs contended that the designs on Knitwaves’ 
sweaters were functional because their primary pur-
                                                             
50 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 
33 (2001). 
51 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
52 Id. 
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pose was aesthetic to enhance the sweaters’ orna-
mental appeal, rather than to identify the sweaters 
as Knitwaves products.53 
Further, Lollytogs alleged that by precluding 
it from making sweaters with the basic fall motifs of 
squirrels and leaves, Knitwaves would significantly 
restrict the number of designs available for apparel 
manufacturers wishing to compete in the back to 
school market, and therefore would foreclose Lol-
lytogs from competing effectively in that market.54  
However, the court noted that Lollytogs did not pro-
vide any evidence that the number of designs availa-
ble for fall motifs sweaters is limited, and that con-
sequentially, protection to Knitwaves’ sweaters 
would restrict Lollytags’ ability to produce alterna-
tive competitive designs.55  Additionally, the court 
recognized that according trademark protection to 
Knitwaves’ designs would not preclude Lollytags 
from using fall colors or motifs, including squirrels 
and leaves, it would only preclude the use of designs 
so similar as to create a likelihood of confusion.56  
Therefore, Lollytags did not meet the market foreclo-
sure requirement of functionality.57 
Similarly, Maharishi Hardy Blechman 
brought a claim against Abercrombie & Fitch for 
trade dress infringement.58  Abercrombie moved for 
                                                             
53 Id. at 1006. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  However, the court did find that Knitwaves’ sweater 
designs did not meet the first requirement of an action under § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act – that they be used as a mark to 
identify or distinguish the source – since the primary purpose of 
the designs was aesthetic rather than source identifying. 
58 Maharishi Hardy Blechman v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 
292 F.Supp.2d 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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summary judgment.59  At issue was Maharishi’s line 
of high-end, baggy, military style pants called 
Snopants, which had an elaborate system of draw-
strings, buttons, and other hardware components.60  
The pants could also be shortened by means of inte-
rior epaulettes, and some contained a fiery dragon on 
the back of one leg.61  Abercrombie claimed that the 
Snopants were aesthetically functional, and there-
fore not entitled to protection.62 
The court looked to the Knitwaves case for 
guidance and applied the same analysis to conclude 
that were the court to grant trade dress protection to 
the Snopants trade dress, as narrowly formulated, 
Abercrombie would be free to design nearly all varie-
ties of military style pants as long as they were not 
confusingly similar to Snopants.63  Accordingly, the 
court found that under both utilitarian and aesthetic 
functionality, Maharishi had raised a sufficient ques-
tion of fact as to whether its trade dress was non-
functional.64  
Furthermore, Yurman Design, Inc., better 
known as David Yurman, a manufacturer of cable 
design bracelets, sued Golden Treasure Imports, Inc. 
for trade dress and copyright infringement.65  The 
defendant moved for summary judgment.66  One of 
Golden Treasure’s arguments was that Yurman’s 
                                                             
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 539. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 546. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Yurman Design, Inc. v. Golden Treasure Imps., Inc., 275 
F.Supp.2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
66 Id. 
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jewelry designs were aesthetically functional.67  The 
court stated that this argument lacked merit because 
the defendants failed to identify which elements of 
the specific designs are the kind that preclude effec-
tive market competition.68  Furthermore, they also 
failed to come forward with any evidence that ex-
tending trade dress protection to the combination of 
the elements of Yurman’s designs, including the use 
of the cable element, would prevent the creation of 
other jewelry designs that would be competitive.69  In 
contrast, Yurman had produced evidence from indi-
viduals in the jewelry industry that there were mul-
tiple alternative designs that were available to Gold-
en Treasures that did not require the combination of 
the elements in Yurman’s design.70  Therefore, Gold-
en Treasures had failed to show aesthetic functional-
ity and its motion for summary judgment on the 
basic of aesthetic functionality was denied.71 
In yet another case, Louis Vuitton Malletier 
sued Dooney & Bourke, Inc. for trademark infringe-
ment and dilution for its Monogram Multicolore and 
Eye Love marks.72  Dooney & Bourke raised the doc-
trine of aesthetic functionality and submitted that it 
barred the enforcement of Louis Vuitton’s trademark 
for any purpose.73  The court stated that Dooney & 
Bourke’s reliance on this doctrine was misplaced be-
cause “[g]ranting trademark protection to Louis 
Vuitton’s Monogram Multicolore and Eye Love 
                                                             
67 Id. at 512. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Burke, Inc., 340 
F.Supp.2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
73 Id. 
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marks [would] not prevent Dooney & Bourke from 
using its own monogram in a spectrum of colors on 
its leather goods.”74  The court noted that it would 
only prohibit the use of patterns so similar as to cre-
ate a likelihood of confusion.75 
This case was appealed and the Second Circuit 
affirmed in part and vacated in part.76  However, 
with respect to the trademark infringement claim, it 
agreed with the district court that the Monogram 
Mutlicolore mark was both inherently distinctive and 
held secondary meaning.77  It is important that the 
court recognized that Louis Vuitton could enjoy 
trademark protection in an aesthetically appealing 
source identifying mark without foreclosing Dooney 
& Bourke from the relevant market. As long as it 
came up with a design that was not so similar as to 
create a likelihood of confusion, the adequate alter-
native designs seem almost endless.  
The courts were reluctant to find that the fea-
tures were aesthetically functional in these cases be-
cause there were repeatedly adequate alternative de-
signs available.  Even when the doctrine is applied 
correctly, the courts still seem hesitant to decide that 
a product feature in fashion is functional.  It seems 
likely that a court will be able to determine that 
there are other adequate alternative designs that a 
competitor could use without being foreclosed from 
the relevant market.  Therefore, going through the 
analysis of this doctrine is useless and a waste of 
time if the outcome is always going to be the same.  
Since it is not helping promote stronger trademarks, 
                                                             
74 Id. at 440. 
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it should just be eliminated from the fashion indus-
try altogether. 
 
B. Applying a Utilitarian Functionality Test 
Additionally, some courts seem to misapply 
the doctrine or transform the question of aesthetic 
functionality into one of utilitarian functionality, 
whether they realize they are doing so or not.  This is 
what happened in Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. 
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.78  Abercrombie sued 
American Eagle Outfitters for trade dress infringe-
ment and American Eagle was granted summary 
judgment; the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit heard the appeal.79  The court ex-
plained the two most common “tests” of aesthetic 
functionality and noted that they were both useful in 
this case.80 
First, the test for “comparable alternatives” 
asks whether trade dress protection of certain fea-
tures would nevertheless leave a variety of compara-
ble alternative features that competitors may use to 
compete in the market, and if the alternatives do not 
exist, then the feature is functional, but if they do 
exist, then the feature is not functional.81  Second, 
the “effective competition” test asks whether trade 
dress protection for a product’s feature would hinder 
the ability of another manufacturer to compete effec-
tively in the market for the product, and if hindrance 
is probable, the feature is functional, but if the fea-
ture is not a likely impediment, then the feature is 
                                                             
78 Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 
Inc., 280 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2002). 
79 Id. at 624. 
80 Id. at 642. 
81 Id. 
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not functional.82 
Among other things, Abercrombie claimed pro-
tection for the use of (1) the words “performance,” 
“authentic,” “genuine brand,” “trademark,” and 
“since 1892,” (2) suggestive symbols such as lacrosse 
sticks and ski patrol crosses, (3) primary colors in 
connection with solid, plaid, and stripe designs, as 
well as those (4) solid, plaid, and stripe designs, and 
(5) clothing made from all natural cotton, wool, and 
twill fabrics.83  Although the court noted that the 
lack of comparable alternatives to pleasing design 
features means that granting an injunction would 
deny consumers the benefits of a competitive market, 
it focused on the fact that Abercrombie’s design fea-
tures of words, symbols, designs, and fabrics were 
generic, and that competitors would have to spend 
more money to design around them.84  This conclu-
sion more closely resembles a finding that the trade 
dress was functional in a utilitarian sense since the 
court found that the design features would affect the 
cost (making it cheaper to manufacture the 
clothes).85 
Courts can rely on the utilitarian functionality 
doctrine in fashion, and it seems that some of them 
already do whether they realize they are or not.  The 
important question to ask is whether a competitor 
will have to spend more money to design around a 
plaintiff.  If the answer is yes, then the product fea-
ture in question will be determined to be functional 
in a utilitarian sense, and will not be afforded 
trademark protection.  This test will ensure that a 
                                                             
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 643. 
84 Id. at 643-44. 
85 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 
n.10 (1982). 
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manufacturer does not have a trademark monopoly 
on a useful feature while avoiding the confusion of 
trying to apply the aesthetic functionality doctrine. 
 
C. Well-Known Source Identifiers Cannot Be 
Functional 
There are also courts that conclude that a 
well-known source identifier cannot be found to be 
functional.  This conclusion therefore supports that 
idea that the functionality doctrine has effectively 
already been eliminated. Adidas-America, Inc. 
brought an action against Payless Shoesource, Inc. 
alleging trademark infringement and other related 
claims.86  Payless raised the affirmative defense of 
aesthetic functionality stating that Adidas could not 
be allowed to deplete a common, generic design fea-
ture in its claim of the exclusive use of stripes on ap-
parel.87  Further, Payless argued that Adidas’ at-
tempt to control two and four parallel stripe designs 
on shoes would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage by limiting the 
range of adequate stripe designs available on foot-
wear.88 
The court recognized that the doctrine of aes-
thetic functionality had been limited, if not rejected, 
in favor of the utilitarian functionality doctrine in 
the Ninth Circuit.89  However, it did note that under 
this doctrine, visually attractive and aesthetically 
pleasing designs are categorized as functional, and 
therefore free for all to copy and imitate.90  The court 
                                                             
86 Adidas-Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F.Supp.2d 
1029 (D.Or. 2008).  
87 Id. at 1083. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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went on to explain that to the extent it still applies 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine, it has been lim-
ited to product features that serve an aesthetic pur-
pose wholly independent of any source-identifying 
function.91  Therefore, it concluded that this defense 
was inapplicable because Adidas was seeking to pre-
vent Payless from using a confusingly similar imita-
tion of a trademark that is a distinctive indicator of 
source.92  Although the court noted the limited ap-
plicability of the doctrine, it still came to the conclu-
sion that although Adidas’ mark was aesthetically 
pleasing, it was nevertheless being used properly as 
a source identifier, and therefore was not barred by 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine. 
Similarly, Gucci America, Inc. sued Guess?, 
Inc. for trademark infringement, among other 
claims, and Guess raised the defense of aesthetic 
functionality solely with respect to the Diamond Mo-
tif trade dress.93  The court explained that if an or-
namental feature is claimed as a trademark, and if 
that protection would significantly hinder competi-
tion by limiting the range of adequate alternative de-
signs, then the aesthetic functionality doctrine would 
deny such protection.94  Further, the court defined a 
feature as being ornamental if “it is added purely for 
aesthetic reasons and serves no source identifying 
purpose.”95 
The court noted that Guess’ assertion of this 
defense was misplaced because the “Diamond Motif 
Trade Dress [was] a well-known source identifier of 
                                                             
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F.Supp.2d 207, 257 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
94 Id. at 245-46. 
95 Id. at 246. 
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Gucci, which [led] to the conclusion that it [was] used 
for more than purely aesthetic reasons, and therefore 
[was] not ornamental.”96  Furthermore, Gucci intro-
duced evidence of fifty years of extensive advertising 
highlighting the Diamond Motif, media coverage, and 
high volume of sales of products with the Diamond 
Motif.97  This evidence made it clear that it was near-
ly impossible for Guess to show that it had a compet-
itive need to use a similar mark on its products.98  
Again, this case shows that it is entirely possible to 
compete with other companies who have claimed 
rights in aesthetically appealing trademarks.  There 
are countless adequate alternative designs in the 
fashion industry that make the aesthetic functionali-
ty doctrine irrelevant. 
 
III. AN INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO A VALID 
CONCERN 
 While the cases certainly display how courts 
struggle with the aesthetic functionality doctrine, 
some judges have explicitly stated their confusion as 
well.  One judge noted that “the critics who argue 
that in application the concept is mischievously 
vague certainly have a point.”99  In addition to courts 
having trouble with this doctrine, scholars have also 
argued for its elimination.100  Professor McCarthy 
                                                             
96 Id. 
97 B. Brett Heavner, Trademark Aesthetic Functionality: A 
Zombie Apocalypse?, BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT 
J., Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?
news=b1e7f45e-8896-4d51-ae4d-4afc4f9c878e. 
98 Id. 
99 LaLonde, supra note 26, at 2 (quoting Publications Int’l, 
Inc. v. Landoll, 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.)). 
100 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
7:81 (4th ed.). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Cleaning Out The Closet 
319 
argues that “aesthetic functionality is an oxymoron 
[because] [o]rnamental aesthetic designs are the an-
tithesis of utilitarian designs.”101  Furthermore, he 
highlights Judge Posner’s observation that a design 
or image can be both aesthetically pleasing and 
source identifying.102  Finally, he states that “aes-
thetic functionality is an inappropriate response to a 
valid concern” because trademark law has long had a 
rule to deal with the concern over features that are 
merely ornamental and therefore not perceived as 
consumers as indicia of origin: the merely ornamen-
tal rule.103  Although Professor McCarthy argues for 
the elimination of the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
in its entirety, this Article argues that there are still 
some situations in which this doctrine is helpful and 
valid.  However, those situations will not be found in 
the fashion industry. 
 Professor McKenna recognizes that the func-
tionality doctrine is “fractured” in his article entitled 
(Dys)Functionality.104  He notes that although some 
courts probably do not understand or do not like the 
functionality doctrine, the greater problem is that 
they instead have fundamentally different views 
about the purpose of the doctrine.105  He also realizes 
that courts seem persuaded that aesthetic features 
are generally not competitively necessary, which re-
sults in some courts rejecting the doctrine of aesthet-
ic functionality altogether, and other courts being re-
luctant to apply in in relevant cases even when they 
recognize the doctrine.106 
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IV. AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY IS RELEVANT IN 
OTHER INDUSTRIES 
Although the doctrine of aesthetic functionali-
ty is essentially flawed in the fashion industry, it is 
still relevant in other industries.  While one person 
wants the dress that she finds the prettiest, another 
consumer might want something for its bright color 
to in order to stand out.  There is never going to be 
one fashion design that is the most aesthetically 
pleasing to everyone, but one design can be, and is, 
the best in other industries.  The choices involved in 
picking out an outfit have social and cultural con-
cerns and implications that are not seen or experi-
enced with other products.  For these reasons, aes-
thetic functionality is relevant in other industries 
although it is no longer an appropriate approach in 
fashion. 
For example, rooftop air vents that were de-
signed to look like rooftop tiles were held to be aes-
thetically functional, and thus not entitled to protec-
tion.107  In a trademark opposition, the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board noted that “[b]ecause appli-
cant’s vents match the contours of the roof vents with 
which they are used, alternatives will not have this 
advantage.”108  Furthermore, applicant’s own testi-
mony and promotional materials stated that the 
vents were “‘functional in design,’ camouflage[d] the 
existence of the vents and [were] aesthetically pleas-
ing.”109  In this case, the court made it clear that al-
lowing trademark protection would significantly un-
dermine the competitor’s ability to compete in the 
                                                             
107 M-5 Steel Mfg., Inc. v. O’Hagin’s Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1086, 
1097 (T.T.A.B. 2001). 
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relevant market.  Apparently there is only one way 
that is the best way to hide rooftop air vents in an 
aesthetically pleasing manner.  Therefore, the aes-
thetic functionality doctrine was relevant and appro-
priate in this case. 
Similarly, Waddington North American Busi-
ness Trust sought a preliminary injunction based on 
claims against EMI Plastics, Inc. for trade dress in-
fringement, among other things.110  Waddington de-
veloped a line of disposable plastic serving trays with 
the name CaterLine that included designs of a 
spoked pattern on certain round trays and bowls, 
and an S-shape lip on all of its oval, square, and rec-
tangular trays.111  EMI started selling a Party Tray 
line that Waddington claimed incorporated Cater-
Line’s spoked design and S-shape lip design on trays 
of identical shapes and dimensions, making the two 
lines indistinguishable.112  The court noted that a 
functional feature is one the exclusive use of which 
would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation related disadvantage, and it even applies 
to features of a product that are ornamental.113  The 
court recognized that where an ornamental feature is 
claimed as a trademark, and trade dress protection 
would significantly hinder competition by limiting 
the range of adequate alternative designs, the aes-
thetic functionality doctrine would deny such protec-
tion.114  
Waddington claimed that the primary purpose 
                                                             
110 Waddington N. Am. Bus. Trust v. EMI Plastics, Inc., No. 
02-CV-3781(FB), 2002 WL 2031372, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 
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of the spoke and S-shape lip designs was to identify 
the product as a CaterLine product.115  However, the 
court found that the design was functional both in 
the utilitarian sense and the aesthetic sense.116  The 
court observed that the simple, basic, and entirely 
unoriginal spoke and S-shape lip designs on its trays 
did not serve to identify or distinguish the trays as 
CaterLine trays.117  Rather, they served to enhance 
the aesthetic appeal of the trays and not to identify 
the source.118  Consumers would be likely purchase 
these trays because they found their combination of 
design features aesthetically pleasing, not because 
the designs served to identify or distinguish the 
goods as genuine CaterLine products.119  Based on 
this and other evidence, the court found that Wad-
dington had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of suc-
cess that its claimed trade dress designs were not 
functional.120 
Additionally, Honeywell International, Inc. 
moved for a preliminary injunction barring its com-
petitor, Eco Manufacturing LLC from manufacturing 
and selling a round thermostat.121  Honeywell sought 
to protect its product configuration, the round shape 
of a thermostat, as a trademark.122  The court denied 
Honeywell’s motion for a preliminary injunction be-
cause Honeywell was unlikely to succeed on the mer-
                                                             
115 Id. at *4. 
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121 Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 295 F.Supp.2d 854, 
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its of its claim.123  The record taken as a whole sup-
ported the finding that giving Honeywell exclusive 
rights to the circular shape would put its competitors 
at a significant, non-reputation related disad-
vantage.124 
In its analysis, the court relied on the Qualitex 
case and reasoned that shape is similar to color, not-
ing that “[t]hermostats work equally well to control 
temperature regardless of shape, but the evidence 
shows that the shape and overall appearance are im-
portant features in selling thermostats.”125  A ther-
mostat is a utilitarian device, but is also part of an 
interior décor.126  Honeywell also had market re-
search showing that overall appearance, including 
shape, plays a critical role in consumers’ initial re-
sponse to products, and an advertisement emphasiz-
ing the aesthetic appeal of round design.127  Accord-
ingly, the court found that the shape met the stand-
ards for aesthetic functionality and could not be 
trademarked.128 
These cases show that the aesthetic function-
ality doctrine is still valuable in other industries.  
There are many products that have one design that 
is the most aesthetically appealing, and this doctrine 
should be used to ensure that those manufacturers 
that use it first do not get a trademark monopoly on 
those specific features.  The aesthetic functionality 
doctrine seeks to promote competition, and in those 
situations, it still does.  However, this doctrine does 
not have the same effect in the fashion industry be-
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cause there is not one design that will be the most 
aesthetically appealing to everyone.  The fashion in-
dustry is also much larger and more diverse because 
everyone is forced to participate in fashion, whether 
they want to or not, because of the fact that everyone 
needs to wear clothing. 
 
V. THE GAME IS NOT WORTH THE CANDLE 
There are many reasons why the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine is irrelevant in the fashion in-
dustry, including its inherent characteristics and the 
misapplication of the doctrine by various courts.  
Furthermore, this situation is similar to the one in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 
where the court decided that design, like color, is not 
inherently distinctive, and therefore product designs 
must acquire secondary meaning before being capa-
ble of receiving trademark protection.129  Justice 
Scalia reasoned that “[c]ompetition is deterred, how-
ever, not merely by successful suit but by the plausi-
ble threat of successful suit, and given the unlikeli-
hood of inherently source-identifying design, the 
game of allowing suit based upon alleged inherent 
distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”130 
 Allowing the aesthetic functionality doctrine to 
be applied to cases in the fashion industry is also a 
situation where “the game is not worth the candle.”  
Putting aside the fact that courts have a lot of trou-
ble applying the doctrine, even when they do so cor-
rectly, they are reluctant to find a product feature 
aesthetically functional.131  This supports the conclu-
                                                             
129 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 
214 (2000). 
130 Id. 
131 McKenna, supra note 22, at 848. 
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sion that this doctrine has already effectively been 
eliminated.  If the outcome is always going to be the 
same, then claimants should not waste the courts’ 
time and energy in trying to figure it out. 
 Furthermore, this doctrine does not belong in 
the fashion industry because of fashion’s social sig-
nificance. People participate in fashion to communi-
cate their interests, their ideas, and their needs to be 
similar, or on the other hand, to be different.  Be-
cause fashion is not a one-size-fits-all approach, the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine is not helpful in de-
termining if trademark protection is warranted.  
This doctrine only gets in the way and detracts the 
focus of the courts by wasting the valuable time and 
energy of judges trying to interpret and apply it, 
when they should instead be immersed in other, 
more relevant, details in the case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The aesthetic functionality doctrine should be 
eliminated from the fashion industry because it is 
inappropriate there, even though it remains appro-
priate in other industries.  The fashion industry’s 
products are some of the most immediate means 
whereby people can create and communicate mean-
ing.132  Everyone participates in the fashion industry 
by buying and wearing clothing, and simultaneously 
achieves the contrasting goals of being distinct and 
belonging.133  
Furthermore, the courts struggle to apply this 
doctrine and the policy goal of promoting strong 
trademarks in the fashion industry gets lost in the 
shuffle.  This ultimate goal of trademark law can be 
                                                             
132 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 2, at 1195. 
133 Id. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Cleaning Out The Closet 
326 
satisfied by instead focusing on: (1) the mark’s 
strength as a trademark, including if it is being used 
as a source identifier, (2) the strength of its second-
ary meaning, (3) the likelihood of confusion, and (4) 
an analysis of utilitarian functionality.  This will 
both eliminate the confusion in the courts and ensure 
that only marks that serve as valid trademarks will 
receive protection. The fashion industry is a social 
movement, and therefore there will never be one de-
sign that is the most aesthetically appealing to eve-
ryone. 
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Abstract 
This Article discusses the issue of excessive 
patent protection and possible remedies; the dis-
cussed remedies are the usage of antitrust laws or 
simply replacing certain patents with copyright pro-
tection.  This Article first explores the relationship 
between patent protection and antitrust law.  It then 
describes a number of tests that have been used in 
the past and one proposed new test, designed to con-
front this interrelationship.  While considering these 
tests, this Article applies two controversial real-
world patents to each in order to examine their bene-
fits and problems. This Article then goes on to dis-
cuss the possible benefits of protecting inventors 
through copyright laws. Generally, the primary goal 
of regulating these areas of law is to reach an opti-
mal level of “consumer welfare” consisting of innova-
tive products at competitive prices.  While this Arti-
cle discusses numerous legal theories, they will be 
framed in the context of attempting to produce the 
greatest amount of consumer welfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As of September 2012, Americans were using 
234 million mobile devices, 119.3 million of which 
were smartphones.1  This incredibly large demand 
for communication devices has encouraged high-
stakes litigation between market competitors over 
many issues.  On May 14, 2012, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard a case 
brought by Apple Inc. (“Apple”) against Samsung 
Electronics Co. Ltd. (“Samsung”).2  One of the issues 
before the court was whether it should issue a pre-
liminary injunction preventing the sale of a number 
of Samsung products that allegedly violated Apple’s 
patents for a large rectangular smartphone display 
                                                             
1 Stephanie Adamo, comScore Reports September 2012 U.S. 
Mobile Subscriber Market Share, COMSCORE (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/11/com
Score_Reports_September_2012_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Mark
et_Share.  As of September 2012, Samsung held 26 percent of 
the United States smartphone and non-smartphone original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) market share.  Apple 
possessed only 17.5 percent of the OEM market share.  In terms 
of smartphone operating systems, Google led with 52.5 percent, 
then Apple followed with 34.3 percent.  Other competitors such 
as RIM, Microsoft, and Symbian held 8.4 percent, 3.6 percent, 
and 0.6 percent, respectively.  Id. 
2 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
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(the D’677 patent)3 and a software feature known as 
the “bounce-back.”4  The issues were remanded back 
to a California District Court, where the jury granted 
Apple $1,049,393,540 in damages for Samsung’s pa-
tent infringement5 and an injunction banning sales 
of Samsung’s Galaxy 10.1 tablet computer.6  Sam-
sung appealed the court’s decision, resulting in the 
court sustaining the injunction,7 then removing the 
injunction8 on the Galaxy Tab 10.1.  Immediately fol-
lowing that development, Samsung filed suit against 
Apple for its then newly released iPhone 5.9  The 
companies, as of April 2014, have at trial over a new 
                                                             
3 Id. at 1317. 
4 Id. at 1318. 
5 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK 2012 WL 4078433 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012); see Apple 
Demands More Than $2 Billion from Samsung for Patent 
Infringement, INFOWORLD (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.infoworld.com/d/the-industry-standard/apple-
demands-more-2-billion-samsung-patent-infringement-239587 
(lowering the final judgment to an amount of $929 million). 
6 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK, 2012 WL 2401680, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2012). 
7 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK, 2012 WL 4097751, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012). 
8 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK, 2012 WL 4490558, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012). 
9 Joanna Stern, Apple v. Samsung Battle Goes On: Galaxy 
Tab Ban Lifted As Samsung Pushes for iPhone 5 Ban, ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/apple-
samsung-wages-galaxy-tab-ban-lifted-
samsung/story?id=17376176; see also Florian Mueller, 
Samsung Asserts Eight More Patents Against Apple in 
California, Including Two FRAND Patents, FOSS PATENTS 
(Apr. 18, 2012, 11:33 PM), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/samsung-asserts-eight-
more-patents.html (explaining that Apple and Samsung have 
filed patent litigation against each other in nine countries 
other than the United States). 
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body of utility patents.10  In the present case, Apple 
has requested that the jury grant damages in excess 
of $2 billion.11 
Other technological firms are injecting them-
selves into high-stakes patent litigation as well.  
Google is claiming $4 billion in damages against Mi-
crosoft for failure to pay licensing fees on patents re-
lated to Microsoft’s Xbox gaming system.12  VirnetX 
was awarded $368.2 million against Apple for unli-
censed use of their technologies in Apple’s Facetime 
program.13  Additionally, Apple filed suit against 
Samsung, claiming that the version 4.1 of the An-
droid operating system infringed some of Apple’s 
software patents.14  All of these claims were brought 
just within the first two weeks of November 2012. 
According to Judge Richard Posner, “patent 
protection is on the whole excessive and . . .  major 
reforms are necessary.”15  He made this comment 
while referring to the $1,049,393,540 verdict, in 
2012, against Samsung, which awarded Apple one of 
the largest verdicts in the history of patent litiga-
                                                             
10 Martyn Williams, Apple Demands More Than $2 Billion 
from Samsung for Patent Infringement, INFOWORLD (Apr. 1, 
2014), http://www.infoworld.com/d/the-industry-standard/apple-
demands-more-2-billion-samsung-patent-infringement-239587. 
11 Id. 
12 Google v. Microsoft Patent License Trial Begins, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
20314883. 
13 Apple Loses Facetime Patent Lawsuit to VirnetX, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20236114. 
14 Id. 
15 Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict 
Competition and Creativity Excessively?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG 
(Sept. 30, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-
competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html. 
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tion.16  Competitors in the technology industry are 
finding that, in order to effectively compete, they 
must not only excel in the market itself, but in the 
courts as well.  This excessive amount of litigation 
has turned the judicial system into a secondary, but 
essential, arena for companies to challenge each oth-
er. 
 
I. PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 
Patent law protects inventors by granting 
them the right to exclude others from benefiting fi-
nancially from their innovations.17  Article I, Section 
8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to 
grant patents.18  The purpose of that section is to 
promote innovation by securing inventors, for limited 
amounts of time, “the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries.”19  Patents are primari-
ly governed by Title 35 of the United States Code.20  
Patents offer patentees the “right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States.”21  However, 
these protections expire after twenty years.22 
In some instances, patents are granted to pro-
tect inventors from competition that arises after the 
inventor has made major investments into research 
                                                             
16 Id.; Jessica Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2012, 1:41 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904443584045776
09810658082898.html. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 35 U.S.C. § 2; see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (changing patent 
system from first-to-invent to first-to-file). 
21 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
22 Id. 
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and development.23  In other situations, marketplace 
competitors become so powerful that other competi-
tors are driven out.24  Competition is conducive to in-
novation, and sometimes patent overprotection sti-
fles innovation by eliminating competition.25 
Patent owners will not be denied relief or 
found guilty of patent misuse if they derive revenues 
from their patents, sell licenses to others, enforce pa-
tent rights against infringement, refuse to license 
certain rights, or “tie” patents to other patents in an-
other market, unless the patent owner has market 
power in the market of the other patent that the first 
patent is being tied to.26  Patents should be under-
stood as negative rights.  They provide the patentee 
the right to exclude; the ability to exclude in patent 
law is somewhat different than the concept of exclu-
sion involved in antitrust law.27 
As indicated in the introduction to this Article, 
there are many types of patent lawsuits being 
brought.  It is important to distinguish between de-
sign patents and, the most common type, utility pa-
tents.28  Utility patents grant protection to “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”29  Utility patents are particularly useful be-
cause they allow inventors to exclude others from 
                                                             
23 Christopher Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component 
Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1260, 1261 (2009). 
24 Id. at 1265. 
25 Id. 
26 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
27 Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust Differing Shades of 
Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2008). 
28 DON W. MARTENS & JOHN B. SGANGA, JR., PRE-LITIGATION 
PATENT ENFORCEMENT § 2:7 (2012) (noting that patent number 
8,000,000 was granted in 2011). 
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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making, using, or selling their inventions.30  Some 
inventions that are particularly likely to acquire util-
ity patents are mechanical devices, electronic devic-
es, chemical compounds, and production processes.31   
Design patents, on the other hand, grant pro-
tection for the nonfunctional ornamental aspects of 
an invention.32  So, design patents protect the prod-
uct’s appearance, not its functionality.33  In order to 
determine whether a design patent has been in-
fringed, a fact finder must determine “whether an 
ordinary observer would find that the allegedly in-
fringing design has a ‘sameness of appearance’ to the 
patented one, not whether the accused infringer used 
the same artistic idea in general.”34  This Article ana-
lyzes both design and utility patents. 
American antitrust laws were created with the 
purpose of protecting and promoting competition.35  
Although one of the goals is to prohibit collusion, this 
Article will focus primarily on the goals aimed 
against exclusion.36  Exclusion, in the context of anti-
trust law, refers to monopolists keeping their com-
petitors from entering into markets and competing 
through some anticompetitive conduct. The legisla-
tive intent to counteract exclusion particularly ap-
plies where  
                                                             
30 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
31 MARTENS & SGANGA, supra note 28, at § 2:7. 
32 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
33 MARTENS & SGANGA, supra note 28, at § 2:7. 
34 Daniel H. Brean, Enough Is Enough: Time to Eliminate 
Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and 
Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 325, 332 (2008) (citing Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 
U.S. 511, 528 (1871)). 
35 JOHN MILES, 1 HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:2 
(2013). 
36 Id. 
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a firm takes an action that precludes others 
from competing against it and is particularly 
troublesome where the firm engaging in this 
type of conduct already has substantial mar-
ket power or where the market in which it 
competes is highly concentrated, when its ex-
clusionary action lacks any procompetitive 
justification, or when the exclusion results 
from collusion among several firms.37 
 
Antitrust laws are meant to protect competition; de-
sired consequences consist of lower prices, higher 
output, and increased innovation. Anticompetitive 
conduct tends to deny these benefits to consumers.38 
 
II. BALANCING PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS 
Both patent and antitrust laws share the goal 
of benefiting the consumer through increased inno-
vation, but there is an inherent paradox within their 
particular methods of operation.  Patents focus on 
promoting innovation; innovation is protected by al-
lowing inventors to exclude others from using the 
claims of their patents.  Antitrust laws focus on pro-
moting competition, but sometimes increased compe-
tition is achieved by condemning the exclusion creat-
                                                             
37 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (partially governing 
antitrust law, section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that 
“[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 . . .”); 1 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 
CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 4:29 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that a company’s 
large size is not indicative of a monopoly, but if it were to be 
abused, courts should take size into consideration). 
38 Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust 
Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 768 (2002). 
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ed by patents.39  In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of 
America, Inc., the court stated that “[w]hen a patent 
owner uses his patent rights not only as a shield to 
protect his invention, but as a sword to eviscerate 
competition unfairly, that owner may be found to 
have abused the grant and may become liable for an-
titrust violations . . . .”40  The Supreme Court ex-
plained in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat that, in 
order for complainants to establish a private anti-
trust action, they must be able to prove that they suf-
fered an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent” and that the injury either “re-
flect[s] the anticompetitive effect either of the [anti-
trust] violation” or other unlawfully anticompetitive 
conduct made possible by or related to that viola-
tion.41  The ideal marketplace would consist of equi-
librium between innovation and competition, but nei-
ther patent nor antitrust laws alone encourage 
movement towards equilibrium. 
A number of tests have been used and pro-
posed in order for courts to maximize consumer wel-
fare by balancing the virtues of both patents and an-
titrust laws.  The most common approach for courts 
to determine whether a company has exceeded pa-
tent or antitrust boundaries is to inquire into the 
“scope” of the patent.42  Generally, if the patentee’s 
actions fall within the scope of the patent, they would 
                                                             
39 Id. at 762-63. 
40 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
41 Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); 
1 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 37, at § 4:48; see 15 U.S.C. § 
15 (2012) (granting standing to “any person who shall be 
injured in his business of property by reason of anything 
forbidden in antitrust laws”). 
42 Carrier, supra note 38, at 788-89. 
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be considered immune from antitrust litigation.43  
Actions falling outside of the patent’s scope are only 
subject to antitrust liability if there is a showing of 
anticompetitive behavior.44 
Another test focuses on the patentee’s intent.45  
In a case decided by the Ninth Circuit,46 the court 
determined that there is a presumption of legality 
when a patentee has patented products, but this pre-
sumption can be rebutted if the patentee’s actions 
can be shown to have had a pretextual business justi-
fication to mask anticompetitive conduct.47  This “in-
tent test” requires the court to examine the defend-
ant’s subjective intent.48 
These tests have been the basis for courts’ pa-
tent analyses in the past, but Michael Carrier, in 
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, proposes 
an alternative.49  He suggests, in his Common De-
nominator Test, that there be an initial presumption 
that a monopolist’s conduct is lawful so long as there 
is an objective justification for patent-based actions 
other than harming competitors.50  The test then 
provides a chance for rebuttal, from the alleged pa-
tent infringer, to demonstrate that competition, not 
patents, is responsible for innovation in the indus-
try.51  At this point, the court should consider the 
type of industry involved and determine whether it is 
                                                             
43 Id. at 788-89. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 793-94. 
46 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 
F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997). 
47 Carrier, supra note 38, at 788-89 (citing Kodak, 125 F.3d at 
1219. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 765. 
51 Id. at 765. 
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one where innovation is derived from massive in-
vestments into research and development, or if it is 
an industry where competitors continuously improve 
upon products with relatively little investment into 
research and development.52  The patentee may then 
counter with a surrebuttal demonstrating that the 
market in question is characterized by innovation; if 
he can successfully do so, he will not be liable for the 
antitrust action.53 
 
III. COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyrights protect original works of author-
ship that are “fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated.”54  Protection for copyrighted materials lasts 
for the creator’s life plus 70 years.55  Among many 
other things, copyrights protect pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works.56  The term “original” only re-
quires that the work be created independently by the 
author and that “it possesses at least some minimal 
level of creativity.”57  Only a slight amount of creativ-
ity is required; most works easily satisfy this mini-
mal level because they possess some creativity, “no 
                                                             
52 Id. at 818; see id. at 831, 756 (noting that for the rebuttal to 
be effective, the alleged patent infringer must demonstrate that 
industry innovation is primarily dependent on a competitive 
market by showing that there are market-based incentives to 
innovate, the product is not difficult to create, the product is 
difficult to imitate, or that the industry is characterized by 
innovation built upon previously developed products). 
53 Id. 
54 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
55 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
56 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
57 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991). 
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matter how crude, humble or obvious [they] might 
be.”58  Designs must be original and nonfunctional, 
but, similar to design patents, the protection extends 
only to those particular features.59  Copyright protec-
tion for artistic craftsmanship will be afforded to fea-
tures that can be identified separately from and that 
are capable of existing independently of the article’s 
utilitarian aspects.60 
Copyrights, unlike design patents, protect only 
the expression of ideas, as opposed to ideas them-
selves; concepts similar to the already common ideas 
cannot be protected, or otherwise, “the first to come 
up with an idea will corner the market.”61  In order 
to prove a copyright breach, plaintiffs must show 
proof that the “defendant copied the plaintiff’s copy-
righted material.”62  The plaintiff must also prove 
that the copying was “so extensive that it rendered 
the infringing and copyrighted works ‘substantially 
similar.’”63 
A typical defense against copyright claims is 
the fair use doctrine.  It allows for parties, other than 
the copyrighting party, to make “transformative” us-
es of the copyrighted material.64  The statute re-
quires courts to analyze the defense by using four dif-
ferent factors: (1) the purpose and character of the 
use (i.e., whether it is used for commercial purposes), 
                                                             
58 Id. 
59 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
60 Id. 
61 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 
(9th Cir. 1994). 
62 Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing 
Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 
2000)). 
63 Id. 
64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work, and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market.65  By serving a different purpose, 
adding a new meaning, or adding a new expression 
to a work, transformative works promote artistic 
progress.66  As a new creation becomes increasingly 
more transformative, the other factors that would 
weigh against a fair use defense, such as commercial-
ism and effects on the market, become less signifi-
cant.67 
 
IV. COMPETING TESTS 
Although there are numerous ongoing patent 
cases that may have even larger impacts on the 
technology industry than the aforementioned litiga-
tion between Apple and Samsung, this Article only 
considers Apple’s D’677 (design patent) and ’381 
(utility patent) patents to analyze how the scope, in-
tent and Common Denominator tests apply in terms 
of initiating antitrust liability.  After exploring the 
option of counteracting patent protection with anti-
trust laws, this Article will explore the alternative of 
using copyright laws.  The copyright laws will only 
be applied to the D’677 patent because copyright law 
is only practical for replacing design patents. 
The D’677 patent was issued on June 29, 2010 
claiming a simple smartphone design with a large 
rectangular display.68  It also specifies that the 
phone’s corners are rounded, the phone’s face is a 
                                                             
65 Id. 
66 Brean, supra note 34, at 350-51. 
67 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 570 
(1994). 
68 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1317 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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highly-polished, reflective surface, and that the de-
sign contains no ornamentation other than a rectan-
gular speaker slot above the display and a circular 
button below.69 
 
 
Figure 1. D’677 Patent Design70 
 
This minimalistic design drew sharp criticism 
from Samsung in the wake of the $1,049,393,540 
verdict; a Samsung statement argued that it was 
“unfortunate that patent law can be manipulated to 
give one company a monopoly over rectangles with 
rounded corners.”71 
U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (the ’381 patent), or 
the bounce-back feature, was designed for Apple’s 
smartphones and tablets, the iPhone and iPad.72  
This feature, protected by the ’381 patent, is engaged 
while the user is scrolling through a document on the 
device.73  When the user scrolls beyond the end of the 
document, sees an area indicating the document’s 
                                                             
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Samsung to Appeal After $1bn Apple Award in US Case, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19381096. 
72 Apple, 678 F.3d at 1318. 
73 Id. 
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end and releases his or her finger, the document 
“bounces-back” into view.74 
Seeking to find a favorable system for analyz-
ing the D’677 and ’381 patent protections, this Part 
will apply the scope, intent and proposed Common 
Denominator tests to evaluate whether antitrust lia-
bility should be invoked to counteract anticompeti-
tive behavior connected with patents. 
 
A.  The Scope Test 
Courts commonly consider the scope of a pa-
tent’s grant when deciding if a patentee misused a 
patent.  Patent owners cannot improperly extend 
their power into the marketplace by surpassing the 
scope of what Congress intended to grant through 
patent law.75  Filing for a patent requires that the 
patentee give a detailed description of the invention 
describing the manner of its production that is clear 
enough for somebody “skilled in the art” to recreate 
the invention.76  The courts use this rule of specificity 
to determine the scope of the patent; as long as the 
action falls reasonably within the patent grant, a pa-
tent misuse defense will never succeed.77  Because of 
this, the scope test is highly favorable to patent pro-
tection and the legal monopolies granted to inven-
tors.  If a claim were to arise concerning a patentee’s 
actions that fall within the scope of the patent, the 
                                                             
74 Id. 
75 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
76 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
77 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (U.S. 2011); see 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 
869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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actions would presumably be considered lawful.78  If 
the patentee’s actions are found to be outside of the 
scope of the patent, a defendant may allege “patent 
misuse” as a defense and possibly recover under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.79 
The first step in the scope test is to determine 
whether the patent falls within the specific descrip-
tion as given by the patentee.  Assume that the al-
leged infringer produced a smartphone that utilized 
the design of the D’677 patent and the bounce-back 
feature of the ’381 patent.  Under the scope test, the 
patentee would simply claim that the competitor took 
the product design of a rectangular display with 
rounded corners and bounce-back feature, and ap-
plied it to his own product.  The defendant may ei-
ther deny that he has copied the patented design or, 
in some instances, argue a defense of patent mis-
use.80 
Patent misuse, an affirmative defense to an al-
legation of patent infringement, allows a party to al-
so invoke antitrust laws against a patentee if the de-
fendant can prove that the patentee filed the patent 
application with a scheme to create an illegal monop-
oly or to restrain trade.81  In United States v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained that restraints of trade embrace acts, con-
tracts, agreements, or combinations of these which 
“prejudice [the] public interest by unduly restricting 
                                                             
78 Carrier, supra note 38, at 790. 
79 1 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 37, § 4:57 (explaining 
that if a patentee is able to lessen or destroy competition 
through the “exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim,” the 
elements for a monopoly are present and the defendant may 
counter with an antitrust suit). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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competition or unduly obstructing the due course of 
trade.”82  The party that allegedly infringed on the 
patent essentially takes the place of the government 
by asserting a claim to annul a patent for fraud.83  
Furthermore, if the fraudulently procured patent vio-
lates section 2 of the Sherman Act, the party that al-
legedly infringed the patent may seek treble damag-
es for the harm imposed by the patent.84 
 
B. The Intent Test 
The intent test is used in some jurisdictions; it 
looks at the subjective intent of the patentee.85  Ju-
ries are to presume that the patentee’s desire to prof-
it from its patent rights is “legitimately procompeti-
tive.”86  There is opportunity for rebuttal if there is 
evidence that “the [patentee] acquired the protection 
of the intellectual property laws in an unlawful 
manner” or that there was a misleading pretext to 
the patentee’s act.87  Patentees may not “rely upon a 
pretextual business justification to mask anticompet-
itive conduct.”88 
If the patentee, the owner of the D’677 and 
’381 patents, were to file suit against a competitor, 
applying the intent test, the fact-finder would have 
to determine the patentee’s subjective intent for en-
forcing the patent.  Here, the presumption stands 
                                                             
82 U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). 
83 Id. 
84 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 
382 U.S. 172, 173 (1965) 
85 Carrier, supra note 38, at 793-94; see Image Technical 
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
86 Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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that the patentee’s actions are legitimately procom-
petitive.  But, if the alleged patent infringer can 
demonstrate that the patent was either illegally ob-
tained or that the patentee used a business pretext 
to mask his anticompetitive conduct, the patentee 
could then face antitrust liability.  Examples of such 
anticompetitive conduct include tying arrangements, 
grant-back provisions, purchaser resale restrictions, 
restrictions on licensee’s sales elsewhere, mandatory 
package licensing, royalty provisions that are not 
reasonably related to the licensee’s sales, and resale 
price restrictions.89 
Along with the intent test taking a substantial 
amount of power from patentees, it may also cause a 
drastic shift toward antitrust law.90  Focusing on the 
patentee’s intent may be especially problematic be-
cause every company is essentially in business to 
outsell its competitors.91  In order to prove the pa-
tentee’s subjective intent, discovery could likely lead 
to documents or e-mails that appear provocative, but 
there is the possibility that they just have been made 
during the course of healthy competition.92  In the 
course of competition, it is natural that firms desire 
to outsell their market rivals; patent protection, in 
some instances, may be the only practical means of a 
firm prevailing.  The benefit of exclusion, which is 
offered by patents, can wither away if patentees have 
to strike a delicate balance between excluding under 
the patent laws and not interfering with competition, 
which is protected by antitrust laws.93 
 
                                                             
89 MILES, supra note 35, at § 5:12, at *15 (2012). 
90 Carrier, supra note 38, at 794. 
91 Id. at 794. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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C. Introduction to the Common 
Denominator Test 
If the courts were to apply the proposed Com-
mon Denominator test, they would begin with the 
presumption that “a company’s patent-based actions 
are lawful as long as there is a plausible justification 
for the action other than injuring competitors.”94  
One such example of a plausible justification would 
be “efficiency.”95  Instead of looking at the patentee’s 
subjective intent, the court should consider the objec-
tive circumstances surrounding the patentee’s justi-
fication.96  Patents essentially allow for a legal mo-
nopoly over certain products, so “[s]uch a strong pre-
sumption makes sense not only because a company’s 
actions based on its valid patents are not the typical 
‘bad acts’ punished under section 2, but also, related-
ly, because they are the intended reward of the pa-
tent system.”97 
 
V.  THE COMMON DENOMINATOR TEST AND THE 
APPLE V. SAMSUNG LITIGATION 
 
A. Rebuttal, Ex Ante Factors, Ex Post Factors 
and Surrebuttal 
Once the patentee demonstrates a plausible 
justification for its patent-based actions, the alleged 
patent infringer may then set out to prove the rebut-
                                                             
94 Id. at 816-17. 
95 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585, 609-10 (1985) (ruling that a ski ticket distributor’s 
exclusion of a ski resort’s tickets was not based on a plausible 
justification, rather, the justification led to an inefficient and 
inconsistent logical outcome). 
96 Carrier, supra note 38, at 816-17. 
97 Id. at 817. 
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tal.98  The rebuttal determines whether industry in-
novation is rooted in patents or competition.99  If the 
innovation arises from an industry that is considered 
to be competition-based, such as a technological field, 
then the rebuttal surmounts the presumption of law-
fulness.100  The presumption of lawfulness can be 
surmounted even when patent-based acts do not ap-
pear to be predatory, because, as Carrier claims, “pa-
tents cannot be the ultimate trump card.”101  To de-
termine the type of industry, the courts have to con-
sider both ex ante and the ex post factors. 
The first ex ante factor that must be proven by 
the alleged patent infringer is that the market in 
question has “market-based nonpatent incentives to 
innovate in the industry.”102  Examples of such in-
centives would include the ability for the innovator to 
be a market pioneer103 or the competition taking 
place in a “network effects market.”104  In terms of 
market pioneers, industries, including pharmaceuti-
cals, cigarettes, oil-drilling rigs, investment banking, 
or even computer and semiconductor industries, al-
low for the early innovators to sustain substantial 
market shares even after their patents expire.105  
Possible explanations for this occurrence are custom-
er familiarity, brand loyalty, and cost advantages.106  
The term “network effects market” refers to markets 
                                                             
98 Id. at 818. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 819. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 831. 
103 Id. at 821. 
104 Id. at 822. 
105 Id. at 821-22. 
106 Id. at 821-22 (noting that in consumer goods businesses, 
pioneers have amassed twenty-nine percent of the market while 
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that benefit each participant through the cumulative 
effect of adding other participants.107  The social 
networking website Facebook is an example of a 
network effects market that envelopes a larger mar-
ket share and higher value as it becomes more popu-
lar. 
After proving that there are non-patent incen-
tives to innovate in a market, the alleged patent in-
fringer must prove at least one of the two remaining 
ex ante factors: “that the product is easy to create or 
that it is difficult to imitate.”108  Patents are particu-
larly important in instances where investments of 
time and capital are very high; on the other hand, 
they are less important when there is a relatively 
smaller time and capital investment.109  The phar-
maceutical industry is an example of an industry 
where products are exceedingly more difficult to cre-
ate and requires spending “hundreds of millions of 
dollars and take[s] ten to fourteen years to bring new 
drugs to market.”110 
Industries where patents do not spur innova-
tion, including aircraft production, semiconductor 
production, vehicle designing, and primary metals, 
may actually enhance industry-wide innovation by 
moving away from patents and more toward anti-
trust liability.111  In terms of the degree of difficulty 
to imitate products, patents are more necessary 
when it is relatively easier for competitors to imitate 
the product.112 
Referring back to the pharmaceutical indus-
                                                             
107 Id. at 822. 
108 Id. at 831. 
109 Id. at 823-24. 
110 Id. at 824. 
111 Id. at 826-27. 
112 Id. at 827. 
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try, it may take years and millions of dollars to de-
velop a new drug, but once it is marketed, the cost of 
imitation may be low because competitors could copy 
the product.113  Such a low cost to reverse-engineer 
and copy could be devastating to drug developers and 
other innovators of the sort, who have carried the re-
search and development costs.  Some industries, such 
as those that require complex mechanical engineer-
ing or intricate machinery, may not necessitate pa-
tents due to the difficulty to imitate.114  Carrier’s 
test, attempting to optimize innovation, provides an 
industry-specific analysis that carefully considers the 
need for patent protection.  The Common Denomina-
tor test has a number of factors that, if at least one of 
them is met, “ensures that the presence of market-
based incentives alone does not trigger the conclu-
sion that patents are not necessary in the indus-
try.”115  These safeguards are present because mar-
ket-based incentives could be existent in industries, 
such as pharmaceuticals, that are dependent on pa-
tent protection.116 
Carrier explains his belief that patent protec-
tion is not essential when a product is either easy to 
create or difficult to imitate on its innovations.117  
His theory, that patent protection may not be essen-
tial, is based upon the industry-specific analysis, 
and, more particularly, whether companies need to 
recoup up-front research and development costs.118  
So, by Carrier’s approach, patents are not needed 
when a product is easy to create or difficult to imitate 
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because substantial expenditures were not put into 
its creation or it is naturally difficult to imitate.119  In 
such situations, he argues that competition, not pa-
tent protection, is essential for innovation.120 
The next stage of analysis focuses on the ex 
post factor.  Here the courts should analyze the “cu-
mulative nature of innovation in the industry.”121  
The term “cumulative industry” refers to an industry 
producing products that are continuously improved 
and innovated upon.122  Products in cumulative in-
dustries usually consist of those that have a newly 
innovated feature combined with already existing in-
ventions.  Thus, a danger arises in this type of indus-
try where a patent is issued and subsequent innova-
tions are stifled.123 
Another inverse relationship exists here be-
tween patent and antitrust law: this particular type 
of industry may benefit from antitrust law which 
would possibly lead to an increase in innovation due 
to the cumulative effect of competitors “one-upping” 
each other.124  Carrier argues that antitrust laws 
should play a greater role in industries that innovate 
off of predecessors’ inventions.125  The Common De-
nominator test’s rebuttal applies only when “both ex 
ante and ex post factors favor competition.”126 
After analyzing the rebuttal, the court may 
find that innovation will best be supported through a 
competitive market that is enhanced by antitrust 
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law; but, just because a patentee is involved in a cer-
tain industry does not suggest that he should be au-
tomatically liable for an infraction of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.127  After a successfully proven rebut-
tal, the Common Denominator Test allows for a sur-
rebuttal.128  The surrebuttal simply requires that the 
patentee provide actual evidence that the industry is 
distinguishable as one that is innovative, thus con-
fining this test only to industries that are discernibly 
non-innovative.129 
After the Common Denominator Test’s pre-
sumption, rebuttal, and surrebuttal have been ap-
plied, and there is any question as to whether they 
are applicable to the perceived antitrust activity, the 
default assumption is that the action is lawful.130  
Carrier explains that the Common Denominator Test 
should not apply to section 2 of the Sherman Act to 
industries that innovate through both patents and 
competition; the pharmaceutical industry fits this 
description.131 
 
B. Applying the Common Denominator Test to 
the D’677 Patent 
First, in the case of the D’677 patent, the 
courts would begin with their initial presumption: 
the patentee’s actions are lawful as long as he can 
provide an objectively plausible justification for his 
                                                             
127 Id. at 833. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 834 n.314 (noting that “some true (i.e., nonsham) 
innovation is enough” and that the lack of innovation should be 
apparent if a market is not benefiting from new and improved 
products). 
130 Id. at 832. 
131 Id. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
The Patent Reform Debate 
352 
actions.132  Suppose that the patentee brings a patent 
infringement suit against a competitor because the 
competitor is producing and selling a smartphone 
with a rectangular-shaped screen and rounded cor-
ners, thus enforcing the D’677 design patent.  Coun-
tering the claim, the alleged infringer may pinpoint 
one of the patentee’s actions and argue that it consti-
tutes anticompetitive behavior.  If the court accepts 
the patentee’s justification as plausible, then the 
competitor may offer a rebuttal.133 
The alleged infringer’s rebuttal will take into 
account the type of industry that is involved by going 
through the Common Denominator test’s ex ante and 
ex post factors.134  First, the alleged infringer will 
need to establish that there are market-based non-
patent incentives for the patentee to innovate.135  In 
this scenario, the patentee was the market pioneer 
who designed the rectangular smartphone with 
rounded corners, so he had the early accessibility to 
the market in order to establish customer familiarity, 
brand loyalty, or cost advantages such as favorable 
contracts with distributors.  These would certainly 
constitute market-based non-patent incentives to in-
novate.136  The rebuttal also requires that the com-
petitor prove at least one of the two remaining ex 
ante factors.137 
The two remaining ex ante factors are whether 
the product is easy to create and whether it is diffi-
cult to imitate.  Considering the D’677 patent’s de-
scription, the court would have to inquire into the 
                                                             
132 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra notes 50, 96-98 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra note 51 and Part V.A. 
135 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text. 
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level of difficulty in inventing a smartphone with a 
highly-polished rectangular screen and rounded cor-
ners.  Certainly a sophisticated technology company 
will hire expert designers and engineers to devise an 
optimal product, but the D’677 patent reveals no 
greater skill than “that exercised by the ordinary de-
signer who is chargeable with knowledge of the prior 
art.”138  The costs of developing the D’677 patent are 
presumably microscopic compared to the costs of re-
searching and developing in a field such as pharma-
ceuticals.  In terms of the difficulty to imitate the 
D’677 patent, as shown by the competitor’s actions, 
there would be very little difficulty in copying the 
general smartphone design.  Therefore, because the 
patent would be easy to copy, the only two successful-
ly rebutted ex ante factors would be that there are 
market-based non-patent incentives to innovate and 
that the patented product was relatively easy to cre-
ate.  Fulfilling two of the three ex ante factors satis-
fies the ex ante requirement, but the ex post require-
ment still remains.139 
Courts must consider, for the ex post require-
ment, whether the industry innovation comes about 
in a cumulative manner.140  The smartphone, and 
technology industry in general, is very innovative.  
New products are constantly being released.  But, in 
terms of cumulative technology, design features like 
the D’677 patent are not the result of cumulative 
technology.  The D’677 patent protects a unique de-
sign feature which was developed independently by 
Apple designers.  Perhaps the D’677 patent is similar 
                                                             
138 Gen. Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., 165 F.2d 
853, 854 (2d Cir. 1948). 
139 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
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to the design of the original iPhone that was released 
in 2007, but in August 2012, a jury even confirmed 
that the D’677 design was not copied from a previ-
ously released Samsung tablet, as Samsung had ar-
gued.141  The design patents of the smartphone in-
dustry, including the D’677 patent, are not created 
through cumulative innovation.  Because the D’677 
patent is not brought about through cumulative in-
novation, the ex post factor is not met. 
According to Carrier’s framework, failure to 
meet the ex post factor is sufficient enough to end the 
analysis in favor of the patentee.142  In other words, 
in the case of the D’677 patent, the analysis would 
not even go as far as the surrebuttal stage.  Fur-
thermore, the ex ante requirements do not appear to 
be well-suited in the case of design patents.  Relative 
to other patented inventions, design patents are 
nearly always easy to create and easy to copy.  It ap-
pears that, in the case of the D’677 patent, the Com-
mon Denominator test fails to institute any substan-
tive antitrust claim for the allegedly infringing par-
ties. 
 
C. Applying the Common Denominator Test to 
the ’381 Patent 
Suppose that the patentee brings a patent in-
fringement suit against a competitor because the 
competitor is producing and selling a smartphone 
that has a bounce-back feature similar to that de-
scribed in the ’381 patent.  Applying the Common 
Denominator test to the ’381 patent begins with the 
same presumption that the patentee’s actions are 
                                                             
141 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK 2012 WL 4078433 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012). 
142 Carrier, supra note 38, at 832. 
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lawful as long as he can provide an objectively plau-
sible justification for his actions.143  The patentee 
would be bringing his lawsuit to enforce the protec-
tions granted by the ’381 utility patent.  Countering 
the claim, the alleged infringer may pinpoint one of 
the patentee’s acts and argue that it constitutes anti-
competitive behavior.  If the court accepts the pa-
tentee’s justification as plausible, then the alleged 
infringer may offer a rebuttal.144 
In determining the ex ante factors, there are 
the same market-based non-patent incentives for the 
’381 patent to innovate as existed with the D’677 pa-
tent (e.g., customer familiarity, brand loyalty and 
cost advantages).145  The next two factors to deter-
mine are whether the ’381 patent was easy to create 
and difficult to imitate.146  In terms of the degree of 
difficulty in creating the ’381 patent, it is certainly 
more difficult to develop than the D’677 patent, but 
not too difficult to create by Carrier’s standards.147 
By Carrier’s standards, difficulty in creation is 
essentially measured by time and capital invest-
ments into research and development; the ’381 pa-
tent would fall into Carrier’s “simple ideas easily 
conceived” category.148  He contrasts inventions in 
the technological realm, such as the ’381 patent, with 
the pharmaceutical industry, which requires much 
                                                             
143 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 50, 96-98 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text. 
146 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. 
148 Carrier, supra note 38, at 826 (arguing that patents are 
not necessary in industries such as internet business methods, 
civilian aircraft, semiconductors, office equipment, motor 
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more time and capital investment for research and 
development.149  The ’381 patent would not be diffi-
cult to create by the Common Denominator test’s 
standards.  In terms of difficulty to imitate, it is not 
clear what a court would determine in this category.  
Creating the bounce-back feature was relatively easy 
for the patentee, so it would presumably be not too 
difficult for a competitor to imitate.150  Even though 
the ’381 patent would be relatively easy to imitate, it 
would still be more difficult than imitating the D’677 
patent or any other design patent.  Therefore, the 
’381 patent would be, by Carrier’s standard, easy to 
create and moderately difficult to imitate. 
The ’381 patent protects a smartphone feature, 
the bounce-back, which exhibits the industry’s new-
est utility innovations.  The historical chain of inno-
vation leading to smartphones started with “land-
line” telephones, then rudimentary mobile tele-
phones were invented and the modern cellular tele-
phone was based upon that technology.  Less com-
plex cellular phones were continuously innovated 
upon until all of the available technology was finally 
compiled into the first modern smartphone.  Innova-
tions for the more rudimentary cellular phones led to 
smartphone technology.  With smartphone technolo-
gy came the innovation of features such as document 
readers; the bounce-back utility was subsequently 
innovated to compliment these new features.151 
The courts would likely recognize that the 
                                                             
149 Id. 
150 Difficulty in creating the bounce-back feature is being 
compared to the difficulty of creation in other fields such as 
pharmaceuticals and complex engineering. 
151 The Evolution of the Mobile Phone, ENG’R’S F. MAG. (Nov. 
6, 2013), http://www.ef.org.vt.edu/2013/11/the-evolution-of-the-
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technology, communications, and smartphone indus-
tries, in their present states, are the result of contin-
uous cumulative innovation.  These products are 
quickly outdated by newer models and designs that 
have innovated from previous designs.  The cumula-
tive nature of the smartphone industry satisfies the 
Common Denominator’s rebuttal, thus allowing for a 
surrebuttal from the patentee.152 
A surrebuttal may be successfully made if the 
patentee demonstrates that his industry is inherent-
ly innovative.153  In this case, the ’381 patentee 
would have to provide actual evidence of innovation.   
Utility features in the smartphone market are con-
stantly being updated by new products that are ex-
ceedingly more innovative.  Undoubtedly, the 
smartphone market is inherently innovative, at least 
in terms of smartphone functionality, due to the ex-
tensive research and development of new products by 
technology firms.154  Because of the inherently inno-
vative nature of the smartphone industry, the pa-
tentee’s surrebuttal is satisfied and the ’381 patent 
will likely not lead to any antitrust liability. 
 
D. Applying the Common Denominator  
Test in General 
Carrier’s Common Denominator test would 
provide the industry-specific analysis that patents 
should receive, but have not in the past.  He argues 
                                                             
152 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
154 Dividend Kings, 4 Tech Giants Ready To Surge On 
Smartphones, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:28 AM), 
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that this test would not have any more than a minor 
impact on patent-based incentives in markets where 
they should be present.155  The Common Denomina-
tor test allows patents to remain valid even after a 
patentee has faced antitrust litigation because the 
test is just designed to provide an antitrust remedy 
when patents are used in anticompetitive ways.156  
Carrier also argues that this test is only applicable to 
monopolists, i.e., companies with at least a sixty to 
seventy percent market share; other patentees, with 
smaller market shares, lack the ability to exercise 
control over markets.157 
This test may be making an unfounded logical 
leap towards antitrust liability when there is a more 
simple solution.  With the Common Denominator test 
there are two extremes: one where all patentee 
actions are lawful and the other, where patentee 
actions are subject to antitrust liability.  This quick 
jump to enforce a patent or antitrust law ignores the 
middle ground where patents are still valid in 
industries in which patents stifle innovation.   
Carrier’s test already determines whether 
patent protection is essential in an industry; this is 
why it should be applied only to determine whether 
patent protection should be continued on any 
particular utility patent.  Instead of protection being 
afforded to competitors only by means of antitrust 
litigation, if the Common Denominator test stripped 
patent protection after its analysis, a lack of patent 
protection would spur innovation in markets where 
patent protection was neither necessary nor 
beneficial to begin with.  Finally, if patent protection 
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is removed and patentees were to behave in an 
anticompetitive manner, then, the antitrust laws will 
apply regularly to remedy that problem.  
The Common Denominator test certainly has 
much to offer in today’s patent market.  Recognizing 
that “innovation takes place through different paths 
in different industries” is a good first step in modern-
izing the patent system.158  The Common Denomina-
tor test also takes into consideration essential ele-
ments of innovation such as market-based incen-
tives, the ease of creating, the difficulty of imitating, 
and markets that are cumulative in their innova-
tion.159  Because of these ex ante factors, the Common 
Denominator test is much better suited for utility pa-
tents rather than design patents. 
 
VI. COPYRIGHTS AND THE D’677 PATENT 
Daniel H. Brean, in Enough Is Enough: Time 
to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More Ap-
propriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for 
Product Designs, argues that design patents should 
be phased out by copyrights;  copyrights will “protect 
designs through copyright law to the extent that they 
are artistic.”160  In analyzing the possibility of copy-
right protection, it is important to distinguish be-
tween functional and nonfunctional features on 
commercial products.  This Part examines the possi-
bility of taking the artistic design from the D’677 pa-
tent and protecting it with a copyright, rather than a 
design patent. 
To begin with, would the D’677 design be cop-
yrightable?  It is a sculptural work that is capable of 
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being both perceived and reproduced, so the D’677 
design is appropriate copyright subject matter.161  
The design, albeit minimalistic, is creative, original, 
and nonfunctional.  If the smartphone designer no-
tices that a competitor has copied his design, and 
that design is substantially similar, he may then en-
force his copyright. 
In order to prove a fair use defense, the al-
leged copyright infringer would need to demonstrate 
that his smartphone design was transformative.162  
The four factors that the court uses to determine the 
design’s fair use (i.e., its purpose and character, its 
nature, the substantiality of the portion used and the 
effect of the use upon the potential market) would 
weigh against the alleged infringer.163  But, the more 
that he can show that his product is transformative, 
the less weight that the four fair use factors will car-
ry.164  Assuming that the D’677 design was imple-
mented in another smartphone, the determination as 
to how transformative the subsequent design is will 
determine whether the alleged infringer will be lia-
ble.  If the design were to be taken with almost no 
changes, and the alleged infringer sold its product 
commercially, the courts would be likely to find lia-
bility for a copyright breach.165  But, if the general 
square shape was taken and improved upon, to the 
extent that the court finds it transformative, the al-
leged infringer will only have exercised fair use of 
the copyrighted design.166 
Replacing design patents with copyright pro-
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tection would provide a solution to many of today’s 
issues regarding design patent litigation.  Inventors 
of truly original and creative designs would receive 
even more stringent protection (70 years after the 
designer’s death)167 than they previously would have 
under design patents (20 years after patent is grant-
ed).168  As mentioned earlier, Samsung’s counsel 
complained that Apple was claiming its monopoly on 
rectangles with rounded corners: with this copyright 
analysis, Samsung would have been able to argue a 
fair use defense.  Whether their product was trans-
formative enough for the defense to be effective, 
would have been a factual determination for the 
court. 
This analysis, inquiring into how transforma-
tive a design is, adds incentives for competitors to 
create new design features, therefore leading to more 
innovative products.  Transitioning towards copy-
right law would be a fair approach to allow future 
innovators to take already existing ideas and inno-
vate off of them, and if they were to copy, then copy-
right owners would have protection extending for a 
longer period than that granted by patents. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In order to optimize innovative consumer 
products, patent, antitrust, and copyright law must 
be reconciled to a certain extent.  Patents encourage 
innovation, but at the expense of competition.  
Antitrust law encourages competition, but unbridled 
competition could lead to a market that takes away 
incentives from innovators. 
                                                             
167 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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The scope test169 provides a stronger patent 
regimen, while the intent test170 shifts the scale more 
towards antitrust law.  The Common Denominator 
test,171 very wisely, takes into consideration the type 
of industry involved.  The Common Denominator is a 
good test that should be considered in future patent 
litigation, but only to the extent of determining 
whether patent protection should be continued.  
Carrier’s test overlooks the possibility that 
sometimes eliminating patents could spur 
innovation, without even entering into consideration 
of antitrust law. 
Copyright protection, giving protection to true 
artistic designs with a reasonable fair use defense, 
provides a good alternative to design patents.  In the 
future, if courts were to apply the Common Denomi-
nator test and remove utility patent protection in 
warranted situations, consumers would likely receive 
the same innovative products at more competitive 
prices.  Finally, these benefits to the consumer would 
also exist if, like Brean argued, courts were to transi-
tion design patent protection more towards copyright 
protection.172   
In the future courts can increase consumer 
welfare by loosening some of the legal monopolies 
created by utility patents through an industry-
specific analysis, and by simplifying the dilemma in-
volved with design patents by phasing them out in 
favor of copyright protection. 
                                                             
169 See supra Part IV.A. 
170 See supra Part IV.B. 
171 See supra Part IV.C and Part V.A. 
172 See supra Part VI. 
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Abstract 
 With the simple click of a button, anyone can 
copy an image from one place and paste it to another.  
What some people do not realize is that these actions 
could have them one click away from copyright in-
fringement.  Advancements in technology have made 
it easier for Internet users to infringe on the rights of 
copyright owners.  Many popular websites, such as 
YouTube and Facebook, have seen the dangers of al-
lowing users to upload videos and images onto their 
websites.  However, one popular website has not yet 
seen the wrath of copyright owners.  This Article 
looks at the rights copyright owners have in the 
realm of Pinterest.  Specifically, this Article analyzes 
how a court would rule on a case of copyright in-
fringement involving Pinterest and the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (or the DMCA), with an em-
phasis on the safe harbor provision within the 
DMCA.  This Article predicts what a court might do 
if it were presented with a copyright infringement 
claim against Pinterest.  Finally, this Article con-
cludes with a look into the future of Pinterest copy-
right law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After months and months of trial and error, a 
mother of three finally perfected a recipe for a 
healthy and low-calorie dessert.  Excited about her 
accomplishment, she enthusiastically wrote about it 
on her “Guilt-Free Eating” blog, in which she often 
blogs about the ability to eat foods most women shy 
away from due to high caloric content.  A month lat-
er, a reader of her blog posted the recipe on Pinter-
est.  This Pinterest user “pinned” the recipe on her 
“Delectable Desserts” board.  Within a week the post 
had 140 “re-pins” and 57 likes.  Within a year, this 
same recipe had been branded as “Skinny Girl Des-
serts” and was being sold in grocery stores across the 
country.  It was not until the mother was at a 
friend’s house and saw what resembled her dessert 
on the front of a “Skinny Girl Desserts” box that she 
realized someone had stolen her idea. 
Years of sweat-drenching workouts and mus-
cle-draining lifts finally paid off for a physical trainer 
as he developed a work-out program incorporating 
interval cardio, weight lifting, and circuit training 
that led to amazing results.  After using the program 
on his clients for a year and seeing the anticipated 
changes and results, he finally felt confident that he 
could create a fitness video to sell on the market.  
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However, before he could take these steps, one com-
mercial virtually stole this dream away from him.  A 
workout video called Circuit Plus was nearly identi-
cal to the workout he created a year ago.  A few 
weeks later he overheard a group of people at the 
gym discussing how Circuit Plus was just like some-
thing they had seen posted on Pinterest eight months 
ago. 
Experiences and life lessons helped one musi-
cally inclined artist to compose lyrics that were wor-
thy of song development.  Along with other songs he 
had written, he posted these lyrics on his Music 
Shaped Me webpage.  With the help of his father, al-
so a lawyer, this artist took the steps to copyright his 
lyrics, but made no mention of this on his webpage.  
His webpage is available for anyone to see who navi-
gates on the Internet.  It wasn’t long until portions of 
his lyrics ended up in cursive letters with a decora-
tive background and graphic designs on the boards of 
many Pinterest users.  Even though he had no idea 
his work had made its way to Pinterest, he was oddly 
aware his work had made its way to the radio in a 
new hit song crafted by a fresh artist in the business.  
Not to his surprise, his name was not mentioned be-
fore or after the song played. 
Given the current structure of copyright law, 
only one of the three previously listed individuals 
might be protected and have a claim for copyright 
infringement.  Because the music artist took the 
steps to own the legal rights to his lyrics, he is pro-
tected from copyright infringement.  While he has a 
right to sue someone, who is liable for using his copy-
righted lyrics as their own?  Pinterest for allowing it 
to be posted on someone’s board?  The Pinterest 
member who reposted the lyrics?  Or the person who 
took those lyrics and made a top hit with them? 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Pinning Your Way to Copyright Infringement 
367 
This Article looks at the rights of copyright 
owners in the realm of Pinterest.  Specifically, this 
Article analyzes how a court would rule on a case of 
copyright infringement involving Pinterest, as no 
such cases have reached the court system.  Part I 
outlines the history of Pinterest and discusses Pin-
terest’s copyright policies and terms of use.  Part II 
summarizes the Copyright Act and the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), with an emphasis 
on the safe harbor provision within the DMCA.  Part 
III predicts what a court might do if it were present-
ed with a copyright infringement claim against Pin-
terest.  Finally, this Article will conclude with a look 
into the future of Pinterest copyright law. 
 
I. HISTORY OF PINTEREST & PINTEREST’S 
COPYRIGHT POLICIES & TERMS OF USE 
Pinterest was launched in March 2010 by Ben 
Silbermann, Paul Sciarra and Evan Sharp.1  Ben Sil-
bermann’s love for collecting tangible objects led to 
the development of a website that would allow others 
to virtually collect ideas and more in one virtual 
place.2  Pinterest had a slow start, but as of July 
2013, it had reached almost 70 million users.3  Users 
have come to enjoy the virtual ability to scrapbook 
images that link to ideas and crafts. 
                                                             
1 Adam Belz, Pinterest Stands Out in Crowded Social Media 
Field, USA TODAY (Oct. 28, 2011, 4:11 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-10-
28/pinterest-Ben-Silbermann/50979542/1. 
2 Id. 
3 Craig Smith, (April 2014) By the Numbers: 65 Amazing 
Pinterest Statistics, DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS (Mar 4, 
2014), http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/pinterest-
stats/#.U34WYCijO3Q. 
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Pinterest allows users to “pin” or “re-pin” im-
ages found on the web or on another user’s Pinterest 
boards.  A pin can either be an image or a video from 
another website or uploaded by the user.  Pinterest 
users can categorize their pins into different boards 
such as “food,” “crafts,” “wedding ideas,” and much 
more.  Pinterest users can find recipes, workouts, 
craft ideas, quotes, and photographs of countless ob-
jects, people, and places.  Comparable to other social 
networks, a Pinterest user can follow others, share 
their pins, like pins, and make comments on pins.  
The Pinterest homepage gives updates to users as to 
what their followed accounts are pinning.  Finally, a 
Pinterest user can re-pin what others have on their 
boards, automatically adding the pin to one of the re-
pinner’s boards.  When something is re-pinned, credit 
is given to the person who first pinned the image or 
video.  While a Pinterest user cannot edit the image 
or remove the source link,4 a user can edit or add to 
the description of the image or video.  
When 80% of images or videos pinned on Pin-
terest are re-pins,5 it is no surprise that copyright 
infringements issues are just a pin away.  However, 
before a user can start using Pinterest, he must 
agree to abide by the Terms and Services and the 
Privacy Policy. It is important to understand the 
Terms and Services before analyzing whether a 
plaintiff has a cause of action or if they have relin-
                                                             
4 A source link is a link to the page from which the pin came 
from.  For example, if a picture was taken from someone’ s blog, 
then the link to that blog would remain with the image every 
time it was pinned. 
5 Craig Smith, (April 2013) By the Numbers: Some Amazing 
Pinterest Stats, PINTEREST INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2013, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.pinterestinsider.com/2013/04/april-2013-by-
numbers-some-amazing.html.  
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quished or waived any rights by using Pinterest.  
The Terms and Services reads as follows: 
 
Pinterest’s products and services are pro-
vided by Pinterest, Inc.  These Terms of 
Service (“Terms”) govern your access to and 
use of Pinterest’s website, products, and 
services (“Products”). Please read these 
Terms carefully, and contact us if you have 
any questions. By accessing or using our 
Products, you agree to be bound by these 
Terms and by our Privacy Policy. 
 
1. Using Pinterest 
 
a. Who can use Pinterest 
 
You may use our Products only if you can 
form a binding contract with Pinterest, and 
only in compliance with these Terms and all 
applicable laws.  When you create your Pin-
terest account, you must provide us with 
accurate and complete information.  Any 
use or access by anyone under the age of 13 
is prohibited.  If you open an account on be-
half of a company, organization, or other 
entity, then (a) “you” includes you and that 
entity, and (b) you represent and warrant 
that you are authorized to grant all permis-
sions and licenses provided in these Terms 
and bind the entity to these Terms, and 
that you agree to these Terms on the enti-
ty’s behalf.  Some of our Products may be 
software that is downloaded to your com-
puter, phone, tablet, or other device. You 
agree that we may automatically upgrade 
those Products, and these Terms will apply 
to such upgrades.  
. . .  
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c. Commercial use of Pinterest 
 
If you want to use our Products for commer-
cial purposes you must create a business 
account and agree to our Business Terms of 
Service. 
 
2. Your Content 
 
a. Posting content 
 
Pinterest allows you to post content, includ-
ing photos, comments, and other materials.  
Anything that you post or otherwise make 
available on our Products is referred to as 
“User Content.”  You retain all rights in, 
and are solely responsible for, the User 
Content you post to Pinterest. 
 
b. How Pinterest and other users can use 
your content 
 
You grant Pinterest and its users a non-
exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, subli-
censable, worldwide license to use, store, 
display, reproduce, re-pin, modify, create 
derivative works, perform, and distribute 
your User Content on Pinterest solely for 
the purposes of operating, developing, 
providing, and using the Pinterest Prod-
ucts.  Nothing in these Terms shall restrict 
other legal rights Pinterest may have to 
User Content, for example under other li-
censes.  We reserve the right to remove or 
modify User Content for any reason, includ-
ing User Content that we believe violates 
these Terms or our policies. 
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c. How long we keep your content 
 
Following termination or deactivation of 
your account, or if you remove any User 
Content from Pinterest, we may retain your 
User Content for a commercially reasonable 
period of time for backup, archival, or audit 
purposes.  Furthermore, Pinterest and its 
users may retain and continue to use, store, 
display, reproduce, re-pin, modify, create 
derivative works, perform, and distribute 
any of your User Content that other users 
have stored or shared through Pinterest.6 
 
The policy outlines who can use Pinterest, 
what rights one has as a user, and what can be done 
with one’s content.  The website also rewords the pol-
icy more simply on the right side of the page so users 
are not confused by the legal language used in the 
policy: “If you post your content on Pinterest, it still 
belongs to you but we can show it to people and oth-
ers can re-pin it. . . .Copies of content shared with 
others may remain even after you delete the content 
from your account. . . .  We respect copyrights. You 
should, too.”7 
Pinterest policies are aimed at protecting itself 
and informing its users on how to protect themselves 
as well.  It emphasizes the importance of copyright 
issues.  Pinterest’s copyright policy is listed on its 
webpage and reads: 
 
Pinterest (“Pinterest”) respects the intellec-
tual property rights of others and expects 
                                                             
6 Terms of Service, PINTEREST, 
http://about.pinterest.com/en/terms-service (last visited May 22, 
2014). 
7Id.   
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its users to do the same.  It is Pinterest’s 
policy, in appropriate circumstances and at 
its discretion, to disable and/or terminate 
the accounts of users who repeatedly in-
fringe or are repeatedly charged with in-
fringing the copyrights or other intellectual 
property rights of others. 
 
In accordance with the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998, the text of which 
may be found on the U.S. Copyright Office 
website at 
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.p
df, Pinterest will respond expeditiously to 
claims of copyright infringement committed 
using the Pinterest website (the “Site”) that 
are reported to Pinterest’s Designated Cop-
yright Agent, identified in the sample notice 
below.8 
 
After detailing the copyright policy, Pinterest 
also outlines what rights a copyright owner has and 
what steps he should take in order have the copy-
right infringement taken care of:  
 
If you are a copyright owner, or are au-
thorized to act on behalf of one, or au-
thorized to act under any exclusive right 
under copyright, please report alleged 
copyright infringements taking place on 
or through the Site by completing the 
following DMCA Notice of Alleged In-
fringement and delivering it to Pinter-
est’s Designated Copyright Agent.  Up-
                                                             
8 Copyright, PINTEREST, 
http://about.pinterest.com/en/copyright (last visited May 22, 
2014). 
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on receipt of the Notice as described be-
low, Pinterest will take whatever action, 
in its sole discretion, it deems appropri-
ate, including removal of the challenged 
material from the Site.  DMCA Notice of 
Alleged Infringement (“Notice”).9 
                                                             
9 The steps a copyright owner should take are listed below: 
 
1. Identify the copyrighted work that you claim 
has been infringed, or - if multiple 
copyrighted works are covered by this 
Notice - you may provide a representative 
list of the copyrighted works that you claim 
have been infringed. 
2. Identify (i) the material that you claim is 
infringing (or to be the subject of infringing 
activity) and that is to be removed or access 
to which is to be disabled, and information 
reasonably sufficient to permit us to locate 
the material, including at a minimum, if 
applicable, the URL of the link shown on the 
Site where such material may be found, and 
(ii) the reference or link, to the material or 
activity that you claim to be infringing, that 
is to be removed or access to which is to be 
disabled, and information reasonably 
sufficient to permit us to locate that 
reference or link, including at a minimum, if 
applicable, the URL of the link shown on the 
Site where such reference or link may be 
found. 
3. Provide your mailing address, telephone 
number, and, if available, email address. 
4. Include both of the following statements in 
the body of the Notice: 
“I hereby state that I have a good faith belief 
that the disputed use of the copyrighted 
material or reference or link to such 
material is not authorized by the copyright 
owner, its agent, or the law (e.g., as a fair 
use).” 
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Pinterest takes more steps by outlining what a 
Pinterest user should do if they receive a copyright 
complaint and how to file a counter-notice.10As one 
last preventive measure, Pinterest also has a page 
for rights of trademark owners.11  Pinterest has cre-
ated policies for its own  protection,  and to assist  
individuals in protecting themselves from claims of 
                                                                                                                             
“I hereby state that the information in this 
Notice is accurate and, under penalty of 
perjury, that I am the owner, or authorized 
to act on behalf of the owner, of the 
copyright or of an exclusive right under the 
copyright that is allegedly infringed.” 
5. Provide your full legal name and your 
electronic or physical signature. 
 
Deliver this Notice, with all items completed, to 
Pinterest’s Designated Copyright Agent . . . . 
 
Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Trademark, PINTEREST, 
http://about.pinterest.com/en/trademark (last accessed May 22, 
2014). 
 
Pinterest respects the trademark rights of 
others. Accounts with usernames, Pin Board 
names, or any other content that misleads 
others or violates another’s trademark may be 
updated, transferred or permanently suspended. 
If you are concerned that someone may be using 
your trademark in an infringing way on our site 
you can let us know by completing the form 
below. Pinterest will review your submission 
and take whatever action, in its sole discretion, 
it deems appropriate, including temporary or 
permanent removal of the trademark from the 
Pinterest site. 
 
Id. 
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copyright infringement.  However, even with these 
precautionary guidelines, Pinterest and individual 
users may still find themselves in legal trouble.  
What happens if Pinterest fails to remove an image 
after being informed by the copyright owner that its 
image was being reproduced without his permission?  
What happens if a Pinterest user somehow benefits 
from a copyrighted image?  Both the Copyright Act 
and the DMCA will guide the analysis of these poten-
tial legal issues.  
 
II. CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
A. Copyright Act 
The Copyright Act of 1976 was created to 
grant copyright holders a set of exclusive rights to 
their works.12  Included in this set of rights is the 
right to “reproduce, perform publicly, display public-
ly, prepare derivative works of, and distribute copies 
of” the protected work.13  Without such a collective 
set of rights, people would be discouraged from creat-
ing new works.  Affording for this, the “principle 
purpose of the [Copyright Act] is to encourage the 
origination of creative works by attaching enforcea-
ble property rights to them.”14  The Act not only out-
lines the rights of copyright owners, but also 
 
provides the owner of a copyright with a po-
tent arsenal of remedies against an infring-
er of his work, including an injunction to 
                                                             
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
13 Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 
2010); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).  
14 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 240 F.3d 
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Diamond v. Am-Law Publ’g 
Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original). 
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restrain the infringer from violating his 
rights, the impoundment and destruction of 
all reproductions of his work made in viola-
tion of his rights, and a recovery of his ac-
tual damages and any additional profits re-
alized by the infringer or a recovery of stat-
utory damages, and attorney fees.15 
 
However, a copyright owner cannot successful-
ly prevail on a copyright claim by just stating his 
work has been infringed.  In order to prevail on a 
copyright infringement claim, “two elements must be 
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) 
copying of constituent elements of the work that are 
original.”16  Ownership alone, however, is only prima 
facie evidence of both valid ownership and originali-
ty.17  While copyright owners are granted a set of 
rights and can sue infringers, “liability is excused 
where the defendant demonstrates that he made ‘fair 
use’ of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.”18 
Section 102 of the Copyright Act outlines the 
extent of copyright protection to “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
                                                             
15 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 433-34 (1984). 
16 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991). 
17 Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, 691 F.3d 
182, 186 (2d Cir. 2012). 
18 Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. 
Supp. 2d 537, 550  (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The availability of a fair 
use defense permits courts to avoid the ‘rigid application of the 
copyright statute’ when ‘it would stifle the very creativity which 
the law is designed to foster.’”) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)). 
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cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”19  The Act defines “works of authorship” as 
any of the following: “(1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including accompanying words; (3) dramatic 
works, including accompanying music; (4) panto-
mimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graph-
ic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and oth-
er audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) 
architectural works.”20  Section 302 of the Act allows 
for a lengthy protection for copyright owners as it 
gives them “a term consisting of the life of the author 
and seventy years after the author’s death.”21  Final-
ly, the Act also outlines how to transfer a copyright 
and the process for registration of original works.22 
 
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
In order to provide protections to copyright 
owners even more so than what the Copyright Act of 
1976 provides, additional copyright laws have been 
crafted to provide owners exclusive rights to their 
material.23  Given the quick and expansive techno-
logical advances with regard to the Internet, copy-
right infringement has increased with just the click 
of a button.  Internet users are now able to upload 
content to webpages very easily and infringers can 
copyright this material just as easily. 
                                                             
19 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
20 Id. 
21 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
22 17 U.S.C. §§ 205,  411 (2012).  
23 It is important to note that  “[t]he DMCA did not simply 
rewrite copyright law for the on-line world… [and that] [c]laims 
against service providers for direct, contributory, or vicarious 
copyright infringement, therefore, are generally evaluated just 
as they would be in the non-online world.”  Ellison v. Robertson, 
357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ellison v. 
Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) to further outline the 
rights and protections copyright owners deserve.  
One of the main purposes of the DMCA is to “facili-
tate the robust development and world-wide expan-
sion of electronic commerce, communications, re-
search, development, and education in the digital 
age.”24  Another purpose of the Act was to create pro-
tection from liability for Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”).25  Congress has taken steps to keep up with 
the fast-paced changes in technology, and the legisla-
tive history of the DMCA explains why this statue is 
necessary to keep up with these changes: “With this 
constant evolution in technology, the law must adapt 
in order to make digital networks safe places to dis-
seminate and exploit copyrighted materials.”26 
The DMCA is divided into five sections.  Title 
II of the Act is designed to protect ISPs from liability 
of copyright infringement.  However, the DMCA was 
also designed to protect copyright owners at the 
same time.  Copyright owners can still sue users who 
upload copyrighted material, but under the safe har-
bor provision, ISPs are not liable for detecting the 
infringement on their websites. 
Within the DMCA, Congress passed the 
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act (“OCILLA”) to deal with the copyright issues 
found on the Internet.27  More specifically, the Ninth 
                                                             
24 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998). 
25 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 17 U.S.C.). 
26 S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 2 (1998). 
27 See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512). 
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Circuit stated that “[d]ifficult and controversial ques-
tions of copyright liability in the online world 
prompted Congress to enact Title II of the DMCA, 
the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limita-
tion Act (OCILLA) [(safe harbor provision]).”28  The 
DMCA is crafted so that ISPs are not held liable for 
the actions of their users.  The Act protects both pri-
mary and secondary providers as long as the ISP did 
not play a role in posting the infringing material.29 
Section 512(k)(1) helps courts understand 
what an ISP is by defining both a narrow definition 
connected to § 512(a) and a broader definition that 
applies to all of § 512.30  Both types provide protec-
                                                             
28 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 
718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (second alteration in 
original).  The Ninth Circuit looked to legislative intent for 
support and found that “Congress decided that ‘by limiting 
[service providers’] liability,’ it would ‘ensure[ ] that the 
efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the 
variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to 
expand.’”  Id. (alterations in original). 
29 Carl E. Brody, Jr., Catch the Tiger by the Tail: Counseling 
the Burgeoning Government Use of Internet Media, 83 FLA. B.J., 
Dec. 2009, at 52, available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/007
41B654A2BF05F8525767E006FC561 (defining a primary 
provider as “an ISP that creates a Web site that interacts with 
the public and allows public comment or posting, whereas 
secondary providers use outside Web providers, such as 
Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter, in order to network”). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2012). 
(1) Service provider. 
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term 
“service provider” means an entity offering 
the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online 
communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s 
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tion when a user posts potentially infringing content 
without modification of the content by the ISP.31  
“The intent is to allow providers protection from the 
misdeeds of others in order to foster the free and 
open and exchange of information on the Internet.”32  
The DMCA is aimed at placing the blame on the per-
son who is actually responsible for copyright in-
fringement, not the ISP for providing the arena to do 
so.  Some courts have recognized that Congress made 
a policy decision that the “DMCA notification proce-
dures [would] place the burden of policing copyright 
infringement – identifying the potentially infringing 
material and adequately documenting infringement 
– squarely on the owners of the copyright.”33  After 
parsing through the statute, the Ninth Circuit de-
clined to shift this burden to the ISP from the copy-
right owner.34 
 In order to receive the protections of the safe 
harbor provision, an ISP must meet specific require-
ments.  The Supreme Court of New York believes: 
 
[T]he thrust of the DMCA is to relieve In-
ternet service providers of the initial need 
                                                                                                                             
choosing, without modification to the content 
of the material as sent or received. 
(B) As used in this section, other than 
subsection (a), the term “service provider” 
means a provider of online services or 
network access, or the operator of facilities 
therefor, and includes an entity described in 
subparagraph (A). 
Id. 
31 Brody, supra note 29.  
32 Id. 
33 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
34 Id.  
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to ascertain the copyright status of the 
sound recordings that they make available, 
to place the burden of asserting copyright 
ownership on the owners of such copyrights, 
and to require the Internet service provid-
ers to “take down” infringing material, upon 
receipt of a valid notice of infringement.35 
 
Section 512(c) of the DMCA specifically 
outlines the requirements that a service 
provider must meet.  It provides in relevant 
part: 
 
(c) Information Residing on Systems or 
Networks At Direction of Users.— 
 
(1) In general.—A service provider shall 
not be liable for monetary relief, or, except 
as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive 
or other equitable relief, for infringement 
of copyright by reason of the storage at 
the direction of a user of material that re-
sides on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider, if 
the service provider— 
 
(A) 
(i) does not have actual knowledge 
that the material or an activity using 
the material on the system or network 
is infringing; 
 
(ii) in the absence of such actual 
knowledge, is not aware of facts or cir-
cumstances from which infringing ac-
                                                             
35 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc.,  948 
N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (Sup. Ct. 2012).  
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tivity is apparent; or 
 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to re-
move, or disable access to, the materi-
al; 
 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit 
directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service 
provider has the right and ability to con-
trol such activity; and 
 
(C) upon notification of claimed in-
fringement as described in paragraph 
(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the sub-
ject of infringing activity.36 
 
 In Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., the 
District Court for the Northern District of California 
outlined the requirements in their own words:  
 
[I]t must be a “service provider” and it must 
adopt, reasonably implement and inform 
subscribers of a policy providing that it 
may, in appropriate circumstances, termi-
nate the accounts of repeat infringers.  Fur-
ther, the service provider is obliged to ac-
commodate, and must not interfere with, 
“standard technical measures” used by cop-
yright owners to identify or protect copy-
righted works.37   
 
                                                             
36 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
37 Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 
1142-43 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citations omitted). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Pinning Your Way to Copyright Infringement 
383 
 The DMCA speaks on many requirements nec-
essary for the safe harbor provision, but fails to men-
tion what happens when an ISP encourages users to 
share illegal material.  In MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court held Grokster lia-
ble for doing just this.38  Even though Grokster may 
not have had specific knowledge of when a user did 
actually upload and share illegal material, it encour-
aged its users to share illegal material and the com-
pany could be found liable by a jury.39  The court ex-
plained, “one who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown 
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts 
of infringement by third parties.”40 
 Given the increasing use of the Internet over 
the past decade or two, copyright infringement 
claims have been finding their way to the courts 
more and more.  The courts have analyzed various 
issues within these copyright infringement claims, 
taking a careful look at the safe harbor provision 
found within the DMCA.  Some of these issues in-
clude the specific knowledge prong within the DMCA 
and the idea of lawful versus unlawful uses of Inter-
net websites.  The following subsections look at the 
case law that has developed over the past couple dec-
ades and the rules that have been created as innova-
tion creates new copyright infringement opportuni-
ties. 
 
1. Cases Involving the Safe Harbor Provision 
 Once a defendant proves that he has met all of 
                                                             
38 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
39 Id. at 924. 
40 Id. 
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the requirements of the safe harbor provision, he is 
protected from liability because the safe harbor pro-
vision is an affirmative defense.41  The Ninth Circuit 
has an abundance of cases dealing with copyright in-
fringement in our technologically growing world.  In 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC, the Ninth Circuit granted Veoh Networks par-
tial summary judgment “in a careful and comprehen-
sive decision holding that Veoh met all the § 512(c) 
requirements and thus was entitled to DMCA safe 
harbor protections.”42  The plaintiff, UMG Record-
ings Inc., did not dispute that Veoh removed the cop-
yrighted material from its webpage, but “filed suit 
against Veoh for direct, vicarious and contributory 
copyright infringement, and for inducement of in-
fringement.”43  UMG further alleged that “Veoh’s ef-
forts to prevent copyright infringement on its system 
were ‘too little too late’ because Veoh did not adopt 
filtering technology until ‘after Veoh harbored in-
fringing material for its own benefit[.]”44  Finally, 
UMG argued that Veoh only removed copyrighted 
material that was identified in the notice of in-
fringement.45  Nothing in the safe harbor provision 
requires that ISPs implement a system that detects 
and prevents copyright infringement or that it has to 
remove material that is not listed within a notice of 
copyright infringement.  Even though Veoh had cop-
yrighted material on its website, it was not found li-
able because it satisfied all four of the requirements 
                                                             
41 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 
718 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir.  2013). 
42 Id. at 1013. 
43 Id.   
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
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under § 512(c).46 
In Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.47 
the Court found that  
 
Section 512(m) is explicit: DMCA safe har-
bor protection cannot be conditioned on af-
firmative monitoring by a service provider. 
For that reason, § 512(m) is incompatible 
with a broad common law duty to monitor 
or otherwise seek out infringing activity 
based on general awareness that infringe-
ment may be occurring.48  
 
Instead, an ISP is only required to remove copyright-
ed information once it receives notice that its website 
contains copyrighted information.  As long as an ISP 
follows the requirements found in the safe harbor 
provision, it will be protected from liability.49 
 
a. Specific Knowledge 
The first requirement of the safe harbor provi-
sion is that the ISP: “(A)(i) does not have actual 
knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing.”50  
Courts have been reluctant to stray from a strict ap-
plication of this provision.  In Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme 
Court found that there was “no precedent in the law 
of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability” 
based on the fact that a defendant had “sold equip-
ment with constructive knowledge of the fact that 
                                                             
46 Id. 
47  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
48 Id. at 35. 
49 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  
50 17 U.S.C. § 512(A)(i). 
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their customers may use that equipment to make 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”51  The 
Ninth Circuit adapted the holding of Sony to the in-
ternet, and held  that “if a computer system operator 
learns of specific infringing material available on his 
system and fails to purge such material from the sys-
tem, the operator knows of and contributes to direct 
infringement,” however, “absent any specific infor-
mation which identifies infringing activity, a com-
puter system cannot be liable for contributory in-
fringement merely because the structure of the sys-
tem allows for the exchange of copyrighted materi-
al.”52 
 The Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to 
adjudicate several cases pertaining to copyright in-
fringement and the Internet.  In so doing, it has had 
the opportunity to establish its opinion on the pur-
pose of specific knowledge found in the safe harbor 
provision, and why it believes allowing a general 
knowledge of copyright infringement should not be a 
basis for liability. 
 
[I]f merely hosting material that falls with-
in a category of content capable of copyright 
protection, with the general knowledge that 
one’s services could be used to share unau-
thorized copies of copyrighted material, was 
sufficient to impute knowledge to service 
providers, the § 512(c) safe harbor would be 
rendered a dead letter: § 512(c) applies only 
to claims of copyright infringement, yet the 
fact that a service provider’s website could 
                                                             
51  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 439 (1984). 
52 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
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contain copyrightable material would re-
move the service provider from § 512(c) eli-
gibility.53 
 
The court emphasizes the idea that if it were to hold 
an ISP to a general knowledge standard, the safe 
harbor provision of the DMCA would be useless.  
While the Ninth Circuit holds that specific 
knowledge should be the standard by which it will 
determine whether an ISP has engaged in copyright 
infringement, the Second Circuit held in Viacom In-
ternational v. YouTube, Inc., that “a service provider 
cannot willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid 
obtaining such specific knowledge.”54 
In Viacom, the plaintiff, owner of several tele-
vision networks, sued the defendant, YouTube, for 
copyright infringement of videos uploaded by users to 
its website.55  In order to find YouTube liable for its 
users’ illegal actions of uploading copyrighted videos, 
Viacom claimed that YouTube had specific 
knowledge of copyright infringement and failed to 
remove the illegally uploaded videos.56  After a thor-
ough analysis of the DMCA safe harbor require-
ments, the Court found that YouTube deserved pro-
tection under the safe harbor provision.57  Looking to 
the fact that YouTube removed all copyrighted videos 
once notified, the court was able to uphold the safe 
                                                             
53 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 
F.3d 1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). 
54 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 
F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Viacom Int’l v. 
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
55 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
56 Id. at 518-519. 
57 Id. at 523. 
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harbor provision.58  Viacom then tried to argue that 
even though YouTube may not have had specific 
knowledge of copyrighted material, it had general 
knowledge of copyrighted material on its website.59  
YouTube was granted summary judgment because 
the judge found that YouTube did not know which 
users had permission to upload and therefore could 
not be held liable for general knowledge of copyright-
ed material on their website.60 
While many ISPs such as Facebook or Twitter 
have difficulty monitoring all of their users’ activi-
ties, making it harder to prove specific knowledge of 
copyright infringement, the company Napster set up 
its operations in a way that specific knowledge was 
obvious.  The case A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. is a 
great example of how effective the DMCA can be in 
stopping ISPs from allowing their users to infringe 
copyrighted materials.  Napster allowed users to 
search its directory for files and then provided the 
user with the address of the computer that contained 
the wanted file.61  Because Napster controlled and 
owned the centralized system where the directory 
was located, the plaintiffs were able to show that 
                                                             
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  It should be noted that this case was appealed in 2012. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether 
YouTube had knowledge or awareness of any specific instances 
of infringement corresponding to the clips-in-suit.  Viacom Int’l, 
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2012). 
However, on April 18, 2013, District Judge Stanton again 
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant 
YouTube.Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
61 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
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Napster had actual knowledge of illegal copyrighting 
activity.62  Whereas Facebook and Twitter have a 
strong argument that they are not aware if a user 
reposts or tweets copyrighted material, Napster 
could not use this same argument.  Napster owned 
and operated the system; therefore actual knowledge 
of copyright infringement was obvious. 
 
b. Lawful & Unlawful Use 
 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., the question the court answered was 
“under what circumstances the distributor of a prod-
uct capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable 
for acts of copyright infringement by third parties 
using the product.”63  After a lengthy analysis, the 
court held “that one who distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, 
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”64  
The court took a lot of its analysis from the Supreme 
Court case of Sony Corporation of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios,65 in which the Court held that “dis-
tribution of a commercial product capable of substan-
tial noninfringing uses could not give rise to contrib-
utory liability for infringement unless the distributor 
had actual knowledge of specific instances of in-
                                                             
62 Id. at 1023. 
63 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005). 
64 Id. 
65 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) (establishing that secondary infringement can arise 
from the very distribution of a commercial product, but there 
must be evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote 
infringing uses in order to impose liability on Sony). 
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fringement and failed to act on that knowledge.”66 
This analysis is a good reflection of a doctrine 
that is now codified in the United States Code that 
distribution of a component of a patented device will 
not violate the patent if it is suitable for use in other 
ways.67  Several cases have cited this proposition by 
stating that “[o]ne who makes and sells articles 
which are only adapted to be used in a patented 
combination will be presumed to intend the natural 
consequences of his acts; he will be presumed to in-
tend that they shall be used in the combination of the 
patent.”68  While the courts strongly uphold the doc-
trine that parties will be held liable if they distribute 
a product intended for copyright infringement, the 
doctrine also “absolves the equivocal conduct of sell-
ing an item with substantial lawful as well as unlaw-
ful uses, and limits liability to instances of more 
acute fault than the mere understanding that some 
of one’s product will be misused.  It leaves breathing 
room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.”69 
                                                             
66 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 545 U.S. at 927 (summarizing the 
Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Sony, 464 U.S. 417). 
67 See 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (2012); see also Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, 545 U.S. at 932; Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (noting codification of 
cases) (“The doctrine was devised to identify instances in which 
it may be presumed from distribution of an article in commerce 
that the distributor intended the article to be used in commerce 
that the distributor intended the article to be used to infringe 
another’s patent , and so may justly be held liable for 
infringement.”). 
68 New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th 
Cir. 1915); see also James Heekin Co. v. Baker, 138 F. 63, 66 
(8th Cir. 1905); Canada v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 
486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903). 
69 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 545 U.S. at 932 (citing Sony, 464 
U.S. at 442); Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 
U.S. 176 (1980)). 
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 This doctrine holds true to the concept that 
because a product can be used in an unlawful way 
does not necessarily mean that the item itself is un-
lawful.  For example, a hammer is not unlawful by 
its nature.  Instead a hammer is designed to hammer 
and remove nails or staples, and to bend metal. 
However, the hammer is not designed to be used as a 
weapon for murder.  Yet in 2011, more murders were 
committed by hammers and clubs than murders 
committed by rifles.70  Even though hammers have 
been used in an illegal manner, it does not mean that 
those who distributed the hammers should be found 
liable for accessory to murder.  Hammer producers 
Kobalt, Bostitch, and VAUGHN should not be found 
partially responsible for any murders or any other 
type of crime committed with a hammer (e.g., break-
ing and entering, battery, or assault).  
 
III. PINTEREST SUED: IS IT LIABLE? 
Most top social network and video sharing 
ISPs (e.g., Facebook,71 Twitter, YouTube, and Mega-
video) have been challenged in court for some type of 
claim for copyright infringement.  However, Pinter-
est, the third largest social network that continues to 
grow in popularity by the day, has yet to be chal-
                                                             
70 Awr Hawkins, FBI: More People Killed with Hammers, 
Clubs Each Year Than Rifles, BREITBART (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/01/03/FBI-
More-People-Killed-With-Hammers-and-Clubs-Each-Year-
Than-With-Rifles. 
71 See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 
1025, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU 
LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2007).  There, the 
court found that a competing social networking site violated 
Section 502 when it accessed the Facebook website to collect 
“millions” of email address of Facebook users, and then used 
those email addresses to solicit business for itself.  Id. 
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lenged for copyright infringement in court.  While 
Pinterest’s terms of service and copyright policies 
outline guidelines for users and protections for copy-
right owners, it is only a matter of time before a “pin” 
is more than just an image “re-pinned” on hundreds 
of Pinterest users’ boards.  It is inevitable that one 
day a copyright owner is going to be surfing the web 
and find his copyrighted image on Pinterest. 
 One might be surprised to know that this sce-
nario has not yet occurred, and the issue of copyright 
infringement has not ended in court, but the fact 
that Pinterest is not a profit-making company is 
plays a huge role in its ability to avoid litigation.  
However, prospective future business models for Pin-
terest, where companies will be able to buy certain 
boards as a means of advertising,72 the potential for 
damages could be great.73  Given the development of 
copyright law, how would a court analyze a claim of 
copyright infringement against Pinterest?  This Part 
will apply current copyright laws and common law to 
predict how a court would analyze these intellectual 
property issues. 
 Predictably, if a copyright owner brought a 
claim of copyright infringement (direct, willful, con-
                                                             
72  Maria Duron, Pinterest When You’re a Service Provider, 
BUZZ101 (May 14, 2012), 
http://thebuzz101.blogspot.com/2012/05/pinterest-when-youre-
service-provider.html (discussing business opportunities for 
companies and advantages of using Pinterest to get ahead); see 
also Hollis Thomases, 4 Things Pinterest Isn’t Saying, INC. (Feb. 
24, 2012), http://www.inc.com/hollis-thomases/what-pinterest-
wont-tell-you.html (discussing Pinterest’s appeal to businesses, 
but the copyright implications involved with using Pinterest). 
73 It should be noted that businesses can currently sign up for 
a business membership with Pinterest, however Pinterest has 
not used this route as a means of profit, but may look to do so in 
the future. 
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tributory, or vicarious) against Pinterest, Pinterest 
would use the safe harbor provision of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and argue that it meets 
all four of the requirements and deserves protection 
from liability.74  First, Pinterest would argue that it 
is an ISP as defined by the Act.  The plaintiff would 
then try to argue and rebut this fact to show that 
Pinterest is not a service provider as defined by the 
Act and does not deserve protection.  However, in In 
re Aimster Copyright Litigation,75 the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois looked to the lan-
guage of the DMCA  in order to determine what a 
service provider is defined as under the Act.  After a 
detailed discussion of the definition of a service pro-
vider,76 the court said that it would “have trouble 
imaging the existence of an online service that would 
not fall under the definitions”77 of what a service 
provider is under the DMCA.  Finally, in Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the District Court for 
the Central District of California also discussed the 
                                                             
74 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
75 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 
(2002). 
76 “The DMCA defines ‘service provider’ in two different ways, 
depending upon which safe harbor is at issue. For the purpose 
of the Transitory Communication Safe Harbor, ‘service provider’ 
is defined as ‘an entity offering the transmission, routing, or 
providing of connections for digital online communications, 
between or among parties specified by a user, of material of the 
user’s choosing, without modification of the content of the 
material as sent or received.’ 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).  For the 
purposes of the remaining safe harbors, the ‘service provider’ 
definition is even more broad: a service provider is ‘a provider of 
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities 
therefor.’  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).  The second definition 
further provides that it includes any entity that qualifies under 
the first definition. Id.” Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 657-58. 
77 Id. at 658. 
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broad definition of a service provider and stated that 
“[a]lthough there appears to be uniform agreement 
that the definition is broad . . . the Court has found 
no discussion of this definition’s limits.”78  Given the 
social media platform that Pinterest allows and the 
potential for business uses on the website, I do not 
think a court would find difficulty in labeling Pinter-
est as a service provider as defined by the DMCA. 
 
A. Types of Claims That Could Be Made 
A copyright owner could pursue many differ-
ent types of copyright infringement claims. Below are 
hypotheticals under (1) direct copyright infringe-
ment, (2) willful infringement, (3) contributory copy-
right infringement, and (4) vicarious liability.  
 
1. Direct Copyright Infringement 
 If a copyright owner tried to sue Pinterest on a 
claim of direct copyright infringement when one of 
Pinterest’s users pinned or re-pinned the copyright 
owner’s image or video, I think  a court would look to 
statutory and common law protections that would 
allow Pinterest to escape liability.  In order to prevail 
on a direct copyright infringement claim, “a plaintiff 
must show that he owns the copyright and that the 
defendant himself violated one or more of the plain-
tiff’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.”79 
A court could look to Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,80 for guidance on 
whether Pinterest should be found liable for direct 
                                                             
78 213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1175 (C.D.Cal.2002).  
79 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(citing A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th 
Cir. 2001)). 
80 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 
121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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copyright infringement or not.  In Cartoon Network, 
the Second Circuit “held that the defendants’ Remote 
Storage DVR (“RS-DVR”) service did not render them 
liable for infringement of the plaintiffs’ [ ] rights.”81  
The Second Circuit eventually held that “it was the 
customer who ‘made’ the copies at issue, not the de-
fendants who merely created and maintained the au-
tomated systems for doing so and, therefore, the de-
fendant could not be directly liable for violating the 
[copyright owner’s] rights.”  Because Pinterest users 
are responsible for things that are “pinned” (upload-
ed) or “re-pinned” on the site and a copyright owner 
would have difficulty proving that Pinterest itself 
“violated one or more of the plaintiff’s exclusive 
rights under the Copyright Act,”82 I predict that a 
court would not find Pinterest liable for direct copy-
right infringement. 
 
2. Willful Infringement 
 If a copyright owner tried to sue Pinterest on a 
claim of willful infringement when one of Pinterest’s 
users pinned or re-pinned the copyright owner’s im-
age or video, I again think a court would look to stat-
utory and common law protections that would allow 
Pinterest to escape liability.  In order to prove willful 
infringement under the Copyright Act,83 a plaintiff 
must prove one of two things: (1) that the defendant 
knew its conduct was infringing or (2) that the de-
fendant’s actions were the result of reckless disre-
gard or willful blindness to the prospect that its con-
                                                             
81 Agence France Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121, 130-33). 
82 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076. 
83 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Pinning Your Way to Copyright Infringement 
396 
duct was infringing.84 
Courts have looked to the defendant’s state of 
mind to determine whether the defendant was on no-
tice that a certain piece of copyrighted work was pro-
tected or whether the infringer had warnings of the 
infringement.85  If the defendant or infringer‘s acts 
are made in good faith that its conduct is innocent, 
then infringement is usually not willful.86  Finally, 
the copyright owner has to prove the willfulness of 
the defendant.87  If Pinterest is unaware of an illegal 
pin or re-pin, then I predict a court would have a dif-
ficult time finding Pinterest liable for willful in-
fringement.  Further, I think a plaintiff would have a 
very large uphill battle of proving that Pinterest was 
willful in copyright infringement.  
 
3. Contributory Liability 
 Because of Pinterest’s nature of pinning, re-
pinning, terms of service, and copyright policies, I 
think any copyright owner would find difficulty in 
getting a court to find liability for direct or willful 
copyright infringement for Pinterest.  However, I 
think Pinterest would be closer to liability under a 
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement 
claim. 
In order to win on a claim of contributory cop-
yright infringement, a copyright owner must show 
that an infringer is “one who, with knowledge of the 
                                                             
84 Bryant v. Media Rights Prods., 603 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 
2010); Island Software and Computer Serv. v. Microsoft Corp., 
413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005). 
85 Agence France Presse, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (citations 
omitted).  
86 N.A.S. Imp., Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 
252 (2d Cir.1992).  
87 Bryant, 603 F.3d at 143. 
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infringing activity, induces, causes or materially con-
tributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be 
held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”88  The 
knowledge prong is determined on a subjective level, 
but liability requires that “the defendant engage[d] 
in ‘personal conduct that encourages or assists the 
infringement.’”89  Finally, courts have generally only 
found a defendant to be contributorily liable if it “(1) 
knew or had reason to know of the infringement and 
(2) materially contributed to the infringement.”90 
In order to find Pinterest liable for contributo-
ry copyright infringement, a copyright owner would 
have to prove that Pinterest not only knew that one 
of its users directly infringed copyrighted material, 
but also that Pinterest materially contributed to the 
infringement.  Even though a copyright owner could 
argue that “[o]ne who furnishes a copyrighted work 
to another, who in turn wrongfully copies from that 
work, may be liable as infringer,”91 and that Pinter-
est by its nature “furnishes” copyrighted work to its 
users by giving the forum and outlet to do so, I do not 
                                                             
88 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 
(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia 
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
89 Id. at 1019 (quoting Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g 
Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added). 
90 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (“We have 
interpreted the knowledge requirement for contributory 
copyright infringement to include both those with actual 
knowledge and those who have reason to know of direct 
infringement.”) (citing A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1020); see 
also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F.Supp.2d 
627, 648 (S.D.N.Y.2011). 
91 Agence France Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 572 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04(3)(b) 
(2012)). 
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a believe a court would buy this argument.  If a court 
allowed this argument, then it would be going 
against the legislative purpose of the safe harbor 
provision.  The safe harbor provision was crafted to 
make sure that ISPs were less likely to “hesitate to 
make the necessary investment in the expansion of 
the speed and capacity of the Internet.”92  Congress 
wants to “ensure[ ] that the efficiency of the Internet 
will continue to improve and that the variety and 
quality of services on the Internet will continue to 
expand.”93 
Further, currently with over 49 million us-
ers,94 hundreds of millions of boards, pins, and re-
pins, it would not only be unlikely, but also ineffi-
cient to make Pinterest monitor every pin to ensure 
that it is not one of copyrighted material.  Pinterest 
should only have to act once it is notified by a copy-
right owner that a user has pinned or re-pinned a 
copyrighted image (as outlined by the DMCA). 
 
4. Vicarious Liability 
A few copyright owners have tried to sue indi-
viduals and companies under the theory of vicarious 
                                                             
92 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). 
93 Id. 
94 Craig Smith, How Many People Use 416 of the Top Social 
Media, Apps and Tools? (May 2014) DIGITAL MARKETING 
RAMBLINGS (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/resource-how-many-
people-use-the-top-social-media/; Pinterest Is Worth $2 Billion 
Because Its 25 Million Users Are Rich, Female, And Like To 
Spend, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2013, 7:35 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/pinterest-is-worth-2-billion-
because-its-25-million-users-are-rich-female-and-like-to-spend-
2013-2.. 
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liability of copyright infringement.95  A defendant 
would be found vicariously liable for copyright in-
fringement of others if the defendant “profit[s] from 
direct infringement while declining to exercise the 
right to stop him or limit it.”96  Some courts have de-
fined a standard to be used to determine if one is vi-
cariously liable for copyright infringement: a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant has (1) the right and 
ability to control or supervise the infringing activity 
and (2) a direct financial interest in the exploitation 
of the copyrighted materials.97 
In A & M Records v. Napster, Inc.,98 the Court 
determined that Napster could be found vicariously 
liable for copyright infringement because “Napster 
has both the ability to use its search function to iden-
tify infringing” material and “the right to bar partic-
ipation of users who engage in the transmission of 
infringing files.”99  While Pinterest has the ability to 
bar participation of users who engage in copyright 
infringement once it learns about illegal acts, Pinter-
est does not have the ability to search all of its mem-
bers’ boards to determine what has been illegally 
pinned or re-pinned.  Even if Pinterest did monitor 
its users’ pins, sometimes pinned images do not have 
anything depicting that the image is protected by 
                                                             
95 See Agence France Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 
572 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005). 
96 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, 545 U.S. at 914. 
97 See Arista Records LLC v. USENET.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 
124, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Dixon v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 
1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15291, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1985). 
98 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
99 Id. at 1027. 
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copyright. Therefore it would be nearly impossible for 
Pinterest to control and supervise all of its members’ 
actions as a means of monitoring copyright infringe-
ment. 
 In order to determine if a defendant is bene-
fiting from the infringement or not, some courts will 
look to see if “parties pay fees or money to the alleg-
edly vicariously liable defendant for the infringing 
works.”100  Pinterest is currently free of charge to all 
of its members and therefore cannot receive any fi-
nancial benefit from money coming from users.  
While this could change if Pinterest decides to charge 
for business accounts in the future, I think a court 
would not find Pinterest vicariously liable for any di-
rect copyright infringement of its users. 
 
B. Protection From Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Provision 
 Apart from the law under the Copyright Act of 
1976, Pinterest is held to the standards as described 
by the DMCA.  Unless a copyright owner could prove 
that Pinterest has actual knowledge that the materi-
al on the website is infringing, is aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is ap-
parent or upon obtaining such knowledge or aware-
ness, receives a financial benefit from the infringe-
ment, or fails to respond expeditiously to remove the 
material, then Pinterest will not be found liable for 
any claim of copyright infringement (i.e., direct, will-
ful, contributory, or vicarious). 
The copyright owner has the burden to prove 
                                                             
100 Agence France Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 574 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); see e.g., Yash Raj Films (USA), Inc. v. Bobby 
Music Co. & Sporting Goods, Inc., 2006 WL 2792756 at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006). 
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these elements,101 and if he cannot, then a court will 
not impose liability on an ISP.  While it is impossible 
to prove that Pinterest has met all of the require-
ments of the safe harbor provision without a claim 
against it and facts to dispute such a claim, Pinterest 
does take precautionary steps with its take down no-
tice policy found on its website.102 
                                                             
101 “DMCA notification procedures [would] place the burden of 
policing copyright infringement – identifying the potentially 
infringing material and adequately documenting infringement – 
squarely on the owners of the copyright.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
102 See Copyright, PINTEREST, 
http://about.pinterest.com/en/copyright (last visited May 22, 
2014). 
 
In accordance with the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998, the text of which may be 
found on the U.S. Copyright Office website at 
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf, 
Pinterest will respond expeditiously to claims of 
copyright infringement committed using the 
Pinterest website (the “Site”) that are reported 
to Pinterest’s Designated Copyright Agent, 
identified in the sample notice below. 
 
If you are a copyright owner, or are authorized 
to act on behalf of one, or authorized to act 
under any exclusive right under copyright, 
please report alleged copyright infringements 
taking place on or through the Site by 
completing the following DMCA Notice of 
Alleged Infringement and delivering it to 
Pinterest’s Designated Copyright Agent. Upon 
receipt of the Notice as described below, 
Pinterest will take whatever action, in its sole 
discretion, it deems appropriate, including 
removal of the challenged material from the 
Site. DMCA Notice of Alleged Infringement 
(“Notice”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Most companies and business people do not 
complain when their product ends up re-pinned on 
Pinterest because it is free advertising at its finest.103  
Therefore, it is no surprise that a plaintiff has not 
yet cried “copyright infringement” against Pinterest 
or individual users.  However, the issue will arise 
when a non-Pinterest user finds his copyrighted im-
age on Pinterest without his permission.  A Pinterest 
user who posts his copyrighted image on Pinterest 
gives others the permission to re-pin and reproduce 
his image, however a non-Pinterest user has not giv-
en anyone the permission to post his image or have 
his image re-pinned on Pinterest.  
Until a claim is brought against Pinterest and 
the facts are presented, it is hard to predict the actu-
al outcome of a case, but as long as Pinterest abides 
by all of the requirements under the DMCA, Pinter-
est should be protected in its entirety.  Currently, 
Pinterest may not have to be fearful of copyright in-
fringement claims, but should be prepared for poten-
tial legal consequences if it decides to open its social 
networking website to the profits of business adver-
tising and marketing.  As Pinterest continues to 
grow every year and the number of pins and re-pins 
continue to multiply rapidly, the chances for copy-
right infringement increase rapidly at the same time. 
Pinterest and its members should both think before 
they pin. 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
Id. 
103 See Brendan Lowry, Three Ways Pinterest Fits Into Your 
Company’s Branding Strategy, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.business2community.com/pinterest/three-ways-
pinterest-fits-into-your-companys-branding-strategy-0455259. 
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Abstract 
This Article will analyze the scope of copyright 
ownership in relation to chains of unauthorized de-
rivative works and chains of arrangement rights in 
cover versions of musical recordings.  In particular, 
the analysis will focus on the gray area in the law 
where an unauthorized derivative work (“D1”) is cre-
ated by an author and another author creates a sec-
ond derivative work (“D2”) based off of D1.  In situa-
tions such as these, does the creator of the original 
derivative work have any rights in their creation if 
their derivative work was unauthorized? 
Further, depending on what rights do exist for 
D1, can the creator of the D2 be found to be infring-
ing upon D1?  Moreover, even in the case of certain 
authorized chains of works such as musical “covers” 
produced under a compulsory license, does the crea-
tor of the first derivative work D1 have any legal re-
course against further authorized derivative work 
creators who base their work on the first derivative 
work? 
This phenomenon is demonstrated through 
examples based in contemporary urban art (Keith 
Haring and Banksy) and cover songs created through 
compulsory licenses (Sir Mix-A-Lot, Glee, and Jona-
than Coulton). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article will analyze the scope of copyright 
ownership in relation to chains1 of unauthorized de-
rivative works and chains of arrangement rights in 
“cover” versions of musical recordings.  In particular, 
                                                             
1 “Chains,” as utilized in this Article, is a term coined by 
Professor Brett Frischmann at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law, after a discussion with him regarding this phenomenon.  
Chains occur when the second author borrows from the first 
author’s work, creating a derivative work.  It can be further 
complicated, or lengthened, when a third author borrows from 
the second author’s work, and so forth. 
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the analysis will focus on the gray area in the law 
where an unauthorized derivative work (“D1”) is cre-
ated, and then a different author creates a second 
derivative work (“D2”) based off of D1.  In this situa-
tion, does the creator of the original derivative work 
have any rights in his or her creation if the deriva-
tive work was unauthorized?  Further, depending on 
what rights exist for the creator of D1, can the crea-
tor of D2 be found to be infringing upon D1?  
Moreover, even in the case of certain author-
ized chains of works such as musical “covers” pro-
duced under compulsory licenses, does the creator of 
the first derivative work have any legal recourse 
against further authorized derivative work creators 
who base their work on the first derivative work? 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
To better understand this phenomenon, one 
may first look to the world of contemporary urban 
art.  The famed New York artist Keith Haring creat-
ed many illustrations of a barking dog in his iconic 
style.  
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Figure 1. Keith Haring’s Barking Dog2 
Over 30 years later, the elusive street artist 
Banksy (most likely without authorization) created a 
piece of street art, entitled “Choose Your Weapon,” in 
which a hooded character is taking the Haring dog 
for a walk. 
 
 
Figure 2. Choose Your Weapon, Banksy3 
 
As a response to Banksy’s creation (and his 
subsequent creation of a title sequence for The Simp-
                                                             
2 Keith Haring’s Barking Dog, MATHI DESIGN, 
http://www.mathidesign.com/boutique_us/images_produits/zMU
RDO_1.jpg (last visited May 24, 2014). 
3 Banksy’s Choose Your Weapon, URBAN DEFECTS GALLERY, 
http://www.urbandefectsgallery.com/shop/banksy-choose-your-
weapon-grey/ (last visited May 24, 2014). 
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sons),4 another street art collective under the moni-
ker J-Boy created a piece of urban art entitled “Very 
Little Helper,”5 a variation featuring only the Banksy 
hooded character walking Santa’s Little Helper, the 
family dog from the classic television show The 
Simpsons.  Note that J-Boy’s creation does not use 
the Haring dog or any expression from the original 
work in the chain. 
 
 
Figure 3. Very Little Helper, J-Boy6 
                                                             
4 Banksy Drags the Simpsons Into the Sweatshop in 
Controversial New Title Sequence, DAILY MAIL REP. (Oct. 11, 
2010, 12:15 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-
1319517/Banksys-Simpsons-Korean-sweatshop-opening-
sequence.html. 
5 Stephen Saban, JBoy vs Banksy: It’s Dog Eat Dog in the 
Graffiti World, WOW REP. (Oct. 11, 2010, 1:15 PM), 
http://worldofwonder.co/2010/10/11/Dog_Eat_Dog_in_the_Graffi
ti/?utm_source=wow&utm_medium=permalink&utm_campaign
=related. 
6 J-Boy’s Very Little Helper, 34 FINE ART GALLERY, 
http://34fineart.com/emulateind.htm (last visited May 24, 2014). 
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Although the parties in this example will most 
likely never litigate these issues in court, we will as-
sume for the purposes of this Article that they in fact 
are litigating the hypothetical in order to analyze 
how the law might be applied.  For this reason, this 
chain of works raises many questions as to which 
parties own which copyrights in which images.  For 
instance, if Banksy did not receive authorization 
from Haring (or Haring’s foundation) to create 
“Choose Your Weapon,” does he forfeit all copyright 
protection in his entire piece?  Similarly, does the 
law allow Banksy to be found to be infringing upon 
Keith Haring’s copyright in his dog, while at the 
same time retaining a valid copyright in his hooded 
figure? 
Further, depending on how the law interprets 
the extent of Banksy’s copyright protection in his un-
authorized derivative work will dictate if, and to 
what extent J-Boy possesses a valid copyright in his 
derivative work based off of Banksy’s “Choose Your 
Weapon.”  If the court finds that Banksy, as the crea-
tor of an unauthorized derivative work, deserves no 
copyright protection at all, and has no valid copy-
right in “Choose Your Weapon,” this will essentially 
allow J-Boy to use his original expression free of the 
threat of infringement.  Alternatively, if the court 
recognizes a copyright in Banksy’s original creation 
of the hoodie character because it is severable from 
the Haring dog, then this may open up J-Boy to lia-
bility for copyright infringement. 
Another illustration of this gray area of rights 
attached to chains of works can be seen in the arena 
of sound recordings.  Recently, the hit television 
show Glee lawfully, under a compulsory license, rec-
orded and performed a cover version of the classic 
hip hop song “Baby Got Back,” originally recorded by 
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Sir Mix-a-Lot.7  Pursuant to the compulsory license 
Glee recorded and performed what may be described 
as a country music variation. 
Previously, a musician named Jonathan Coul-
ton, also under a valid compulsory license, had rec-
orded a country version of “Baby Got Back.”  Inter-
estingly, the Glee version of the song shockingly re-
sembled the Coulton cover.8  One could gather that 
in reality, Glee’s version of “Baby Got Back” was ac-
tually a cover of Coulton’s pre-existing cover.9  Nota-
bly, Coulton’s cover does not receive its own copy-
right protection as far as the underlying musical 
composition because of the compulsory license Coul-
ton acquired for his cover, which does not protect the 
arrangement itself. 
Anybody may obtain a compulsory license to 
make a cover version of a song, provided that all 
formalities in 17 U.S.C. § 115 are followed.  A com-
pulsory license may be obtained for any nondramatic 
musical work that has previously been distributed to 
the public in the United States under the authority 
of the copyright owner.10  Consequently, a cover art-
ist must serve proper notice on the copyright holder 
and make timely royalty payments to the copyright 
holder.11  Further, § 115 allows the cover artist “the 
                                                             
7 Chelsea Stark, ‘Glee’ Airs ‘Baby Got Back’ Cover Despite 
Copyright Controversy, MASHABLE (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://mashable.com/2013/01/25/glee-baby-got-back-
jonathan-coulton. 
8 Madina Toure, Artist Unhappy With Glee’s Use of ‘Baby Got 
Back’: Do Cover Songs Have an Identity of Their Own?, 
SYRACUSE.COM BLOG (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:20 PM), 
http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2013/01/post_181.html. 
9 Id. 
10 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(1) (2012). 
11 Id. at § 115(b)(1), (c)(2). 
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privilege of making a musical arrangement of the 
work to the extent necessary to conform it to the 
style or manner of interpretation of the performance 
involved, but the arrangement shall not change the 
basic melody or fundamental character of the work, 
and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative 
work under this title, except with the express consent 
of the copyright owner.”12 
Essentially, by choosing to record his cover 
version under a compulsory license, Coulton elected 
to receive no rights in the new arrangement used to 
produce his country version. Under § 115, the ar-
rangement effectively falls into the public domain, 
and consequently the cover artist cannot claim it be-
cause of the way the statute is designed, and the 
original songwriter cannot claim it, as the original 
songwriter is not author of the arrangement.13 
The ownership of the copyright as to the com-
position and arrangement of “Baby Got Back” be-
longs to Anthony L. Ray (better known by his stage 
name, Sir Mix-A-Lot), and its publisher Universal 
Music,14 and as such Coulton appears to have no le-
gal recourse against Glee for copyright infringement 
for copying his country arrangement of the song.15   
Once again, creators of the first work in a 
chain of works may have no recourse to protect their 
                                                             
12 Id. at (a)(2) (emphasis added). 
13 Mike Madison, Coulton, Glee, and Copyright, 
MADISONIAN.NET BLOG, (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://madisonian.net/2013/01/28/coulton-glee-and-copyright. 
14 Elizabeth Landau, Singer Alleges ‘Glee’ Ripped Off His 
Cover Song, CNN (Jan. 26, 2013, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/26/showbiz/glee-coulton-song-
copyright/index.html. 
15 Note that the analysis would differ if Glee actually used 
Coulton’s sound recording, as that would be infringement. 
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original portions of such works, allowing the next in 
the chain to freely steal their expression.  In this 
case, the fact that a compulsory license under § 115 
clearly states that the cover artist does not create a 
derivative work makes the arrangement unprotecta-
ble and leaves Coulton in a difficult situation.16 
Attempting to quantify the actual rights of 
each member of these derivative work chains will in-
volve analyzing many ambiguous areas of law such 
as: (1) if authorization is needed to create a deriva-
tive work that will resulting in any rights at all for 
the derivative artist, (2) the many policies behind dif-
ferent court’s reasoning for denying or allowing de-
rivative work rights without prior approval, (3) some 
exceptions unique to each area of intellectual proper-
ty (such as VERA for works of fine art and compulso-
ry licenses for musical compositions), and (4) some 
possible solutions to remedy such situations. 
 
II. DERIVATIVE WORKS 
 
A. The Derivative Work 
The Copyright Act of 1976, specifically in § 
106(2), bestows on creators of original works of au-
thorship (which are fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression) a collection of exclusive rights including 
the right “to prepare derivative works based upon 
the copyrighted work.”17 
A derivative work is defined in 17 U.S.C. §102 
as: 
a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical ar-
rangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art 
                                                             
16 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2012). 
17 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
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reproduction, abridgement, condensation, 
or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted.  A work 
consisting editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, 
as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a “derivative work.”18 
 
Accordingly, under this definition both pieces 
of art based on the Haring dog qualify as derivative 
works.  Moreover, both musical cover versions of 
“Baby Got Back” are not considered to be derivative 
works under § 115, but would be under other similar 
circumstances, which will be discussed in the solu-
tions portion of this Article.19 
Relatedly, both of these examples also demon-
strate how the right to reproduce these works can be 
extremely profitable.  Commonly, the rights to repro-
duce such derivative works can be more valuable 
than the right to the original work itself.20  Banksy is 
considered by many to be the most popular living 
street artist of our generation, having had several 
pieces of art sell for over a million dollars at auc-
tion,21 and his art being reproduced and sold on eve-
rything from canvases to T-shirts.  Similarly, Glee is 
one of the highest rated shows on television today,22 
                                                             
18 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
19 See infra Part IV.B. 
20 Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 
F.2d 607, 618 n.12 (7th Cir. 1982). 
21 Lowpro, Viewpoints: Top 25 Most Expensive Banksy Works 
Ever, ARRESTED MOTION (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://arrestedmotion.com/2011/09/banksy-top-25-most-
expensive-works-ever. 
22 Daniel Bowen, Glee: The Most Important Show on TV?, 
WHAT CULTURE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://whatculture.com/tv/glee-
the-most-important-show-on-tv.php. 
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and for a small up-and-coming artist such as Coul-
ton, being associated with such a hit television show 
could exponentially increase his current fan base, re-
sulting in greater record sales and live concert at-
tendance. 
 
B. Do You Need Authorization From the 
Original Copyright Holder to Create a 
Derivative Work? 
The crux of the issue at hand, especially when 
analyzing the Keith Haring derivative works chain, 
is whether the creator of an unauthorized derivative 
work can claim any rights in his or her unique ex-
pression.  The answer to this question is one of 
abundant ambiguity and is greatly dependent on the 
Circuit in which the case is brought. 
The Second Circuit in Eden Toys, Inc. v. Flore-
lee Undergarment Co. dealt with the fictional chil-
dren’s cartoon character Paddington Bear.23 The 
court held that when analyzing a string of derivative 
illustrations that the Plaintiff indeed did have a val-
id copyright obtained through licenses authorizing 
the derivative works, but addressed the possible out-
come absent the valid license.24  Eden Toys involves 
three successive tiers of valid copyrights in drawings 
of Paddington Bear which all were derivative works 
stemming from one another.  The Plaintiff, through 
licensing agreements, obtained a valid copyright to 
all three tiers.  In a footnote analyzing whether the 
Plaintiff could have a valid copyright in the chain of 
derivative without authorization in the original Pad-
dington drawings, the court explains: 
                                                             
23 Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc. 697 F.2d 
27, 35 (2d Cir. 1982). 
24 Id. at 36-37. 
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It is true that if Eden did not have Padding-
ton’s consent to produce a derivative work 
based on Paddington’s copyrighted illustra-
tions its derivative copyrights would be in-
valid, since the pre-existing illustrations 
used without permission would “tend[ ] to 
pervade the entire derivative work.”25 
 
Here, the court recognizes the fact that a de-
rivative work by its nature retains the “same aes-
thetic appeal” as the original work, and consequent-
ly, because of its inherent similarities, will be an in-
fringing derivative work if authorization is absent.26 
 
C. Is There a Bright Line Rule Somewhere Over 
the Rainbow? 
Around the same time the Eden case was be-
ing litigated, the Seventh Circuit, in Gracen v. Brad-
ford Exchange,27 although only in dicta, expresses 
the view that there is a bright line rule that a deriva-
tive work cannot be endowed with any copyright pro-
tection if the work was created without the authori-
zation of the original works copyright holder.28 
In Gracen, the Defendant Bradford Exchange, 
under a license from MGM Studios, invited several 
artists to compete to win an exclusive contract to 
produce paintings that would be used on a series of 
collector’s plates featuring characters from the clas-
sic movie The Wizard of Oz.29  Originally, the Plain-
tiff Gracen’s painting of the character Dorothy was 
                                                             
25 Id. at 34 n.6. 
26 Id. at 35. 
27 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). 
28 Pickett v. Prince, 52 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
29 Gracen, 698 F.2d at 301. 
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selected to be the image for the collector’s plates, but 
after a disagreement as to the terms of the contract, 
Gracen was replaced by another artist who based 
their painting not on the movie’s depiction of Doro-
thy, but instead on Gracen’s painting of Dorothy.30   
Although the court affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the 
painting lacked sufficient originality to be copyright-
able,31 in dicta the court, considering 17 USC 
§103(a), declared that: 
 
[E]ven if Miss Gracen’s painting and draw-
ings had enough originality to be copyright-
able as derivative works she could not copy-
right them unless she had authority to use 
copyrighted materials from the movie.  
“[P]rotection for a work employing preexist-
ing material in which copyright subsists 
does not extend to any part of the work in 
which such material has been used unlaw-
fully.”  Therefore, if Miss Gracen had no au-
thority to make derivative works from the 
movie, she could not copyright the painting 
and drawings, and she infringed MGM’s 
copyright by displaying them publicly.32 
 
Although in dicta, the Gracen court lays out a 
bright line rule awarding no rights to those who cre-
ate unauthorized derivative works, even to such as-
pects that are original to the derivative work’s au-
thor. 
 
 
                                                             
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 305. 
32 Id. at 302. 
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D. A TKO for Original Expression in 
Unauthorized Derivative Works? 
Following in the footsteps of the Gracen deci-
sion, in the Ninth Circuit case, Anderson v. Stallone, 
Plaintiff Anderson was a screenwriter who wrote a 
31-page treatment entitled Rocky IV based on the 
famous characters created by Sylvester Stallone for 
his Rocky movie franchise.33  Sometime in the early 
1980s, while on tour promoting the movie Rocky III 
to members of the press, Stallone shared an idea for 
Rocky IV in which Rocky is asked by a representative 
from the White House to fight a Russian boxer as a 
prelude to the Olympics.34  The fight would take 
place in Russia, where Rocky would have to over-
come insurmountable odds to become the victor.  An-
derson based his 31-page treatment on this descrip-
tion portrayed by Stallone and credited him as a co-
author.35  Anderson presented his treatment to 
members of MGM who would be producing the film, 
but they chose not to option Anderson’s script. Sub-
sequently, Stallone completed his own Rocky IV 
script, which was used to create the fourth install-
ment of the series.36 
Plaintiff Anderson claims that Stallone had 
copied his Rocky IV script from Anderson’s 31-page 
treatment, and brought suit for copyright infringe-
ment arguing the position that he is entitled to copy-
right protection for the non-infringing portions of his 
treatment.37  The court granted summary judgment 
for Defendant Stallone partly based on the fact that 
                                                             
33 Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0593-WDKGX, 1989 WL 
206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
34 Id. at *1. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at *2. 
37 Id. at *5. 
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Anderson’s work was not entitled to any copyright 
protection under 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) and § 106(2).38 
Anderson argued that § 103(a) grants copy-
right protection to those parts of his treatment that 
are original expression, owed solely to him.39  In his 
argument, Anderson pointed to the language of the 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report 
No. 94-1476, which stated 
 
the bill prevents an infringer from benefit-
ing, through copyright protection, from 
committing an unlawful act, but preserves 
protection for those parts of the work that 
do not employ the preexisting work.40 
 
The court recognized that the language of the 
House Report is confusing, but disagreed with An-
derson’s logic, stating that taking the language as a 
whole is meant to award such rights only to compila-
tions, not derivative works.41  The House Report clar-
ifies this distinction by stating, 
 
an unauthorized translation of a novel 
could not be copyrighted at all, but the 
owner of copyright in an anthology of poetry 
could sue someone who infringed the whole 
anthology, even though the infringer proves 
that publication of one of the poems was 
unauthorized.42 
 
The Court ultimately held that Stallone owns 
                                                             
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *9. 
40 Id. (citing H.R. REP. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 
(1976)) (emphasis added). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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the copyrights for the first three Rocky movies and 
that under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), Stallone also has the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works.43  The 
Court also determined that due to the fact that An-
derson’s treatment is an unauthorized derivative 
work, he has no interest in the copyright (even in 
parts original to his own expression) and has in-
fringed upon Stallone’s copyright.44 
 
E. This Is What It Sounds Like When 
Unauthorized Derivative Works Holders Cry? 
Ironically, in 1999, the musician Prince found 
himself not so much partying,45 but instead defend-
ing himself against a copyright infringement claim in 
the Seventh Circuit.  The case of Pickett v. Prince46 
involved an electronic guitar designer who incorpo-
rated the Prince symbol into the design of the body of 
a guitar. 
 
Figure 4. The Prince Symbol.47 
                                                             
43 Id. at *18. 
44 Id. 
45 Prince’s popular single “1999” declares that he’s going to 
“party like it’s 1999.”  Daniel Dunican, Prince – 1999 (12inch) 
(Vinyl), YOUTUBE (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpTygqODWBg. 
46 Pickett v. Prince, 52 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
47 Prince Logo, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/af/Prince_logo.svg 
(last visited May 24, 2014). 
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Pickett hoped that he could ultimately sell the 
guitar to Defendant Prince and bolster his reputation 
as a guitar maker.48  Prince decided not to purchase 
Pickett’s guitar, and subsequently Pickett discovered 
Prince performing with a different guitar that simi-
larly incorporated the aforementioned symbol.  
Pickett filed suit against Prince, alleging copyright 
infringement as to his rights in the symbol guitar.49 
Prince defended such claims by arguing that 
the Plaintiff cannot bring a copyright infringement 
suit because the Defendant never granted the Plain-
tiff the authority to create a derivative work, and as 
such the Plaintiff has no enforceable rights to sue 
upon.50 
Pickett argued that the court should not ad-
here to the Gracen bright line standard, stating that 
without a valid authorization to create a derivative 
work one cannot have any rights in such work, which 
the court should instead treat as mere dictum.  
Pickett instead insisted that the “pervades” standard 
originally mentioned in the Eden Toys footnote 
should control.51 
The court explains that the Plaintiff never ac-
tually articulates what the “pervades” standard en-
tails, but the court understands the Plaintiff’s argu-
ment to follow the logic that copyright protection is 
available under § 103(a) for parts of the derivative 
work that do not employ the preexisting work re-
gardless of whether authorization was obtained.52 
 
[U]nder Plaintiff’s interpretation, authori-
                                                             
48 Pickett, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 896. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 901. 
52 Id. at 902. 
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zation is never necessary for a valid copy-
right in original parts of the derivative 
work (i.e., those parts not “pervaded” by the 
preexisting work).  For Plaintiff, a deriva-
tive work is only unlawful if the original 
work “pervades” it entirely; whether or not 
the creator of the original work has author-
ized it is irrelevant. In other words, Plain-
tiff finds no circumstances in which author-
ization would be an issue.53 
 
According to the Plaintiff, the language in § 
103(a) expresses a Congressional intent that some 
infringing derivative works would still receive copy-
right protection, but only covering those “original” 
parts not employing the pre-existing material,54 as 
long as the original aspects of the derivative work do 
not “pervade” the entirety of the pre-existing copy-
righted material, whether or not authorization was 
granted by the original copyright owner.55 
The court for many reasons finds the Plain-
tiff’s argument unavailing, and even though the 
bright line rule proposed in Gracen was presented in 
dicta, the court sided with the Defendant finding 
that the Plaintiff’s symbol guitar had no copyright 
protection because it lacked the necessary authority 
from the Defendant, Prince, to be considered a legit-
imate derivative work.56 
 
F. Professor Nimmer’s Treatise 
Although the Northern District of Illinois ul-
timately followed the bright line standard articulated 
                                                             
53 Id. at 904. 
54 Id. at 902. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 906. 
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in Gracen, in a footnote the court discussed the am-
biguity surrounding the topic of whether the creator 
of an unauthorized derivative work can maintain a 
valid copyright in his or her portion of such work 
that does not “pervade” the original right holder's 
creation.57  The court contemplated the fact that even 
Professor Nimmer’s treatise, considered to be the go 
to authority in almost every copyright case, “does not 
answer this matter conclusively.”58 
The court explains that Professor Nimmer ad-
dresses what he calls the “lawful use of the underly-
ing work as a condition to a derivative copyright.”59  
The statement enunciates the point that if a copy-
righted work is incorporated into a derivative work 
without authority from the original copyright holder 
that act will constitute copyright infringement.60 
Nonetheless, the court continues to point out 
that Professor Nimmer separately states that a de-
rivative work still may claim copyrightability under § 
103(a) in that which was originally contributed to the 
derivative work even though the derivative author 
may be an infringer as to that which was borrowed 
from the pre-existing work.  Professor Nimmer states 
“only that portion of a derivative . . . work that em-
ploys the pre-existing work would be denied copy-
right.”61 
The court finds these two views to be some-
what contradictory, and appears to question a bright 
line authorization standard because there may be a 
possibility where, without a valid authorization to 
create a derivative work, the author may be able to 
                                                             
57 Id. at 906 n.17; see supra Part II.C for further discussion. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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salvage some rights. 
One can see that even though the Pickett court 
follows the dicta of Gracen, it still recognizes that 
there are contradictory views as to the “pervasive” 
standard, which is still an unsettled point of law. 
 
III. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE & POLICY CONCERNS 
 
A. Policy 
There are many reasons stated by the differ-
ent courts as to why their legal interpretations have 
led to what is clearly a preference for not awarding 
unauthorized derivative works creators with any 
rights, but there are also powerful policy concerns, 
not always addressed or expressed in an upfront 
manner by the court, but surely are influential in 
their reasoning. 
 One such case that deals with important policy 
considerations (although not specifically spawning 
its holding from a derivative works analysis) is Cas-
tle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group.62  
This Second Circuit case involved Plaintiff Castle 
Rock Entertainment, the copyright holders to the hit 
television series Seinfeld, suing Carol Publishing for 
copyright infringement concerning their trivia quiz 
book entitled The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, known as 
The SAT.  The SAT was a 132-page book containing 
643 trivia questions and answers concerning the 
many characters and events that had taken place 
over several seasons of the Seinfeld television pro-
gram.  The Defendant based such questions on 84 of 
the 86 existing episodes that had aired by the time of 
the book’s publication.  The majority of the questions 
                                                             
62 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132 
(2d Cir. 1998). 
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in The SAT were multiple-choice questions, which 
included one correct answer taken directly from a 
Seinfeld television episode, and multiple incorrect 
answers that were the Defendant’s original crea-
tion.63 
The Court, when analyzing the copyright in-
fringement claim, decided to treat the 86 Seinfeld ep-
isodes as one “discrete, continuous television series” 
in aggregate, and not as each their own independent 
work, or each respectively being a derivative work 
based on the prior episode.64   
The Court held that The SAT unlawfully cop-
ied the Plaintiff’s expression by deriving their ques-
tions from the Seinfeld television series, and that 
such copying did not constitute a fair use as codified 
in 17 U.S.C. § 107.65  The Court, while coming to this 
conclusion in their fair use analysis, discusses the 
policy matter of the possible future derivative works 
market for the Plaintiff.  The Court states that 
“[u]nlike parody, criticism, scholarship, news report-
ing, or other transformative uses, The SAT substi-
tutes for a derivative market that a television pro-
gram copyright owner such as Castle Rock ‘would in 
general develop or license others to develop.’”66  In 
essence, the Court, while analyzing the fourth factor 
of the fair use test – the “effect of use upon potential 
market for or value of copyrighted work”67 – is in a 
roundabout manner stating that the future deriva-
tive work market is a right that valid copyright hold-
ers should have control over. 
                                                             
63 Id. at 135. 
64 Id. at 138. 
65 Id. at 145. 
66 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 592 (1994)). 
67 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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The logic in Castle Rock is further extrapolat-
ed upon in Warner Brothers Entertainment and J.K 
Rowling v. RDR Books.68  Here, the Second Circuit 
was faced with, among other claims, a copyright in-
fringement claim by the Plaintiff, the copyright hold-
er of the enormously popular Harry Potter series, 
brought against the Defendant, a book publisher who 
was attempting to publish the unauthorized The 
Harry Potter Lexicon, which the Defendant described 
as the “definitive” Harry Potter encyclopedia.69  The 
Defendant compiled the information for the content 
of the Lexicon from the creator of the Harry Potter 
character and author of the series, “J.K. Rowling, ei-
ther in the novels, the ‘schoolbooks,’ from her inter-
views, or from material which she developed or wrote 
herself,” and a small amount of select outside refer-
ence sources, such as Bullfinch’s Mythology, Field 
Guide to Little People, New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, and online encyclopedias.70 
The Court did not agree with the Plaintiff’s 
contention that the Lexicon was indeed an unauthor-
ized derivative work based on the Harry Potter fran-
chise because the Lexicon was not an “elaborate re-
counting” that did not follow the same plot structure 
as the Harry Potter novels, and because the purpose 
of the Lexicon was to give the reader an understand-
ing of individual elements in the elaborate world of 
Harry Potter that appear in diverse and voluminous 
sources as organized in an A-to-Z reference guide.71 
The Court once again, as in Castle Rock, con-
fronted the policy issues surrounding the potential 
                                                             
68 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
69 Id. at 523. 
70 Id. at 525. 
71 Id. at 539. 
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for a future derivative works market.  Although the 
court did not hold that the market for reference 
guides becomes derivative simply because a copy-
right holder may plan to produce or license a similar 
product,72 the Court did hold that 
 
in striking the balance between the proper-
ty rights of original authors and the free-
dom of expression of secondary authors, 
reference guides to works of literature 
should generally be encouraged by copy-
right law as they provide a benefit to read-
ers and students; but to borrow from Rowl-
ing’s overstated views, they should not be 
permitted to ‘plunder’ the works of original 
authors . . . without paying the customary 
price . . . 
 
 and consequently authors would “lose incentive to 
create new works that will also benefit the public in-
terest.73 
In sum, the Court was hesitant to hold that a 
copyright holder’s plans to produce a similar work in 
the future does not per se lead to the fourth factor of 
the fair use analysis tipping in their favor, noting the 
fact that the Defendant’s Lexicon would essentially 
“plunder” the works of Rowling, and additionally 
that “one potential derivative market that would 
reasonably be developed or licensed by Plaintiffs is 
use of the songs and poems in the Harry Potter nov-
els”74 would be impaired by the publishing of De-
fendant’s Lexicon which was enough to find the work 
of Defendant infringing, and strongly against public 
                                                             
72 Id. at 550. 
73 Id. at 551. 
74 Id. 
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policy. 
Further illustrating the policy concerns inter-
twined with unauthorized derivative works, the 
Pickett court,75 who found ambiguity as to interpreta-
tions concerning statutory language in the House 
Report while anchoring their decision to following 
Gracen’s bright line rule, was particularly sympa-
thetic to Defendant Prince, because granting any 
copyright in the Plaintiff’s derivative work may de-
prive him of the exclusive right to produce additional 
derivative works based on the symbol he created.76 
In particular, the Court emphasized that 
Prince may lose the ability to one day produce and 
market the guitar at issue in the case, or possibly a 
bass guitar version, or even a violin containing the 
Prince symbol.77  The possibility of Prince producing 
such items the future is not farfetched, just as the 
possibility of a future production of a trivia book in 
Castle Rock.  Prince is one of the most well-known 
musicians in the world and has used the symbol as 
part of many derivative works such as T-shirts, post-
ers, and other merchandise.  One should also note 
that instilling any sort of copyright in Pickett’s unau-
thorized guitar could potentially rob Prince of the 
opportunity to license his symbol to other guitar 
makers of his choice in the future,78 similar to the 
songs from the Harry Potter series discussed by the 
court in RDR.  The court describes such a situation 
as the “creation of a de facto monopoly on derivative 
works to the detriment of the owner of the copyright 
in the preexisting work.”79 
                                                             
75 See supra Part II.E. 
76 Pickett v. Prince, 52 F. Supp. 2d 893, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 908. 
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These examples illustrate the fact that courts, 
when deciding what rights may be awarded to an 
unauthorized derivative works holder, cannot simply 
look at severability or the pervasiveness of the deriv-
ative work, but must also factor in policy concerns 
such as the potential for a future derivative market 
for the valid copyright holder, the benefit that will be 
instilled in the public interest by offering authors in-
centives to create further works, and avoiding the 
creation of a “de facto monopoly.”80 
 
B. Fair Use, Punishment, and the Public 
Domain 
As previously discussed, many courts, while 
grappling with the problem of unauthorized deriva-
tive works or policies related to potential future 
markets for production or licensing of such works, 
have analyzed the possibility of a fair use defense 
presented by a defendant.  Although this Article is 
not principally concerned with the fair use defense in 
regard to the Banksy and Coulton hypotheticals, a 
brief discussion as to its relevance is still warranted. 
The doctrine of fair use is a limited exception 
in American copyright law to copyright holder’s oth-
erwise exclusive rights.  The fair use doctrine is de-
signed to “fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”81  
Codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976,82 fair 
use is justified “for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or re-
                                                             
80 Id. 
81 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 
513, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8)). 
82 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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search” and as such is not an infringement of copy-
right.83 
In a fair use analysis, after a finding of the de-
fendant’s infringement of a copyright, the court must 
analyze this defense on a case-by-case basis by bal-
ancing a four-factor test: (1) the purpose and charac-
ter of the use; (2) nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and, (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential markets.84  If 
the Court finds that the factors weigh in the defend-
ant’s favor, the fair use doctrine will excuse such in-
fringement.  Fair use must ideally balance 
 
on one hand “[t]he monopoly created by 
copyright . . . rewards the individual author 
in order to benefit the public,” and on the 
other “[m]onopoly protection of intellectual 
property that impeded referential analysis 
and the development of new ideas out of old 
would strangle the creative process.”85 
 
In the realm of unauthorized derivative works, 
the fair use doctrine does play a relevant role in that 
if the unauthorized derivative work is found to be 
justified after weighing the four fair use factors, this 
would in essence transform the unauthorized deriva-
tive work into a piece no longer needing permission 
from the original copyright holder, and as such res-
cue the derivative work creator’s rights in their orig-
inal expression.  The House Report No. 94-1476, 
                                                             
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (quoting 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1109 (1990)). 
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when clarifying § 103, specifically anticipates for 
such a situation when they explain,  
 
Under this provision, copyright could be ob-
tained as long as the use of the preexisting 
work was not “unlawful,” even though the 
consent of the copyright owner had not been 
obtained. For instance, the unauthorized 
reproduction of a work might be “lawful” 
under the doctrine of fair use or an applica-
ble foreign law, and if so the work incorpo-
rating it could be copyrighted.86 
 
Although some could argue that Banksy’s 
“Choose Your Weapon” could be saved by a court 
finding that it qualifies for fair use protection under 
§ 107 in the enumerated categories of either criticism 
or comment, there are far too many other unknown 
factors to definitively come to such a conclusion.87   
Another school of thought focuses on the idea 
that the law does not reward wrongdoers, and as 
such Banksy, by not obtaining a valid authorization 
to create “Choose Your Weapon,” loses the privilege 
of copyright protection in his original expression, and 
all other related benefits because of his bad act.  This 
theory essentially forces any unauthorized derivative 
work, absent a valid exception such as fair use, into 
the public domain.  In the Banksy situation, Haring 
would still hold all rights in his dog character, but all 
additional expression added by Banksy, such as his 
hooded figure character, as a result of his transgres-
sion would instead be thrust into the public domain, 
                                                             
86 H.R. REP. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1976). 
87 Ultimately this Article is more concerned with the possible 
outcomes of no valid fair use defense.  See supra Part III.B for a 
discussion regarding fair use. 
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free for anyone to use.  Some would argue that this is 
the correct result because Banksy should not be re-
warded for violating Haring’s legal rights, and socie-
ty should reap the benefits of the misdeed with new 
elements added to the public domain for everyone to 
improve upon. 
Similarly, in the case of a musician who choos-
es to creates a cover version of a song by satisfying 
the requirements of a compulsory license under § 115 
by operation of law, the expression found in the new 
arrangement falls into the public domain, facing a 
similar fate to that of an unauthorized derivative 
work discussed above.  This is effectively why Coul-
ton has no legal recourse against Glee for stealing his 
country arrangement.  Because Coulton chose to use 
a compulsory license to create his cover version of 
“Baby Got Back,” a legal consequence of such a deci-
sion (surely unanticipated by Coulton) is that now 
his arrangement is part of the public domain for all 
to use freely.88 
This result is distinguishable from the Banksy 
situation in the manner that Coulton was not a 
wrongdoer; in fact his actions were completely legal 
and encouraged under § 115.  However, because the 
compulsory license is a cost effective method to ob-
tain access to source material without obtaining the 
copyright owner’s permission, which can be costly for 
a new artist to negotiate for such rights, the conse-
quence of such a convenience comes with the down-
side of no legal rights in the cover artist’s new ar-
rangement.89 
Although fair use may be a viable defense for 
the creator of an unauthorized derivative work in 
                                                             
88 Madison, supra note 13. 
89 Id. 
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some limited situations, it is not a viable solution in 
all circumstances.  Fair use is reserved for actors 
who are not wrongdoers.  Subsequently, those 
wrongdoers will effectively find their work added to 
the public domain for all to use freely.  Similarly, and 
arguably unfairly, a parallel result is inevitable un-
der § 115 as to the arrangement of cover songs as a 
consequence of the compulsory licenses convenience. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS & APPLICATION 
 
A. Did Banksy Choose the Wrong Weapon? 
Now, the discussion will return to the first hy-
pothetical concerning the chain of derivative works 
based on the Keith Haring dog.90  In this example, 
Banksy has created his derivative work “Choose 
Your Weapon” by producing his own original hooded 
figure holding the Keith Haring dog on a leash as if 
the figure is taking the dog for a walk. 
If one analyzed “Choose Your Weapon”91 under 
the reasoning set out in Eden Toys, one could come to 
the conclusion that because Banksy most certainly 
did not obtain Haring’s consent to produce the deriv-
ative work, he would hold no rights in the work.  Un-
der this logic, J-Boy’s piece “Very Little Helper”92 
would not be infringing as a derivative work as to the 
hooded character created by Banksy, and would be 
free from any form of copyright infringement liability 
with regard to Banksy. 
Moreover, the Eden Toys court was the first to 
discuss this idea of the original copyright holder’s 
work pervading the entire derivative work.  In this 
                                                             
90 See supra Figure 1, note 2, and accompanying text in Part I. 
91 See supra Figure 2. 
92 See supra Figure 3. 
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case, one can easily separate the Haring dog from the 
hooded figure without any overlap.  An argument can 
be made that the Haring dog does not tend to per-
vade the entire derivative work because both images 
are completely separable; consequently, Banksy 
should be liable for infringing the Haring dog, but 
may retain rights as to the hooded figure character.  
These rights could be used to bring his own suit 
against J-Boy for creating an unauthorized deriva-
tive work using Banksy’s copyrighted hooded figure. 
However, following the reasoning laid out in 
dicta by the Gracen court, Banksy would forfeit all 
rights in “Choose Your Weapon,” including those 
parts of expression that are original to him, although 
completely severable.  As such, J-Boy essentially has 
stolen Banksy’s original expression with no fear of 
liability from Banksy (but is still of course possibly 
liable to The Simpsons for using the image of Santa’s 
Little Helper). 
A similar result would be produced under the 
holding in Stallone.  However, the logic followed by 
the court in Stallone was based on the idea that the 
character of Rocky was developed to such a point 
that he was part of “one of the most highly delineat-
ed group of characters in modern American cine-
ma.”93  Moreover, the characters in the derivative 
work, Plaintiff Anderson’s Rocky IV treatment, 
“[were] not merely substantially similar to Stallone’s, 
they are Stallone’s characters.”94  As such, because 
the character Rocky, combined with his unique per-
sonality and mannerisms created by Stallone, was so 
intertwined and essential to the story that there 
                                                             
93 Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0593-WDKGX, 1989 WL 
206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
94 Id. at *8. 
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could be no way to separate the two, identifying 
which aspects could be protectable without the Rocky 
character would be an impossible chore. 
Correspondingly, the dog in the Banksy piece, 
as in Rocky, was not merely substantially similar to 
that of the Haring dog, it was essentially identical.  
But unlike the character of Rocky, the Haring dog is 
not so intertwined with the hooded character that 
they could not be separated and easily distinguished, 
which is evidenced by the fact that J-Boy used the 
figure in his derivative work without any trace of the 
Haring dog, with the hooded character completely 
identifiable as originally created by Banksy).  This 
aspect of severability could possibly be enough to dif-
ferentiate these situations and conceivably negate 
much of the impact of the Stallone holding in this 
case. 
Once more, a similar result almost certainly 
would be achieved under the holding of the Prince 
case.  Again, the court in Prince followed the bright 
line rule laid out in Gracen, denying any sort of copy-
right protection to an unauthorized derivative 
work.95  However, the court clearly established, that 
an unauthorized creator of a derivative work may be 
entitled to copyright protection in those facets of the 
derivative work which do not appear in the original 
copyrighted item, but only if the original aspects 
used in the unauthorized derivative are not so “per-
vasive” as to overtake the entire essence of the 
work.96  The Prince court, in reality, based their de-
nial of copyright protection of the Plaintiff’s guitar 
concerning those facets that were original to him.97  
                                                             
95 Pickett v. Prince, 52 F. Supp. 2d 893, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 907. 
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If the Prince symbol was removed from the guitar, all 
that would remain would be functional and utilitari-
an objects, such as guitar strings.98  As such, even if 
the court did decide that the symbol guitar was sepa-
rable, there would be nothing left to grant rights for 
anyhow. 
As Prince suggests, the Banksy hooded figure 
is easily separated from the Haring dog and once di-
vided, unlike the Prince symbol guitar, some protect-
able subject matter would indeed remain.  The pure-
ly original expression that would normally be award-
ed full copyright protection (if it were not part of an 
unauthorized derivative work), once severed, would 
remain protectable. 
Further, Banksy, as the creator of an unau-
thorized derivative work, would enjoy no copyright 
protection in his piece “Choose Your Weapon,” even 
though there are purely original aspects attributable 
only to Banksy.  Interestingly, J-Boy will be able to 
use Banksy’s original expression as articulated in the 
form of his hooded character without fear of claims of 
copyright infringement brought by Banksy.99  
It seems ironic and unjust that the law pun-
ishes the first author of an unauthorized derivative 
work in a chain by depriving them of all copyright 
protection, especially to any severable and original 
parts of the work, while simultaneously rewarding 
any other subsequent derivative work authors who 
take any original aspect of the first author’s unau-
thorized derivative work by allowing that second au-
thor to essentially perform the same bad act, free of 
any threat of legal consequences under copyright 
                                                             
98 Id. 
99 Although there most likely would be a trademark claim still 
available.  
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law. 
Furthermore, a result mandating that Banksy 
would receive no rights in any portion of his work 
would be contrary to the policy concerns expressed in 
Prince.  Essentially, Banksy has been foreclosed from 
enjoying any benefits in connection with future de-
rivative works based on has original expression, in-
cluding, but not limited to, future sequels of “Choose 
Your Weapon,” while J-Boy may freely exploit them.  
This can be seen as reminiscent of the Prince court’s 
logic, as to the future opportunity for Prince to pro-
duce his own guitars or violins based on his copy-
righted symbol. 
 
B. Did Baby Get Back Any Rights for Coulton? 
The second situation posed earlier concerned 
the television show Glee recording and performing a 
cover version of an already existing cover version of 
the song “Baby Got Back.”  Unlike the previous hypo-
thetical however, both works in this chain were au-
thorized by statute; the authority enjoyed by both 
works’ creators (Glee and Coulton) was obtained le-
gitimately through a compulsory license. 
As such, Coulton was within his rights to pro-
duce his cover version of “Baby Got Back” in a coun-
try music style.  Similarly, Glee, which subsequently 
obtained the same compulsory license, was also well 
within its legal rights to also produce a country ver-
sion of the same song.   
The interesting ripple, which has resulted 
from this situation, is that Coulton is not entitled to 
any sort of credit or compensation from Glee for copy-
ing his original arrangement.  Covers do not possess 
their own copyright protection as far as the underly-
ing musical composition, so Coulton’s only legal re-
course under copyright law is an infringement suit, 
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which he is only able to bring if Glee used portions of 
the actual audio track he recorded.100 
So once again, in this gray area of the law, the 
author of the first work in a chain of derivative 
works is left with no recourse to defend the copying 
of their original expression that distinguished the 
derivative work from the original copyrighted work.  
This loophole allows the second author to escape all 
legal liability for their work that has essentially sto-
len the first author’s expression, which would have 
been subject to copyright protection if it was not un-
der a compulsory license. 
This situation is distinguishable from all the 
prior cases analyzed, particularly when discussing 
the policy issues discussed in Prince.  Specifically, 
the compulsory license is designed to make sure that 
the original composer, who must allow covers of their 
song, as long as the cover artist abides by the limita-
tions of 17 U.S.C. § 115, is guaranteed to receive 
compensation from each cover through royalty pay-
ments.  In Prince the court was sympathetic to the 
fact that many possible options from future deriva-
tive works could be foreclosed upon, robbing the orig-
inal rights holder from future income.  Here, the 
rights awarded through compulsory licenses do not 
foreclose any possible avenues to the original rights 
holder and only award rights to the creator of the 
secondary work if their actual sound recording is 
identically reproduced. 
 
V.  WHICH WEAPON SHOULD BANKSY CHOOSE?  HOW 
CAN COULTON GET BACK HIS “BABY GOT BACK”? 
Both Banksy’s and Coulton’s situations raise 
many issues concerning the proper rights that should 
                                                             
100 Landau, supra note 14.  
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be afforded to artists who are links in a chain of ar-
tistic works that build from one another.  Although 
one situation is constructed from a chain of unau-
thorized derivative works, and the other is composed 
under a lawful compulsory license, both find them-
selves with identical unfortunate fates.  However, 
there are possibilities that feasibly could find a more 
favorable result for Banksy and Coulton. 
As discussed earlier, one prospect for Banksy 
to obtain rights in the original expression of his 
hooded figure would be to defend an infringement 
action with a valid fair use defense.  A court finding 
such an outcome would fundamentally excuse 
Banksy for his “wrongdoing” and preserve his rights 
in only the aspects of “Choose Your Weapon” which 
are original to him.  This would allow Haring to keep 
all rights in his dog figure, and all future derivative 
projects or licensing opportunities he would like to 
exploit, and would leave limited circumstances in 
which Banksy could exploit the image.  Further, 
Banksy would keep all rights in his original expres-
sion of the hooded character, which would include 
the ability to bring an infringement action against 
other unauthorized derivative works, such as J-Boy’s 
“Very Little Helper.”.  But as discussed earlier, a fair 
use defense is not an easy defense to prove, and as 
such most likely not a practical solution. 
Another interesting aspect is that the compul-
sory license, if one existed for visual arts and was 
available to Banksy when he created “Choose Your 
Weapon,”101 would possibly have been a viable solu-
tion.  By complying with the limitations of a compul-
sory license applied to the visual arts, Banksy’s de-
                                                             
101 Compulsory licenses under 17 U.S.C. § 115 are only for 
sound recordings, not for visual works. 
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rivative work would no longer have been considered 
unauthorized and he would not need authorization 
as long as he complied with whatever statutorily 
mandated actions must be fulfilled.  Further, this 
would award him legal protection as to exact copies 
of his original expression, similar to the idea that 
Coulton’s only current recourse would be if Glee used 
his actual sound recording.  Under this theory one 
could argue that J-Boy, by copying Banksy’s hooded 
character, has performed the equivalent of copying 
the actual sound recording, as may be the case in the 
Glee situation. 
Further, the real core of the issue in the 
Banksy chain of derivative works is the question of 
whether Banksy’s unauthorized derivative work in 
fact “pervades” a sufficient amount of Haring’s ex-
pression to not be entitled to any copyright, and re-
latedly, whether the novel expression of the hooded 
character presented by Banksy in his unauthorized 
derivative work is completely severable from the 
Haring dog, and if so, should be awarded independ-
ent copyright protection. 
This situation would put courts in a difficult 
situation.  How could a court set a standard to meas-
ure what “pervading” a work actually means?  It 
would almost certainly involve a case-by-case analy-
sis with many factors to balance similar to the fair 
use test discussed earlier,  or possibly the “pervasive” 
standard could be an extension of the current fair 
use analysis? 
 
A. Viable Severability Standard 
Correspondingly, and ostensibly more practi-
cal, would be a viable severability standard (reminis-
cent of the analysis used in trademark law under the 
functionality doctrine).  Under such a standard a 
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court would have to analyze: (1) to what extent the 
original expression of the offending derivative work 
is original to the offending artist, and (2) if the in-
fringing and non-infringing expressions of the deriv-
ative work can be separated to such a point that both 
expressions could exist independently.  If a defend-
ant could satisfy both of these requirements, then a 
court could effectively award rights to the infringing 
derivative artist as to their independent expression, 
while simultaneously punishing them for infringing 
the unauthorized portions under a traditional in-
fringement action. 
Under this theory, the Court could award 
Banksy all the pertinent copyright protection in his 
hooded figure, including the right to sue others for 
infringement in that expression, and simultaneously 
proceed with a standard infringement analysis as to 
the Haring dog that Banksy used illegally, handing 
down punishment accordingly.  Of course, there are 
flaws incorporated in this reasoning, including the 
fact that it ignores the public policy of not rewarding 
wrongdoers, and the fact that in this specific exam-
ple, the derivative work is a fairly straight forward 
image which can easily be separated.  (In Banksy’s 
derivative work, it would be as easy as drawing a 
line down the center of the image between the Har-
ing dog and the hooded figure.)  Most other situa-
tions surely will not present the Court with such us-
er-friendly separation, and as such may create judg-
ments based on personal preference,102 or parties be-
                                                             
102 A concern that may be interpreted as parallel to the fears 
of judges interpreting artistic merit when determining if a valid 
copyright is merited, which is discussed in the seminal case 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239, 251 
(1903), where the court determined “[i]t would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
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ing assigned unwarranted copyright protection in 
others’ rights. 
 
B. Attribution & Moral Rights 
The further irony stemming from both of these 
situations is strengthened by the fact that Coulton 
has expressed the opinion that attribution could have 
been one of the worthwhile solutions to Glee stealing 
his arrangement: 
 
It’s a little frustrating.  Whether or not 
they’re in the right legally, it doesn’t seem 
like the best way to handle it. If you’re go-
ing to claim that you’re giving an artist ex-
posure and they should be grateful – there’s 
a right way to do that. Contact them ahead 
of time.  Say this is great, we’re going to 
talk about it on our blog and tell all our 
fans that they should be fans of yours.  
We’re going to put a credit in the show.  
That doesn’t cost them anything.  It’s a 
show with something like a $3.5 million 
budget for each episode, but there are still 
so many free things they could have done to 
engender goodwill.103 
 
Interestingly, moral rights of attribution are 
only awarded under US copyright law for works of 
                                                                                                                             
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one 
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive 
until the public learned the new language in which their author 
spoke.” 
103 Laura Hudson, Jonathan Coulton Explains How Glee 
Ripped Off His Cover Song – And Why He’s Not Alone, WIRED 
(Jan. 25, 2013, 3:21 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2013/01/jonathan-coulton-glee-song/ 
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fine art.  Under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
(VARA), works of art that meet certain criteria are 
traditionally awarded moral rights which are not 
present in any other sector of United States intellec-
tual property law.104  In particular, one of these ex-
clusive rights is that the author of a work of visual 
art shall have the right to claim authorship of their 
original works.105  If similar legislation to that of 
VARA were available for musicians who cover songs 
under a compulsory license, such as Coulton, they 
could be endowed with the right to at least be accred-
ited for their arrangements of cover songs repro-
duced by a second derivative artist. 
 
C. Licensing 
Another viable solution for Coulton would be 
to obtain a license to “Baby Got Back” from the Har-
ry Fox Agency.  Agencies like Harry Fox act on be-
half of many copyright holders in administering the 
further uses of such copyrights.  These licenses are in 
many ways similar to the rights granted to an artist 
under § 115 in that they grant rights that are no 
greater and no lesser than the rights under § 115.  
The major difference between the Harry Fox license 
and the legal grant authorized by Congress in § 115 
is that the license is actually a contract between the 
original composer and the cover artist, and possibly 
could be amended through negotiations to reflect an 
intellectual property right in the arrangement for the 
cover artist.106 
Similarly, Coulton could circumvent the Harry 
Fox license all together, and instead approach Sir 
                                                             
104 17 U.S.C. §106(a) (2012). 
105 17 U.S.C. §106(1)(a) (2012). 
106 Madison, supra note 13. 
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Mix-a-Lot directly and negotiate a deal including, 
rights, royalties, and any other issues important to 
Coulton concerning his cover version.  This agree-
ment could entail requiring Coulton to assign his 
publishing rights (for the new arrangement) to Sir 
Mix-a-Lot, or conversely, Coulton could insist on 
keeping the publishing rights (and possibly pay Sir 
Mix-a-Lot a royalty) granting him rights in his new 
arrangement.107 
 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that particularized special circum-
stances exist, such as the compulsory license and 
VARA, illustrates that legislation has been put in 
place to deal with deficiencies as to the rights of cop-
yright holders. Of course, it is nearly impossible to 
prepare for every issue that could possibly arise con-
cerning artist rights, however, these pieces of legisla-
tion prove that there are viable possibilities already 
available to fill holes in the law upon discovery. 
Artists, like Banksy, who create severable un-
authorized derivative works, may be assisted by the 
court’s adoption of a test of some nature to retain 
rights in the original portions of such work, or by a 
successful fair use defense of an infringement action.  
But such options may be unlikely due to the strong 
public policy to not reward wrongdoers. 
Coulton could never have anticipated when he 
chose to record his cover song under § 115 that an-
other creator would copy his arrangement.  Nonethe-
less, Coulton and others who find themselves in a 
similar predicament could be compensated by a law 
compelling attribution to such artists.  More realisti-
cally however, many believe that Glee did actually 
                                                             
107 Id. 
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copy Coulton’s actual recording,108 so Coulton may 
find justice in a standard copyright infringement ac-
tion (or most likely a settlement, if actual copying is 
proven). 
Ironically, if Coulton did in fact receive attrib-
ution initially by Glee, he would most likely not be 
enjoying the large amount of publicity that has aris-
en from the unauthorized copying.  For a brief period 
following the outrage, Coulton’s cover version outsold 
any Glee song on iTunes.109 
 
                                                             
108 Caleb, Were Jonathan Coulton’s Actual Audio Tracks 
Reused by Glee?, REFRACTORING MY BRAIN (Jan. 26, 2013, 11:23 
PM), http://refactoringmybrain.blogspot.com/2013/01/were-
jonathan-coultons-actual-audio.html. 
109 Michele Catalano, Jonathan Coulton Vs. Glee And Fox 
Update: Last Laughs, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2013, 8:17 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michelecatalano/2013/01/31/jonat
han-coulton-vs-glee-and-fox-update-last-laughs. 
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Abstract 
The thesis of this Article is that under an ex-
clusive recording agreement entered into in the 
United States between a record label and recording 
artist on or after January 1, 1978, any key member 
or recording artist that signed the recording contract 
is a bona fide author of a sound recording for purpos-
es of claiming standing in order to effectuate a ter-
mination of transfer of grant under Section 203 of 
the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 Part I will summarize the history of sound re-
cordings as copyrightable subject matter.  Part II will 
examine record industry custom and practice as it 
relates to the relationship between recording artists 
and record labels under exclusive recording agree-
ments.  Part III will examine what occurs in a typical 
recording session for the purpose of offering indicia of 
who is making substantive creative decisions that 
affect the final sound recording.  Part IV will explore 
different theories of who may reasonably articulate a 
claim of authorship credit in a sound recording.  Part 
V will present a nuanced, reasonable and practical 
solution to the issue of determining who has stand-
ing as an author of a sound recording for purposes of 
terminating a grant of transfer under Section 203 of 
the 1976 Copyright Act.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, independent record labels in the 
United States were thriving by satisfying consumer 
demand unfulfilled by major labels.  Small record la-
bels such as Alternative Tentacles, Mystic, SST, Epi-
taph, Frontier, Posh Boy, and Dischord Records were 
flourishing by capturing the zeitgeist of suburban 
teenage angst in sound recordings.  These independ-
ent labels were prospering by satisfying a demand 
for underground music and releasing 12” and 7” vinyl 
punk rock records deemed technically and commer-
cially un-mass-marketable by the majors.  The fol-
lowing hypothetical played out many times during 
this period.  
 A suburban teenage garage band gets the at-
tention of an independent record label and is offered 
an exclusive recording agreement.  Up to this point 
the band’s biggest accomplishment had been per-
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forming at a high school talent show or making a 
crude demo tape.  The group is unrepresented by 
counsel and the recording agreement is a take it or 
leave it proposition.  The band signs the deal as is.  
The band is not thinking about copyright law1 and 
they are not motivated by making money;2 they are 
just excited that anyone would want to pay for their 
studio time and release their records. 
The record company has a reputation for re-
leasing great albums and has a built-in niche audi-
ence that eagerly awaits to purchase the label’s new 
releases.  The band is flattered they were even asked 
to join the record company’s roster and feel confident 
they will be positioned for a successful debut release.  
The label releases and sells tens of thousands of cop-
ies of the album on vinyl and cassette tapes, recoups 
and makes a tidy profit.  Although the group receives 
a few small royalty checks, they never received any 
                                                             
1 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution is the source of power that gives Congress the 
right to promulgate copyright legislation.  The copyright clause 
states “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8. 
2 Cf. Howie Cockrill, DRM: Incentive Theory, MULTIMEDIA & 
ENT. L. ONLINE NEWS (June 27, 2007, 10:41 AM), 
http://beatblog.typepad.com/melon/2007/06/drm-incentive-
t.html (“Incentive Theory is often said to be the greatest 
ideological force behind U.S. copyright law.  Through an 
Incentive lens, the purpose of copyright law is to incentivize 
creative behavior by granting certain monopolistic rights to 
producers or creators. . . .  If copyright owners are unable to 
turn a profit or even make a living on the creative works that 
they invested a great deal of time and money in, then there is 
no INCENTIVE for them to continue to contribute creatively to 
society.”). 
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formal or accurate accountings.  Because of the une-
qual bargaining power between the label and the 
band, the band has entered into a contract that can 
be characterized as the epitome of an unremunera-
tive transfer.3 
As time goes by, incidental band members 
come and go and key creative members stay 
throughout all incarnations of the group.  The key 
members are signatories to all exclusive recording 
agreements signed on behalf of the band throughout 
their career.  The band achieves cult status in the 
genre of underground music they helped define.  As 
the years go by, the group uneventfully dissolves and 
fades away. 
Thirty five years later, history shows that 
those early sessions produced seminal recordings 
that influenced many modern day platinum selling 
rock bands.  The former members of those teenage 
rock bands are now in their fifties and learn that 
they4 may be able to terminate the written grants of 
transfer memorialized in those early recording 
                                                             
3 “The provisions of section 203 are based on the premise . . . 
[of] . . .  safeguarding authors against unremunerative 
transfers.  A provision of this sort is needed because of the 
unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from 
the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been 
exploited.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
4 Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Basin, Copyright Termination 
and Loan-Out Corporations: Reconciling Practice and Policy, 3 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 55, 93 (2012) (“Sections 203 and 
304(c) clearly contemplate that termination rights are to be 
held only by natural persons (artists) and their 
families/descendants, and not corporate entities, this revision 
expressly deems the individual author to be the legal author of 
the work for purposes of the Copyright Act’s termination 
provisions.  This ensures that the rescued termination rights 
vest in the artists themselves, rather than in their loan-out 
corporations.”). 
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agreements.5  Along with being influential recordings 
that paved new musical ground for today’s modern 
rock acts, those old sound recordings also have sen-
timental value to the music groups that originally 
gave them life.  These former recording artists now 
desire to recapture their sound recording copyrights 
and re-issue their old masters in order to receive a 
larger share of the results and proceeds derived from 
future commercial exploitations.6  The problem 
members of these recording artists face is determin-
ing who7 if anyone8 can terminate the transfer of 
                                                             
5 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012) (“In the case of any work other 
than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant 
of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a 
copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, 
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination . . . .”); see also 
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (“Termination of the grant may be effected 
at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of 
thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant; or, if 
the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period 
begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of 
publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty 
years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term 
ends earlier.”). 
6 The company Tunecore operates on a business model that 
facilitates digital phonorecord deliveries of master recordings to 
digital stores such as iTunes, AmazonMP3, Rhapsody, Google 
Play, Rdio, Spotify, iHeartRadio, eMusic and MySpace for a flat 
fee of twenty nine dollars and ninety nine cents ($29.99) for the 
first year and forty nine dollars and ninety nine cents ($49.99) 
for each following year, per album.  Under this model the sound 
recording rights holder retains one hundred percent (100%) of 
master rights, receives weekly iTunes sales trend reports, 
monthly overall music sales reports and retains all income 
derived from commercial exploitation of masters subject only to 
the annual fee mentioned above. 
7 Under the definitions section, the Copyright Act of 1976 does 
not define the term “author.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  See also 
Video Interview with Jay Cooper: 35 Year Copyright Reversion 
Clause, Works for Hire, and the Future of the Music Business, 
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grant9 of sound recording copyrights that occurred 
thirty five years ago. 
 The thesis of this Article is that under an ex-
clusive recording agreement entered into in the 
United States between a record label and recording 
                                                                                                                             
ARTISTS HOUSE MUSIC (Nov. 2007), 
http://www.artistshousemusic.org/videos/35+year+copyright+re
version+clause+works+for+hire+and+the+future+of+the+music
+business (explaining that “there’s no definition of author . . .  
the sound recording is subject to being recaptured because it is 
not defined as one of the nine categories that can be assigned as 
a work made for hire and therefore the author has a right to 
recapture 35 years later, now we get into the real issue.  Who is 
the author?  Is it the featured artist?  Is it the featured artist 
and the producer?  Is it the featured artist and the producer 
and the engineer?  Who is the author?  We don’t know who the 
author is.”); Larry Rother, Record Industry Braces for Artists’ 
Battles Over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES, August 16, 2011, at C1 
(“The legislation, however, fails to address several important 
issues.  Do record producers, session musicians and studio 
engineers also qualify as ‘authors’ of a recording, entitled to a 
share of the rights after they revert?”). 
8 See Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11CV1557 BTM(RBB), 
2012 WL 1598043, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).  The Scorpio 
Music court held that a joint author of a musical composition 
who transferred his copyright interest in a separate grant may 
unilaterally terminate that grant. “Upon consideration of the 
language and purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 203 in conjunction with the 
law governing the rights of joint authors, the Court concludes 
that a joint author who separately transfers his copyright 
interest may unilaterally terminate that grant.”  Id. 
9 “In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, 
the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of 
copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the 
author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is 
subject to termination under the following conditions: (1) In the 
case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant 
may be effected by that author or . . . [i]n the case of a grant 
executed by two or more authors of a joint work, termination of 
the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who 
executed it . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
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artist on or after January 1, 1978, any key member 
or recording artist that signed the recording contract 
is a bona fide author of a sound recording for purpos-
es of claiming standing in order to effectuate a ter-
mination of transfer of grant under Section 203 of 
the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 Part I will summarize the history of sound re-
cordings as copyrightable subject matter.  Part II will 
examine record industry custom and practice as it 
relates to the relationship between recording artists 
and record labels under exclusive recording agree-
ments.  Part III will examine what occurs in a typical 
recording session for the purpose of offering indicia of 
who is making substantive creative decisions that 
affect the final sound recording.  Part IV will explore 
different theories of who may reasonably articulate a 
claim of authorship credit in a sound recording.  Part 
V will present a nuanced, reasonable and practical 
solution to the issue of determining who has stand-
ing as an author of a sound recording for purposes of 
terminating a grant of transfer under Section 203 of 
the 1976 Copyright Act.  
 
I.  HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF SOUND RECORDINGS 
UNDER THE LAW 
 
A. The 1909 Copyright Act 
 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, there was no 
federal copyright protection for sound recordings. In 
fact, there has been a long history of discrimination 
against sound recordings as protectable subject mat-
ter under federal law.10  For example, compared to 
                                                             
10 Hearing Before the House Committee on Patents on Revision 
of Copyright Law, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 488-89 (1936) 
(“Recordings are not creations of ‘authors’ because they are 
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the fully realized public performance right afforded 
to musical composition rights holders, only recently 
have sound recording rights holders enjoyed a nar-
row public performance right in digital audio trans-
missions under federal copyright law.11  Fortunately 
for authors and copyright owners, national discrimi-
nation of sound recordings has slowly faded away 
over the past sixty years12 and has evolved into a 
more fully recognized federal right. 
 
B. The 1971 Amendment 
 Due to the lobbying efforts of radio broadcast-
                                                                                                                             
mechanical contrivances produced by efforts of engineers, 
technicians, performers and machines rather than by 
‘authors.’”). 
11 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 56, COPYRIGHT 
REGISTRATION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS 1 (2012) (“The Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, P.L. 104-
39, effective February 1, 1996, created a new limited 
performance right for certain digital transmissions of sound 
recordings.”); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, 
§ 3:162 (2012) (“Sound recordings have limitations on protection 
not found with other works of authorship. They were not 
granted a performance right until 1995 and then only a limited 
one for digital audio transmissions.”). 
12 “[T]here is no doubt in my mind that recorded performances 
represent the ‘writings of an author’ in the Constitutional sense 
and are fully as creative and worthy of copyright protection as 
translations, arrangements, or any other class of derivative 
works. I also believe that contributions of the record producer to 
a great many sound recordings also represent true ‘authorship’ 
and are just as entitled to protection as motion pictures and 
photographs. No one should be misled by the fact that in these 
cases the author expresses himself through sounds rather than 
by words, pictures, or movements of the body . . . .”  Hearings on 
H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 and H.R. 6835 before 
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1863 (1965) (statement of Abraham 
Kaminstenstein, Register of Copyrights). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Cash From Chaos 
454 
ers in the 1960s, federal protection of sound record-
ings was a controversial topic.  Radio broadcasters 
feared that if sound recordings were recognized by 
federal copyright law it would subject them to pay-
ment of public performance royalties for use of sound 
recordings similar to those paid to music publishers 
for public performance of musical compositions.  
While the battle between radio broadcasters and rec-
ord labels waged on, bootleggers thrived because 
there was no federal law prohibiting them from cre-
ating unauthorized copies of records. 
As piracy became more and more widespread, 
the recording industry entered into a compromise 
with radio broadcasters.  In 1971, Congress passed 
the Copyright Amendment.  The 1971 Amendment 
represented a negotiated compromise that allowed 
record labels to combat illegal bootlegging via federal 
copyright protection against unauthorized reproduc-
tion of sound recordings.13  To appease broadcasters, 
the 1971 Amendment carved out an exception to the 
public performance right traditionally held by copy-
right owners.  Under the compromise between labels 
and broadcasters, radio broadcasters would not have 
to ask permission, nor pay, for the right to publicly 
perform a sound recording on terrestrial radio and 
record labels would have the force of federal copy-
right law to combat piracy. 
 
C. The 1976 Copyright Act 
 The 1976 Copyright Act was the culmination 
of a sixteen year effort to modernize United States 
                                                             
13 On March 10, 1974, the United States became a member of 
the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, which 
became effective April 18, 1973. 
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copyright law.  In the early 1960s, Congress sought a 
comprehensive revision to the 1909 Copyright Act.14  
Congress eventually enacted the 1976 Copyright Act 
which incorporated the primary elements of the 1971 
Copyright Amendment.15  The 1976 Copyright Act 
also changed the term of copyright to the life of the 
author plus fifty years, redefined the work made for 
hire doctrine and added a fair use provision.  The 
1976 Copyright Act was also designed to make Unit-
ed States intellectual property law comport with the 
laws of Europe and other countries.16  Additionally, 
as with the 1971 Amendment, the 1976 Copyright 
Act continued to recognize sound recordings as copy-
rightable subject matter.17 
 
D. The 1999 Amendment 
 In 1999, under the guise of adding a technical 
amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act, the Recording 
Industry Association of America18 lobbied Congress 
                                                             
14 See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance 
to Copyright Law’s Inalienable Right to Terminate Transfers, 33 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227, 229 (2009). 
15 Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in 
Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 386 (2002) (“The 
legislative history of the 1976 Act incorporates verbatim a 
number of passages from the legislative history of the 1971 
Sound Recordings Act. In fact, Congress enacted the 1971 Act 
(rather than simply waiting to address sound recording 
copyrights in the 1976 Act) in order to avoid any unnecessary 
delay in granting copyright protection to sound recordings.”). 
16 PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT supra note 11, at § 1:82 (2012) 
(“By vesting copyright upon creation and fixation and providing 
for a single term of protection based on life of the author plus 50 
years, the 1976 Act made substantial progress toward making 
U.S. law more compatible with the Berne Convention.”). 
17 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
18 The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is a 
trade group that represents the United States recording 
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to add sound recordings as a tenth enumerated cate-
gory19 of works deemed capable of being character-
ized as works made for hire.20  Without any analysis 
                                                                                                                             
industry.  The mission of the RIAA is to foster a legal and 
business environment that strengthens and advocates the 
creative and financial prosperity of its members. In support of 
this mission, the RIAA lobbies to protect the intellectual 
property rights of its members and monitors state and federal 
laws, regulations and policies.  The RIAA also certifies Gold®, 
Platinum®, and Diamond® sales of phonorecords. 
19 See Randy S. Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of 
Copyrights in Sound Recordings: Is There a Leak in the Record 
Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211 (1993) (“A 
seemingly simple solution for record companies, of course, 
would be to lobby Congress for an amendment to the definition 
of a work for hire that would add sound recordings to the nine 
types of specially commissioned works.”). 
20 Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus 
Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I—S. 1948, 
§1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501A-521,1501A-544 (1999) (amending 17 
U.S.C. §101) (repealed 2000) (“Work Made for Hire. – Section 
101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended in the definition 
relating to work for hire in paragraph (2) by inserting ‘as a 
sound recording,’ after ‘audiovisual work’.”); see also How Stella 
Got Her Masters Back: Reversion Rights, SXSW Panel (Mar. 15, 
2012), http://schedule.sxsw.com/2012/events/event_MP9606.  
Panelist Eric German, Esq. states the reason record labels 
believe sound recordings should be characterized as ‘works 
made for hire.’  “Congress was intending to clarify something 
that everyone already knew to be true.  It’s been standard 
industry practice for decades and decades to assume these 
things are works made for hire . . . .  Almost every single record 
deal that ever was says this is a work for hire and every artist 
represented by counsel knows that, signs it, that’s what they 
thought all along too.  The point is the reason that it doesn’t say 
sound recordings in the work for hire section of the Copyright 
Act is really an accident of history.  The work for hire provisions 
were drafted back in 1965; in 1965 there was no such thing as a 
sound recording copyright.  Back in the day, sound recordings, 
masters weren’t protected by copyright.  That didn’t come into 
existence until 1971, so by the time sound recordings existed, 
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or debate, Congress passed the amendment and 
President Clinton signed it into law.  After backlash 
and a bitter dispute between record labels and the 
artistic community,21 the 1999 Amendment was re-
pealed in 2000 without prejudice and with congres-
sional instructions that no inference was to be made 
either way as to its enactment and repeal.22  As a re-
                                                                                                                             
this work for hire language had already been drafted, so of 
course the work for hire provision didn’t mention sound 
recordings because they weren’t copyrighted but by the time we 
get to the late ’90s, we get the Sonny Bono Term Extension Act 
and we start looking at the prospect of what’s coming up in 
2013.  There is this idea that ‘Oh my God’ everyone assumes 
these are work for hires, every contract says they’re work for 
hires but yeah, we have to clean up the historical language from 
the ’60s.  I don’t think that anyone thought that it had to 
happen in order to affect anything in the law but I think it just 
might as well to avoid the issue that we’re talking about today.  
So Congress puts this in 1999 and adds it.  Here’s the facts, 
everyone thought these were work for hire, every contract said 
they were work for hire, Congress said, ‘Oh, by the way, we 
meant to have work for hire, let’s amend the Copyright Act and 
put this in there.  Yes, shit storm is the phrase you used.  
Because of procedural issues, everyone thought there wasn’t 
enough debate on the subject.  Artist advocacy groups got very 
vocal about this.  So they decided to pull it back in 2000 and 
said, ‘OK, we won’t go through with that, and there’s a 2000 
amendment that deals with that.”  Id. 
21 See How Stella Got Her Masters Back: Reversion Rights, 
supra note 20 (discussed by panelist Eric German). 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (amended “work made for hire” 
definition) (“In determining whether any work is eligible to be 
considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither 
the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual 
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as 
enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the 
deletion of the words added by that amendment – (A) shall be 
considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall 
be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval 
of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts 
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sult, Congress left the issue of whether a sound re-
cording could be a work made for hire unresolved 
and ambiguous. 
 History shows that the rights afforded to 
sound recording owners are evolving.  Throughout 
the last hundred years sound recordings have gone 
from not being federally recognized copyrightable 
subject matter to a category of intellectual property 
that is slowly enjoying the full panoply of rights af-
forded to other types of works.  Looking forward, fu-
ture judicial opinions interpreting Section 203 of the 
1976 Copyright Act are sure to further define the 
rights held by sound recording copyright owners. 
 
II. RECORD INDUSTRY CUSTOM AND PRACTICE 
 Once a band is scouted and the label deems 
them worthy of a deal, the recording artist is offered 
                                                                                                                             
or the Copyright Office.  Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if 
both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright 
Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual 
Property Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as 
enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never 
enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by 
the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.”); see 
also How Stella Got Her Masters Back: Reversion Rights, supra 
note 20 (discussed by panelist Daryl Friedman) “In ’99 at the 
suggestion of the recording industry association Congress put in 
a law that . . . added . . . sound recordings as a category of 
works for hire . . . .  I . . . was in Washington at the time we 
worked on this issue I don’t believe that Congress had ill intent.  
I think they were just thinking they were doing the right thing 
because it would clarify what they had been told was a very 
clear issue but ambiguous in the law, so they added sound 
recordings as a category of work for hire.  What happened is a 
shit storm of artist revolt when they found out about it and my 
CEO testified about it on the Hill, Sheryl Crow testified and 
eventually that was taken out and we’re back to the sort of 
ambiguous state.”  Id. 
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an exclusive recording agreement whereby the par-
ties agree that in exchange for an advance and prom-
ise of artist’s royalties, the record label is entitled to 
the artist’s exclusive recording services.  Further to 
this agreement, the label takes the position that as a 
matter of law, all sound recordings (also known as 
‘masters’) created during the term of the contract fall 
within the subject matter and scope of the exclusive 
recording agreement and shall be deemed to be prop-
erty of the label from the moment of fixation.  Typical 
language found in recording agreements usually 
characterizes these sound recordings as works made 
for hire23 and as a result the label is deemed the au-
thor of the works.  The recording agreement will also, 
as a matter of custom and practice, include language 
stating that in the event the masters are not found to 
be works made for hire then the artist shall have as-
signed the copyright in the sound recordings to the 
label.24  This “belt and suspenders” approach offers 
                                                             
23 But see Fifty-Six Hope Road Music v. UMG Recordings, No. 
08-CIV-6143(DLC), 2011 WL 3874861 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011) 
in which a dispute concerning the ownership of the renewal 
term copyrights in pre-1978 sound recordings embodying the 
performances of reggae artist, Bob Marley.  The court applied 
the “instance and expense test” under the 1909 Act and deemed 
the recordings created pursuant to exclusive recording 
agreements between Bob Marley and the predecessor in 
interest to defendant UMG Recordings, Inc. were works made 
for hire. 
24 Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Reg. of Copyrights).  “Although the recording industry has 
changed considerably since the 1960’s, the contracts signed 
between record companies and performers appear to have 
changed very little. Most contracts contain clauses specifying 
that the works produced by performers are works made for hire. 
Such contracts generally contain an additional clause providing 
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some consolation to the label in the event that the 
work made for hire language is deemed invalid.  If 
the work made for hire provision is deemed invalid, 
the record company can at least be assured they have 
the right to create derivative works and freely exploit 
the masters for at least thirty five years from the 
date of grant or first publication. 
 In the music industry a sound recording25 is 
created by the process of layering individually rec-
orded tracks of instrumental and vocal performances 
until the many parts are compressed into a final uni-
tary whole.  After sound recordings from a recording 
session are mixed and mastered (or compressed), un-
der the terms of most recording agreements, usually 
between ten to thirteen individual recordings are se-
lected to be included in an album.26  The recordings 
are then arranged, copied,27 packaged, marketed, 
                                                                                                                             
that if the work created is found to by courts to fall within 
neither prong of the definition of works made for hire, that the 
performer assigns all his rights to the record company.” Id. 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Sound recordings’ are works 
that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or 
other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the 
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other 
phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”); see also PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, at § 3:160 (“Sound 
recordings are thus purely aural works, covering only the series 
of recorded sounds.”). 
26 Modern practice also includes digital distribution via 
streaming and sale of individually downloadable phonorecords 
in non-album a la carte configurations. 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Phonorecords’ are material 
objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the 
sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
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distributed and sold to consumers in physical and 
digital formats or licensed to third party audiovisual 
content creators. 
Because demand for physical product has dis-
sipated28 due in part to rampant illegal file sharing29 
over the past decade,30 the modern practice of distri-
bution and commercial exploitation of sound record-
ings is now being transformed and moving from an 
ownership to an access based model.31  Today, most 
record company business models are more focused on 
selling or streaming digital configurations of sound 
                                                                                                                             
device. The term “phonorecords” includes the material object in 
which the sounds are first fixed.”). 
28 D.X. Ferris, Exclusive Interview: Hawthorne Heights on 
Leaving Wind-Up Records, Starting Their Own Label, 
Alternative Press (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.altpress.com/features/entry/hawthorne_heights_inte
rview_leaving_wind-up_records_cardboard_empire (quoting 
Eron Bucciarelli of Hawthorne Heights: “In our opinion, the 
physical format is going the way of the dinosaur, and it doesn’t 
make sense to invest a lot of money into stocking up on an 
inventory.”). 
29 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing of 
MP3’s over the internet for the purpose of space-shifting 
represented copyright infringement). 
30 Album Sales Plummet to a 12-Year Low, NME (Apr. 16, 
2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.nme.com/news/various-
artists/63256 (reporting that “[o]verall LP figures over the last 
week are 27.62% down with week-on-week sales currently 
standing at 1,446,218. Compared with figures of 1,882,878 for 
the same week last year, that shows a 23.19% drop overall. 
That is lower than any of the 640 previous weeks that have 
elapsed since the year 2000.”). 
31 Jareen Imam, Young Listeners Opting to Stream, Not to 
Own Music, CNN (June 16, 2012, 3:39 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/tech/web/music-streaming 
(“[T]he cloud model is where the state of music is heading, and 
for many people ownership is not essential.”). 
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recordings to consumers and for the lucrative32 busi-
ness purpose of master use licensing.33 
                                                             
32 In contrast to the dramatic decrease of physical 
phonorecord sales revenue in the United States caused by 
rampant illegal file sharing, the business of licensing sound 
recordings to film producers, television studios, ad agencies and 
video game publishers for use in their audiovisual projects has 
become a very lucrative revenue stream for record labels.  In 
addition to the value derived from marketing impressions 
created for the artist an independent record label with a decent 
catalog can easily generate $1 million dollars a year in gross 
revenues in licensing fees.  One can reasonably infer that major 
record labels with much more extensive catalogs of successful 
recordings are generating a substantial amount of revenue from 
master use licensing of their catalog.  A recent Rolling Stone 
magazine article reported that The Beatles recently licensed 
master rights to “Tomorrow Never Knows” for use in the 
Showtime series Mad Men for $250,000.  ‘Mad Men’ Paid $250K 
for Beatles Song, Rolling Stone (May 8, 2012, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/mad-men-paid-250k-
for-beatles-song-20120508.  I think the reason that third party 
master use licensing remains a healthy robust source of 
revenue is because the users of sound recordings in these 
instances are most likely to be established content creating 
entities themselves that are owned by major corporations and 
run by professionals.  These enterprises understand and respect 
the importance of copyright law.  These licensees have much to 
lose in the event they were to unlawfully use another entity’s 
intellectual property without permission.  In addition to 
harming their reputation by participating in unlawful conduct, 
the 1976 Copyright Act provides for $150,000 in statutory 
damages for copyright infringement per willful violation.  
Compare this to the no win proposition created by an illegal file 
sharing teenager who is trading MP3s with her friends.  If the 
record label decides to bring an action against such an 
individual, the teenager is most likely going to be judgment 
proof and the record label will look like a bully in the court of 
public opinion. 
33 As commonly used in the music industry, the term “master 
use licensing” refers to the practice of licensing master rights to 
third party audiovisual content (film, TV show, video game) 
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 Under the common arrangement summarized 
above, rights to ownership, control and exploitation 
of sound recordings are deemed to be held solely and 
exclusively by the record label.  Although under the 
language of most exclusive recording agreements 
sound recordings are labeled works made for hire, 
federal copyright law holds that just because a writ-
ing or contract states the work is a work made for 
hire, it does not legally necessarily make it so.34  One 
must analyze the substance of the relationship be-
tween the artist and label in order to determine if the 
work can be properly deemed to be a work made for 
                                                                                                                             
creators whereby the record label (licensor) grants to the 
audiovisual creator (licensee) permission to reproduce sound 
recordings in fixed and timed synchronization with a visual 
image. 
34 Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 24 (“. . . the fact that work-for-hire 
agreements and copyright registrations (characterize the 
works) as works for hire . . . does not lead to the legal conclusion 
that the sound recordings that are the subjects of those 
agreements and registrations are indeed works made for hire.  
If a specifically ordered or commissioned work does not fall 
within one of the categories set forth in the . . . statutory 
definition, the agreement of the parties cannot transform it into 
a work made for hire.”); see also How Stella Got Her Masters 
Back: Reversion Rights, supra note 20 (discussed by panelist 
Ken Abdo, Esq.).  “Most recording agreements in existence have 
work for hire language, which basically means as a technical 
matter that the person offering the services is an employee of 
the employer.  It is an inalienable right that someone has to 
their copyrights so just by saying something is a work for hire, 
even in a writing, doesn’t make it a work for hire.  A work for 
hire is a technical term of art, so, there are many examples of 
what constitutes a work for hire across many different 
businesses, which is basically, you’re an employee, you’re 
treated as an employee, paid as an employee and therefore the 
creative content becomes the property of the employer.”  Id. 
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hire.35 
 
A. Is a Sound Recording a Work Made For Hire? 
 Under Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act36 
there are two mutually exclusive means by which a 
work may acquire work made for hire status.  One of 
the means by which a work can be deemed a work 
made for hire is if it was created by an employee un-
der the course and scope of employment.  The other 
means by which a work may acquire work made for 
hire status is if the work falls within one of the enu-
merated categories of works specially ordered or 
commissioned, is created for use in one of the nine 
enumerated categories, created by an independent 
contractor37 and the parties expressly agree in a 
signed written instrument that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire. 
 One consequence of being deemed a work 
made for hire is that the hiring party, rather than 
                                                             
35 See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 
1141 (2003).  It is also true that the term “work for hire” need 
not expressly be included in such a writing. What is necessary 
is that it must appear from the document that the parties both 
intended that the work be considered a work for hire.  Id. 
36 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘work made for hire’ is – (1) a 
work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or (2) a work specifically ordered or commissioned 
for use as a contribution to a collective work, as part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, 
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the 
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them 
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”). 
37 But see Neil J. Rosini, Copyright Recapture 2012: Strategies 
for Owners and Transferees Facing the New Termination 
Threat, STRAFFORD (June 26, 2012) at slide 36 (“Whether or not 
post 1/1/78 sound recordings by independent contractors are 
eligible for work for hire status is unclear.”). 
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the creator of the work, would be deemed the author 
and will own the copyright in the sound recording 
from the moment of fixation.38  This means that the 
recording artist will not be a rights holder of the 
sound recording copyright.  Instead the artist will 
only be entitled to receive royalties from exploita-
tions of the masters under the terms of the recording 
agreement.  Another consequence is the effect on 
copyright duration.  Under the 1976 Copyright Act, 
the life of copyright for a work made for hire is 120 
years from the date of creation or ninety-five years 
from publication, whichever comes first.39  The most 
important implication for the purposes of this Article 
would be that if sound recordings are deemed to be 
works made for hire, they would not be subject to re-
version under Section 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 The first step in the work made for hire analy-
sis requires determination as to whether the creative 
party was an employee acting within the scope of his 
or her employment; the Supreme Court in Communi-
ty for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid instructs us to 
look to the law of agency.40  In interpreting Section 
101 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court 
held that there are twelve factors41 that should be 
examined in order to determine if the party is an 
employee.  With no single factor being determinative, 
the factors to be considered are: (1) the skill required 
to create the work; (2) the source of the tools and in-
strumentalities; (3) the location of the work; (4) the 
duration of the relationship between the parties; (5) 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign ad-
                                                             
38 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
39 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012). 
40 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 
(1989). 
41 Id. at 751. 
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ditional projects to the hired party; (6) the extent of 
the hired party’s discretion over when, and for how 
long, to work; (7) the method of payment; (8) the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; (9) 
whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; (10) whether the hiring party is in 
business; (11) the provision of employee benefits; and 
(12) the tax treatment of the hired party.42 
 Under most situations, the modern recording 
artist signed to an exclusive recording contract will 
most likely not fall within the definition of an em-
ployee acting within the scope of his or her employ-
ment.  The delivery requirements of a typical record 
deal provide that the artist shall deliver commercial-
ly satisfactory recordings that the label believes will 
sell.  Other delivery criteria require that the record-
ings must be studio recordings, are to be recorded 
during the term, feature the performance of the re-
cording artist, do not infringe any third party rights, 
and are of a certain quantity and minimum playing 
time.43  Typically, the artist usually works unsuper-
vised by the record label and the artist will have 
complete control over creative decisions affecting 
production of the sound recordings.  The lack of label 
control over the artist shows a lack of a sufficient 
nexus between the artist and label that favors a find-
ing that the recording artist is not an employee. 
 In instances where a third party producer is 
brought on board, although the artist may work 
closely with a producer, the artist is the hiring party 
in relation to the producer.  The artist is responsible 
                                                             
42 Id. 
43 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
MUSIC BUSINESS 110-11 (7th ed. 2009). (discussing delivery 
requirements for recordings under a typical recording 
agreement). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Cash From Chaos 
467 
for engaging and paying for the services of the pro-
ducer out of the artist’s advance and all-in royalty.  
Because in most instances the recording artist is the 
final creative decision maker,44 and because the label 
does not withhold taxes or pay social security taxes 
on behalf of recording artists, it is very unlikely that 
the record company will be able to successfully argue 
that the recording artist is an employee of the label 
acting within the scope of his or her employment 
when the works are created. 
 If the recording artist is found not to be an 
employee of the record label under the Community 
For Creative Non-Violence analysis, then we look to 
the second means provided under Section 101 of the 
work made for hire definition.  Usually, the record 
label’s stronger argument of characterizing sound re-
cordings as works made for hire is found here and 
based on the position that the artist is an independ-
ent contractor.  But, under an independent contrac-
tor analysis, only nine types of works can be works 
made for hire. The nine categories are (1) contribu-
tion to collective works, (2) part of a motion picture 
or audiovisual work, (3) translation, (4) supplemen-
tary work such as an introduction, index, appendice, 
forward, explanation, (5) a compilation (6) an in-
structional text, (7) a test, (8) as answer material for 
a test, or (9) an atlas. If the work falls within one of 
the nine enumerated categories and there is a signed 
writing expressly stating that the sound recording is 
                                                             
44 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 56, supra note 
11, at 3.  Although the artist is in control of what happens 
during the tracking phase of the recording, I have experienced 
situations where a rogue producer in post-production will re-
arrange or shorten the recorded chorus or verse, add an effect or 
vocalist, or performance of a side-musician without consulting 
the artist or label. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Cash From Chaos 
468 
a work made for hire, then the work will be deemed a 
work made for hire. 
 Here, the label’s position would be based on 
the premise that a sound recording is either a work 
specifically ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work,45 a work that is part of 
an audiovisual work46 or that the album embodying 
the sound recordings is a compilation.47  Although, 
there is a dearth of Supreme Court judicial opinion 
on these matters, there have been several decisions 
in lower jurisdictions recognizing that sound record-
ings are not one of the nine categories of specially or-
                                                             
45 See Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 24. “Record companies have argued that 
even under the law as it existed before last November, the vast 
majority of commissioned sound recordings qualified as works 
made for hire because they were contributions to collective 
works or compilations, two categories of works included in the 
statutory definition. This theory may well be valid under 
traditional distribution models. A record album may well be 
considered a collective work, and a sound recording of each 
performance included on the album therefore may well be a 
contribution to a collective work. The courts have not yet 
addressed this issue, although several courts have stated that 
sound recordings as such are not among any of the nine 
categories of specially ordered or commissioned works. Some 
representatives of performers have rejected the theory that an 
individual sound recording on an album can usually be 
considered a contribution to a collective work, arguing that an 
album of songs by the same artist, delivered by that artist to a 
record company, does not qualify as a collective work.”  Id. 
46 See Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in 
Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (2002) for an in depth 
discussion. 
47 See David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, 
Works for Hire, and the Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 
49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 387 (2001) for an in depth 
discussion. 
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dered or commissioned works.48  Because of the lack 
of authority on this  issue, it is hard to predict with 
any degree of certainty whether record labels putting 
forth one of these theories would be successful in 
convincing a court that sound recordings are works 
made for hire under the terms of a traditional record-
ing agreement. 
Although the above arguments characterizing 
sound recordings as works made for hire will likely 
fail, record labels do have another alternative that 
will enable them to successfully obtain control over 
sound recording copyrights for at least thirty five 
years from the date of grant.  Under this approach, a 
label would be able to control rights to sound record-
ings under the non-work made for hire terms of the 
recording agreement via the assignment clause,49 but 
they would not own the copyright in the sound re-
cording as a matter of law under the Section 101 def-
inition of a work made for hire. 
 
III. THE RECORDING SESSION 
  Recording an album is usually a long and ar-
duous process and subject to many unforeseen occur-
                                                             
48 See Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc., 128 
F.3d 872, 878 (5th Cir.1997) (finding that the category of 
“audiovisual works” in the work for hire definition does not 
include sound recordings); see also Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. 
Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999) (sound recordings at issue were 
“not works for hire under the second part of the statute because 
they do not fit within any of the nine enumerated categories”); 
see also Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 
(D.D.C. 1999) (finding that “a sound recording does not fit 
within any of the nine [enumerated] categories”). 
49 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 380–81 
(1994) (“[Artist/record company] contracts typically contain ‘belt 
and suspenders’ language transferring copyright in the event a 
work is found not [to] be a work made for hire.”).  
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rences.  The consistent variable is that a creation of a 
sound recording results from a culmination of many 
steps and a multitude of decisions.  With the above in 
mind, this Part will examine a typical recording ses-
sion for a four piece rock band comprised of vocals, 
guitar, bass and drums. 
  In the music industry, a typical sound record-
ing is created by a process of layering individually 
recorded audio tracks of instrumental and vocal per-
formances until the many individual tracks are com-
pressed into a final unitary whole.  During a tradi-
tional recording session each instrument is isolated 
and recorded on a separate track,50 then mixed and 
mastered.  The mixing phase refers to the process 
where the volume levels of the individual tracks are 
adjusted and some effects are added to enrich the vo-
cal and musical performances.  After all desired vol-
ume levels are decided upon for each individual track 
in the matrix, the final mix is then compressed into a 
unitary whole and becomes the final ‘mastered’ ver-
sion of the recording.51  This mastered version of the 
                                                             
50 Although an argument can be made that each separate 
track is a sound recording subject to copyright in and of itself, a 
better characterization is that creation of a sound recording is a 
process that occurs over a period of time.  The master recording 
that has been tracked, mixed and compressed is the complete 
version of the work.  An analogy can be made to creation of an 
audiovisual work, each day of principal photography is not 
intended to be a complete audiovisual work, but rather the final 
work is the culmination of a process that includes filming, 
scoring, directing and editing all the individual parts. 
51 For the sake of clarity, please note that the term ‘mastered’ 
here refers to the process of aggregating the individual recorded 
tracks created during the recording session and compressing 
them into a unitary whole whereby. The purpose of the 
mastering process is to create the final sound recording along 
which includes the output volume levels the listener hears 
when listening to the commercially released recording.  The 
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sound recording is then reproduced, distributed, 
marketed and commercially exploited by the record 
label. 
  Historically, most rock bands are organically 
created by a group of friends.  The musical composi-
tions performed by the band are usually written by a 
key member or key members of the group.  These key 
members are the masterminds and source of creative 
vision for the band.  The musical compositions are 
the underlying works that are performed when the 
band plays live and are embodied in sound record-
ings.  The composition is made up of the lyrics and 
melody of musical work.  In most instances, the key 
member gives aural effect to the ideas embodied in 
the composition.52  For example, the guitar player 
will have a riff and play it at practice; the singer may 
have a notebook of lyrics or a chorus in mind.  Dur-
ing rehearsal the guitar player may play a riff over 
and over again until the drummer and bass player 
join in, followed by the singer, and the composition 
eventually takes shape, with certain parts extended, 
shortened, changed, or deleted as deemed necessary 
by the band.  Once the final form of the musical com-
position is agreed upon, the band will usually prac-
tice performing it in their rehearsal studio until they 
get the opportunity to fix it in a recording. 
  Prior to the formal recording of a musical 
                                                                                                                             
term ‘mastered’ should not be confused with the term master 
recording which is just another name for a phonorecord as used 
in the music industry.  Thus, a sound recording is the final 
result of ‘mastered’ audio recordings and the last mechanical 
step in creation of the work.  A sound recording is also 
embodied in a master recording i.e., a phonorecord. 
52 Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 
(1884) (“...[T]he author is the man who really represents, 
creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or imagination.”). 
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work, there is usually a pre-production phase in 
which the artist creates low cost raw versions of re-
cordings that are typically recorded at the band’s re-
hearsal studio.  These demos are usually devoid of 
any big production elements.  The purpose of demo is 
to give the artist and label a rough idea of what the 
final recording will or should sound like.  These 
rough drafts are usually listened to by the artist and 
sent to the record label and producer for creative 
feedback.  Once the artist takes the producer’s and 
label’s creative notes into consideration, the artist 
will fine tune the composition in order to realize their 
creative vision of what the final sound recording 
should sound like.  With the help of the producer and 
label, the artist decides which compositions will be 
recorded.  Once they have a target list of works to 
record, the artist will head to the studio to begin 
tracking (also known as recording) the album. 
  The formal process of creating a sound record-
ing begins with tracking the drums.  The drums pro-
vide the foundation of the recording.  The drums are 
the time keeping element upon which that the rest of 
the group builds upon.  Along with the final mix 
down, the process of tracking the drums is usually 
the most cumbersome and labor intensive. 
  Although it is true that the sound engineer 
usually decides which microphones to use and where 
to place them, the overriding goal of the engineer 
when tracking the drums is to set up the micro-
phones with the intention of not getting in the way of 
the drummer’s performance.  The drummer as re-
cording artist usually does not concern himself with 
placement of microphones.  The drummer as creator 
of his performance chooses which gear he will use for 
the recording session.  These choices are based on his 
comfort level and on his subjective idea of what 
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equipment sounds the best.  As a technical matter, 
once the drum tech sets up the kit, the drummer is 
mostly interested in having his drums set up in the 
usual manner in which he performs, making sure all 
the drum heads, stands and cymbals are tilted at the 
proper angles and within his reach. 
  Next, the engineer comes in, works around the 
placement of the drum kit and sets up the micro-
phones for the purpose of capturing the drummer’s 
performance, ever vigilant of making sure the micro-
phones are not obstructing the drummer’s perfor-
mance in any way.  In order to accomplish this goal, 
a reasonably competent sound engineer will work 
within a range of industry norms and practices that 
dictate the types of microphones used and the dis-
tance between the microphone and the instrument.  
Although the engineer has discretion to choose ex-
pensive microphones, if he has them at his disposal, 
for the most part the professional sound engineer’s 
microphone of choice for recording musical instru-
ments is going to be a high quality, moderately 
priced and durable microphone.53 
  Once the microphones are set up, the engineer 
will ask the drummer to hit each drum head and 
cymbal over and over again while the engineer is in 
the control room.  The engineer will then fine tune 
the microphone volume levels of each isolated micro-
phone at the mixing board.  The process of repeatedly 
hitting each drum head and cymbal is long and mo-
notonous and could take hours until the exact de-
sired tone of sound is captured.  The engineer and 
producer are usually the parties deciding the appro-
priate drum sound to be desired for purposes of 
                                                             
53 The Shure SM57 microphone is the mainstay of the live 
performance and recorded music industry. 
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tracking. 
  Once the right sound is agreed upon, the levels 
on the mixing board are noted for future reference.  
This process is repeated until all the desired sound 
levels are reached for all the individual drums and 
hardware included in the kit (i.e., the floor toms, 
snare, bass drum, hanging toms, high hat, crash 
cymbal, and ride cymbal).  Once the desired levels for 
each piece of drum hardware are found, then the first 
layer, which is actually the combination of multiple 
layers of drum tracks, is recorded.  The creativity 
provided by the drummer originates from his person-
al drumming style which is mainly derived from his 
internal timekeeping rhythm and how fast, hard or 
soft he hits the drums and cymbals while he plays. 
  On the first take, the entire band will perform 
the musical composition in unison in different isola-
tion booths while the drum tracks are isolated and 
recorded.  These ancillary vocal, guitar and bass 
tracks are not intended for use in the final sound re-
cording.  These ancillary recordings are referred to as 
scratch tracks and will later be discarded and rec-
orded over.  The sole purpose of the scratch tracks 
are to provide the drummer with an audio context to 
which he performs his drum parts. 
  Next the bass track is recorded.  Usually the 
bass player sets up his bass cabinet and amplifier in 
a recording booth isolated from the rest of the band.  
The engineer will choose the types of microphones to 
be used and decide where to place the microphones.  
Again, these technical non-unique54 decisions fall 
                                                             
54 Samson Vermont, The Sine Qua Non of Copyright is 
Uniqueness, not Originality, 20 TEXAS INTELL. PROP. L.J. 327, 
328 (“[U]niqueness is the true sine qua non of copyright and 
that the two components [independent creation by the author 
and a modicum of creativity] are rough heuristics for 
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within reasonable parameters dictated by studio in-
dustry custom and practice.  During tracking of the 
bass performance, the bass player will listen to the 
previously recorded drum tracks on headphones.  
The unique creativity provided by the bass player is 
derived from his interpretation of the musical com-
position, his picking style and the individual rhythm 
which finds expression when he physically plays the 
bass.  Once captured, the isolated recording of the 
bassist’s performance will be the second major layer 
of the recording matrix that goes into creating the 
final sound recording. 
  Next, the guitars are recorded under a similar 
process as was used to record the bass parts.  The 
guitar player listens to the drum and bass tracks on 
headphones in an isolation booth and records his gui-
tar parts.  The creativity provided by the guitar play-
er is mostly derived from his timing and unique 
method of strumming the instrument.  The guitar 
player also decides which distortion box to use (if 
any) during his recorded performance.  The guitar 
player also decides which instrumental guitar flour-
ishes and leads are going to be added to the record-
ing.  These unique leads and flourishes are usually 
recorded on separate tracks on separate takes, using 
the aforementioned process of playback and “layer-
ing” additional tracks on top of each other.  After the 
drums, bass and guitars are recorded, the vocalist 
will also go through a similar process of listening to 
the recorded music on headphones and have his iso-
lated performance recorded on a separate track or 
tracks.  The originality created by the vocalist’s per-
formance comes from his unique vocal tone, timing, 
                                                                                                                             
uniqueness. When we focus directly on uniqueness, many 
puzzles melt away.”). 
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cadence, breathing capacity and energy behind the 
performance of the lyrics.  At each step of the way 
each individual performance is mechanically cap-
tured in the sound recording. 
  During the entire recording process the pro-
ducer will offer creative feedback to the recording 
artist.  It is the job of the producer to inspire the 
band in order to draw out the best possible perfor-
mance and capture it on the recording.  The level of 
creative feedback and degree to which the recording 
artist cooperates with the producer varies immensely 
depending on the parties.  As with all creative en-
deavors, the process of creating a sound recording is 
a very fluid process and the producer’s degree of in-
fluence on the final result55 is based mostly on the 
relationship and chemistry between the parties. 
  Once tracking is complete, the volume levels 
and effects layered on the individual tracks are 
mixed down into a final version by the sound mixing 
engineer.  Depending on the agreement of the par-
ties, the job of mixing the final recording may or may 
not be done by the recording engineer who may or 
may not be the same person as the producer.  Once 
the final mix of individual isolated tracks is com-
plete, the recording is compressed and ‘mastered’ by 
the engineer into a final unitary whole technically fit 
for commercial exploitation.  This mastered record-
ing is the first phonorecord which embodies the 
sound recording.  This first phonorecord is the source 
asset from which all subsequent copies or 
phonorecords are reproduced. 
                                                             
55 Sometimes in post-production a producer will re-arrange or 
shorten the recorded chorus or verse, add an effect or vocalist, 
or performance of a side-musician without first consulting the 
artist. 
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IV. SOUND RECORDING AUTHORSHIP 
 
A. A Survey of Artistic, Legislative and Judicial 
Guidance 
 There are many sources that inform as to who 
is an author of a sound recording.  Although the 1976 
Copyright Act does not define the term “author,” Cir-
cular 56 issued by the United States Copyright Office 
expresses that a performer or producer is the au-
thor.56  Recording artists,57 commentators,58 and ju-
                                                             
56 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 56, supra note 
11 (“The author of a sound recording is the performer(s) or 
record producer or both.”). 
57 Katie Van Syckle, Q&A: Dave Grohl on His ‘Sound City’ 
Doc and Taking Risks in Music, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/q-a-dave-grohl-on-his-
sound-city-doc-and-taking-risks-in-music-
20130125#ixzz2NLaBayS6.  Some artists even give great 
deference and creative credit to the actual studio and mixing 
board used in producing their sound recordings. Professional 
musician and vocalist David Grohl is quoted as saying “I always 
had a strong connection to that studio because Nirvana wasn’t 
meant to be the biggest band in the world. We just weren’t. So 
when we went there for 16 days, we weren’t making that album 
with the intention that we were going to change the fuckin’ 
world. We just wanted it to sound good . . . The fact that what 
happened actually, happened, makes me think there’s 
something a more than just wires and knobs in that place. 
Personally, I have a strong emotional connection to it. 
Musically, there’s something magical about that place, and 
when I heard that they were closing I thought, ‘I have a studio, 
I make records every day. If I could be reunited with this piece 
of equipment that I consider to be the best sounding board I’ve 
ever worked on and the board that’s responsible for the person 
that I am, it would be a huge full-circle emotional reunion for 
me.’ And that’s why I made the movie.”  Id.  This statement was 
made in reference to the Neve 8028 analog mixing console from 
Sound City recording studio.  Sound City was the recording 
studio where Fleetwood Mac, Nirvana, The Red Hot Chili 
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dicial opinions59 also provide clues as to who should 
be deemed an author of a sound recording.  Although 
there is no definitive case law resolving the issue of 
who is an author of a sound recording, there is a rich 
history suggesting that an author of a work is the 
mastermind or creator of the work.60  
 Legislative history also provides guidance as 
to who could be deemed an author of a sound record-
ing.  Congress has suggested that performers, studio 
engineers and producers may be deemed authors of 
sound recordings,61 and even suggested that the per-
                                                                                                                             
Peppers, Neil Young, Bad Religion, Tom Petty, Rick Springfield 
plus many others recorded. 
58 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT NIMMER § 2.10[A][3] (1999) (“Absent an employment 
relationship, or an express assignment of copyright from the 
performers to the record producer, the resulting ownership of 
the sound recording copyright will either be exclusively in the 
performing artists, or ... a joint ownership between the record 
producer and the performing artists.”). 
59 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that exercising control over the finished work 
is strong indicia of authorship). 
60 Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 
(1884). Here the Court adopted a dictionary definition of 
“author,” and held that an author is “he to whom any owes its 
origin; originator; maker.”  Id.  See also Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).  
Generally, the author of a work is the person who “actually 
creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into 
a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”  
Id. 
61 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5 
(1971) (“The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will 
usually, though not always, involve ‘authorship’ both on the 
part of the performers whose performance is captured and on 
the part of the record producer responsible for setting up the 
recording session, capturing and electronically processing the 
sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final 
sound recording. There may be cases where the record 
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son who sets up the recording session may be consid-
ered an author.62  Most telling from a historical per-
spective is the fact that Congress decided to leave the 
1971 Amendment silent as to the issue of authorship.  
As a result, the 1909 Act controlled, and because 
Congress deemed that sound recording authorship 
should be left to the free market to decide, works 
were often characterized as works made for hire un-
der work made for hire provisions of recording con-
tracts.63 
 
                                                                                                                             
producer’s contribution is so minimal that the performance is 
the only copyrightable element in the work, and there may be 
cases (for example, recordings of birdcalls, sounds of racing 
cars, etc.) where only the record producer’s contribution is 
copyrightable.”). 
62 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976) (“[S]etting up the 
recording session, capturing and electronically processing the 
sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final 
sound recording” may constitute authorship of a sound 
recording.)  But see Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 605-
606 (1993) (finding that plaintiff was not a joint author of a 
sound recording where he had merely arranged and paid for the 
recording session and requested that specific works were to be 
recorded.  Plaintiff did not make any musical or creative artistic 
contribution to the sound recordings.  Plaintiff did not serve as 
the producer, studio engineer nor in any way directed the 
manner in which the musical compositions were performed.); 
see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT NIMMER § 2.10[A][2][b] (1999) (“If the act of `setting 
up the recording session’ were the record producer’s only basis 
for claiming original contribution to the recording, and hence 
‘authorship,’ it would be ill-based indeed. This is no more an act 
of `authorship’ than is the act of one who makes available to a 
writer a room, a stenographer, a typewriter, and paper.”). 
63 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5 
(1971) (“As in the case of motion pictures, the bill does not fix 
the authorship, or the resulting ownership, of sound recordings, 
but leaves these matters to the employment relationship and 
bargaining among the interests involved.”). 
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B. Sheryl Crow “Featured Artist” Approach 
 The Subcommittee hearings of the 106th Con-
gress were held to resolve the issues raised by the 
1999 Amendment.  During these work for hire hear-
ings, recording artist Sheryl Crow testified as to who 
she thought should be deemed an author of a sound 
recording.  In answering the question, she took a 
pragmatic position that focused on the financial and 
creative burdens associated with the creation and 
marketing of records.  The answer to determining 
sound recording authorship in Ms. Crow’s mind was 
provided by looking at the music industry custom 
and practice and focusing on the party that carries 
the burden of creativity and economic responsibility.   
 In her mind, from a constitutional64 perspec-
tive, the featured recording artist was the creative 
force65 behind the sound recording.  Also important, 
                                                             
64 Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 24, at 162-66 (statement of recording 
artist, Sheryl Crow)  “If anyone in this room sat in a recording 
studio, you would see that the artist featured on a sound 
recording functions as the author of the work. Without the 
creative vision of that featured artist, there would be no sound 
recording. To legislate that the record label should be 
recognized and credited as the author of the sound recording 
undermines what I feel the framers’ intent of the Constitution 
was. I am the author and creator of my work. Although I 
appreciate my record label’s advice to me, they by no means tell 
me what to do on my records...I am basically left to my own 
devices in creating a work. I choose what the sound should be 
by choosing and working closely with a producer, or in my case I 
produce my own material. I choose the musicians, the 
engineers, the studio all based on what I am striving to express 
artistically.”  Id. 
65 Id.  “. . . After I have composed the songs that will appear 
on the recording, I try to define how I want the album to sound . 
. . .  I try to bring a look and feel to the recording that will take 
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from a public policy vantage point, she stated that 
the featured artist (and not the engineer, producer, 
back-up singers, or studio musicians) is the party re-
sponsible for recouping the costs of creating and 
marketing the album to the record label. The fund 
from which the advance is recouped is derived solely 
from the featured artist’s royalties.66  In her opinion, 
the featured artist should be deemed the author be-
cause the featured artist was the creative force be-
hind the recording.  Further buttressing her position, 
                                                                                                                             
the listener on a journey. Because I produce my own records, I 
am basically the captain of the ship and ultimately, the decision 
maker, I must also decide what musicians I want to perform on 
each song, given the desired sounds I want to attain, what 
engineering staff to implement my sonic vision, (and) what 
studio will be appropriate . . . .” 
66 Id.  “But the most important factor is that I pay for the 
recording of my albums and a portion of the marketing of the 
album out of my own royalties, as do all other recording artists. 
This is where we, as authors of our own work differ from the 
film industry. Comparisons with regard to the work for hire 
amendment have been made where it is necessary to treat films 
as a work made for hire to avoid issues of authorship. The 
record business is different than the film industry in a 
fundamental way. In the film industry, the studio pays the 
production costs, they hire the director, they hire the actors, 
they come out with a product that they have hired to be 
fulfilled, and then they own the film. The cost of the production 
is never charged back to the creative contributors. In the record 
industry, as a recording artist I do not receive a fee for making 
an album. I may receive an advance to cover the cost of the 
recording process, which I am responsible for paying back in 
full. In other words, I don’t receive a dime from the sale of my 
records until I have paid for all the costs incurred during 
production up to the point of distribution . . . .  In short, the 
sound recording artist is not only the author but is also the 
person in charge of all facets of production up to the point of 
distribution. We give the record labels our work to exploit for 35 
years. Like other authors, we should be able to reclaim our 
work as Congress intended.” 
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she argued that the featured artist should benefit 
from the spirit of the statute because the featured 
artist was typically the unremunerated party who 
was ultimately burdened financially under the exclu-
sive recording agreement. 
 
C. Marybeth Peters “Key Contributor” Approach 
 Register of Copyright Marybeth Peters also 
testified during the work made for hire Subcommit-
tee hearings of the 106th Congress.  When asked for 
her opinion as to who should be deemed an author of 
a sound recording, Ms. Peters recommended a reso-
lution that would result in works of joint authorship.  
These works would be partly owned by the “Key Con-
tributor” as creator/author and partly owned by the 
record label as employer or commissioning party.  
Under her Key Contributor view, sound recording 
authorship would be deemed vested in part to record-
ing artists as individual authors only if they contrib-
uted a major portion of copyrightable expression in 
the sound recording vis-à-vis their performance67 and 
in part to the record label under the work made for 
hire doctrine.68  The Register of Copyright recom-
                                                             
67 See Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 24.  “. . . a ‘key contributor’ . . . is someone 
who has made a major contribution of copyrightable expression 
to a sound recording. Ordinarily, it would include the featured 
performer or performers. For example, Frank Sinatra and 
Madonna would clearly be key contributors of authorship to the 
sound recordings on which they perform. Each of the members 
of the Beatles and Metallica would also be key contributors. In 
contrast, a background musician would not be a key 
contributor.” Id. 
68 Incidentally this same result may arise if a band member 
also happens to own the record label.  This occurred frequently 
in the early 1980s when many independent record labels were 
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mended a compromise whereby the 1976 Copyright 
Act would be amended creating an exception to the 
sound recording category under the Section 101 work 
made for hire definition (as revised by the 1999 
Amendment) that would allow key contributors a 
right to terminate,69 but only as to their portion of 
meaningful authorship.70  Here, the meaningful au-
                                                                                                                             
formed by recording artists out of necessity.  Many bands that 
could not get signed by a major label simply resorted to 
releasing their own records.  These independent record labels 
were created by a key contributing member of the band.  
Examples of dual label/key contributor ownership include the 
record labels Alternative Tentacles (owned by Jello Biafra, lead 
singer of the Dead Kennedys), Dischord Records (owned by Ian 
MacKaye, lead singer of Minor Threat), SST Records (owned by 
Greg Ginn, guitar player of Black Flag), Epitaph (owned by 
Brett Gurewitz, guitar player of Bad Religion) and BYO 
Records (owned by Shawn and Mark Stern, vocalist, guitar 
player and bass player of Youth Brigade). 
69 Subject to the ‘majority rule’ provision of 17 U.S.C. § 
203(a)(1): “In the case of a grant executed by two or more 
authors of a joint work, termination of the grant may be 
effected by a majority of the authors who executed it . . . .” 
70 See Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the 
Judiciary, supra note 24.  “Most sound recordings will have a 
number of potential coauthors, including all of the musicians 
who perform on the recording, the producer of the recording, 
and perhaps others. There could easily be a dozen or more 
potential coauthors of a single sound recording .  . . .  The 
Copyright Office believes that those who contribute significant 
authorship to a sound recording should have the right to 
terminate. I will refer to these persons as ‘key contributors.’ I 
use the term ‘key contributors’ because, as the recording 
industry has correctly emphasized, permitting every contributor 
to a sound recording to exercise termination rights could make 
the exploitation of a sound recording unworkable . . . a ‘key 
contributor’ . . . is someone who has made a major contribution 
of copyrightable expression to a sound recording. Ordinarily, it 
would include the featured performer or performers. For 
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thorship referred to by the Register of Copyright is 
the artist’s unique performance fixed in the sound 
recording. 
 
D. Other Theories for Determining Who is an 
Author of a Sound Recording 
 
1. Authorship as Implied by Public Perception 
and Record Label Representations 
 A proponent of the proposition that a record-
ing artist is the author of the sound recording may 
also try to argue that because of public perception 
                                                                                                                             
example, Frank Sinatra and Madonna would clearly be key 
contributors of authorship to the sound recordings on which 
they perform. Each of the members of the Beatles and Metallica 
would also be key contributors. In contrast, a background 
musician would not be a key contributor. Exempting those key 
contributors from the work made for hire provisions should 
result in only a limited number of potential terminations. This 
could be accomplished by retaining the inclusion of sound 
recordings among the categories of works eligible to be 
commissioned works made for hire, but excluding the 
contributions of these key contributors from work-made-for-hire 
status. The result would be that the sound recording would be a 
joint work that is in part work made for hire and in part a work 
of individual authors.”  But see Eriq Gardner, Ray Charles’ 
Children Win lawsuit Over Song Rights Termination, 
HOLLYWOOD RPT. (Jan. 30, 2013, 10:18 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/ray-charles-children-
win-lawsuit-416809. Here, Gardner holds the view that the 
recent case involving suit against the grandchildren of Ray 
Charles holds bad precedent for producers in their capacity to 
block termination notices.  “Here is where Collins made the 
second piece of important precedent by deciding that the 
foundation lacks standing since the statutes were intended to 
apply only to authors, statutory heirs and grantees of transfers 
and their successors -- not beneficial owners, which could be 
bad news for other royalty recipients like record producers who 
might wish to challenge termination notices.”  Id. 
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and record label representations, the recording artist 
has a valid claim to assert authorship in sound re-
cordings that capture the recording artist’s perfor-
mance.  An authorship claim based on this quasi-
source of origin theory may be made on the premise 
that authorship of a sound recording could be rea-
sonably derived by examining who the public thinks 
the natural author is.  Here, the artist could claim 
that members of the public would naturally identify 
the artist as the author of the work and that no rea-
sonable member of the public would identify the rec-
ord label as the author of the sound recording.71 
Buttressing this position, the artist could show 
that the primary focus of marketing materials creat-
ed by the label feature the name and likeness of the 
recording artist and were not focused on the record 
label in and of itself.  Flowing from this equitable 
quasi-trademark position, the recording artist would 
argue that since it was to the label’s advantage to 
commercially exploit the sound recordings by mes-
saging that the recordings featured the artist’s per-
formances, then the artist now has a valid claim that 
she is the author.  The artist can claim she was the 
origin of the sound recording, i.e., that the record la-
bel was not the primary source of marketable value 
inherent in the sound recording, but rather the value 
in the work was derived from the fact that the artist 
was the creator. 
 
                                                             
71 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).  
Applying a similar rationale, the court held that “[i]t is striking 
in Malcolm X how much the person who controlled the hue of 
the lighting contributed, yet no one would use the word ‘author’ 
to denote that individual’s relationship to the movie. A creative 
contribution does not suffice to establish authorship of the 
movie.” Id. at 1233. 
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2. Authorship by Estoppel 
 Under an authorship by estoppel approach, 
one can leave out those individuals that do not send 
termination of grant notices within the window of 
opportunity as outlined under Section 203 from the 
realm of possible sound recording authors.72  If a par-
ty fails to assert termination rights as dictated by the 
statute in a timely manner, they are lost.  As a prac-
tical matter, if only one out of several potential 
claimants were to deliver termination of grant notice 
within the requisite window of opportunity, then the 
class of potential authors closes as a matter of law to 
all other non-claimants. 
Under this approach, only those individuals 
who timely filed for a Section 203 reversion are in 
the pool of eligible sound recording author candi-
                                                             
72 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012) (“Termination of the grant may 
be effected at any time during a period of five years beginning 
at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the 
grant; or if the grant covers right of publication of the work, the 
period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of 
publication of the work under the grant or at the end of the 
forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever 
term ends earlier.”); 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A) (“The notice shall 
state the effective date of the termination, which shall fall 
within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this 
subsection, and the notice shall be served not less than two or 
more than ten years before that date.”); see also Rosini, supra 
note 37, at slide 27-28 (“§ 203(a) provides right of termination 
for post-1978 grants made by author (applicable both to pre-
1978 and post - 1978 works) with a Five Year Window open 
from the 35th anniversary through the 40th year (with a twist 
for publication rights) - measured from the grant. The twist: If 
the grant covers the right of publication of the work, effective 
date must occur between (i) the 35th anniversary through the 
40th year measured from the date of publication OR (ii) 
between the 40th anniversary through the 45th year measured 
from the date of execution of the grant, whichever ends 
earlier.”). 
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dates. Those who did not file a timely termination 
notice have waived their statutory rights, including 
any potential joint authorship claims they may have 
had.  This does away with the potential clutter of 
claimants by closing the class to those who do not file 
a timely notice of termination under the statute. 
 
V. AUTHOR AS “KEY MEMBER” 
  The following Part will provide a reasonable, 
nuanced and equitable solution to the issue of deter-
mining who is an author of a sound recording for 
purposes of terminating a grant of transfer under 
Section 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act.  This solution 
is not focused on the broad issue of who can be an au-
thor of a sound recording in general, but rather fo-
cuses on the practical and narrow issue of who is an 
author of a sound recording for purposes of recaptur-
ing rights under Section 203 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act. 
  The answer can be found by focusing on who is 
a key member of the recording group.73  From this 
class of key individuals we then look to see which 
                                                             
73 Session musicians can be excluded from the potential pool 
of sound recording authors because session musicians are not 
the sine qua non of the sound recording. But rather, the key 
member is the indispensable unique and essential ingredient 
that makes the sound recording an original work. See also 
Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the Judiciary, 
supra note 24 (testimony of Jay Cooper addressing issue as to 
why session musicians can be subject to work made for hire 
agreements).  “There is one other intervening factor, which is 
that he [the session musician] is a member of the musician’s 
union. When you contract with musicians, you contract with a 
certain employment form. The union sanctifies this relationship 
and he is paid as an employee just like any other hired hand on 
that particular record date.”  Id. 
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member of that class was a signatory to the record-
ing agreement from which the sound recordings 
arose.  Under this two-step approach, if an individual 
is a key member of recording artist and a signatory to 
a record contract signed in the United States on or 
after January 1, 1978, then that individual should be 
deemed an author of a sound recording entitling 
them to terminate the grant of transfer under Sec-
tion 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
  I propose that as a matter of equity, only key 
members of a band should be eligible to have stand-
ing as an author of a sound recording in order to as-
sert a Section 203 termination.  This ad valorem74 
vesting of sound recording authorship for purpose of 
Section 203 termination is based on the premise that 
if the key member was not in the band, then the rec-
ord label would not have signed the band to an exclu-
sive record contract.  If a member of recording artist 
is a key member, then one can reasonably deduce 
that they are an initial creative agent and cause of 
the circumstances that gave rise to the existence of 
the recording agreement in the first place.  But for 
the creative vision, unique skills and original talent 
of the key member,75 the record label would not have 
                                                             
74 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (9th ed. 2009) defines an ad 
valorem tax as “[a] tax imposed on the value of something (esp. 
real property), rather than on its quantity or some other 
measure.”  But instead of imposing a tax, I suggest here that 
courts impose (vest) authorship in key members according to 
their value as creators. 
75 Denis Dutton, A Darwinian Theory of Beauty, TED (Nov. 
2010), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/denis_dutton_a_darwinian_theory_of_
beauty.  Denis Dutton presented a number of interesting 
related observations regarding beauty, based on the premise 
that “We find beauty in something done well.”  Echoing what 
Dutton holds as axiomatic, I propose that the key member is 
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signed the band to an exclusive recording contract. 
  Since participation by the key member in the 
recording group is the primary cause for the exist-
ence of the recording agreement and the recording 
agreement is the legal document that gives rise to 
the circumstances from which the sound recording is 
created, then one can, following back in a logical 
manner, show a causal nexus between the key mem-
ber as valued creative member of recording artist 
and prime mover of circumstances that led to the 
creation of the sound recording.  Additionally, all key 
members of a recording artist who intend76 to create 
joint works under the recording agreement would be 
the sole joint authors of the work for purposes of Sec-
tion 203.77 
                                                                                                                             
responsible for doing something well, i.e., performing.  Because 
the performance of the key member captured in the sound 
recording is done well, then this is something the record label 
finds beauty in.  Since the record label values this key member 
performance it has offered the group an advance and exclusive 
recording agreement.  Without the key member’s participation 
in the group, the record company would not have offered a 
record contract to this group of individuals.  Without this 
recording agreement no subsequent sound recording derived 
from the agreement would have been created. 
76 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (“. . . 
equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships in 
which all participants fully intend to be joint authors.  The 
sharing of benefits in other relationships involving assistance in 
the creation of a copyrightable work can be more precisely 
calibrated by the participants in the contract negotiations 
regarding division of royalties or assignment of shares of 
ownership of the copyright . . . ”). 
77 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976) (“Under the bill, as 
under the present law, co owners of a copyright would be 
treated generally as tenants in common, with each co owner 
having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, 
subject to a duty of accounting to the other co owners for any 
profits.”). 
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  A recording artist can show they are a key 
member by providing evidence that they are entitled 
to royalties under the exclusive recording agreement. 
Here, authorship can be justified by showing that the 
key member is a beneficial owner “plus.”  The “plus” 
element is the reason the key member receives the 
royalty.  If the reason the member receives a royalty 
is due to the fact that they were a meaningful crea-
tive contributor to the sound recording, then their 
position as key member is justified.  This reason 
would trump the status of a member being a royalty 
recipient for non-creative, political or other business 
reasons.  This would be a question of fact to be decid-
ed on a case-by-case basis.  If a member of the band 
has shown they are a key member, then they have 
passed the first hurdle on their way to being deemed 
an author of a sound recording for purposes of recap-
turing copyrights under Section 203. If an individual 
shows they are a key member, they have justified 
their inclusion as a member of the eligible pool of 
candidates that may claim authorship of a sound re-
cording with vested standing rights to assert a Sec-
tion 203 termination. 
  The second step in the analysis looks at who 
signed the grant of transfer.  Because Congress uses 
the language “executed” in reference to the types of 
grants that authors can terminate, one can apply the 
plain meaning rule to reasonably infer that Section 
203 terminations of transfer are meant to apply only 
to written grants.  Section 203 states: 
 
In the case of any work other than a work 
made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive 
grant of a transfer or license of copyright or 
of any right under a copyright, executed by 
the author on or after January 1, 1978, oth-
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erwise than by will, is subject to termina-
tion under the following conditions: (1) In 
the case of a grant executed by one author, 
termination of the grant may be effected by 
that author or . . . In the case of a grant ex-
ecuted by two or more authors of a joint 
work, termination of the grant may be ef-
fected by a majority of the authors who exe-
cuted it . . .78 
 
 Section 203 plainly states that only individu-
als who execute the grant have reversion rights. As a 
matter of practice, an exclusive recording agreement 
is signed by the recording artist and an authorized 
representative of the label.  Therefore, Congress 
must have intended that a recording artist who signs 
a recording agreement is an author capable of recap-
turing sound recording copyrights under Section 203. 
 When combining the rationale and analysis 
summarized above, the equitable and practical con-
clusion is that only key members of the recording art-
ist who signed the recording agreement may recap-
ture rights to sound recordings under Section 203.  
The advantage of this interpretation is that it leaves 
out all other authorship claimants from the realm of 
bona fide authors who can perfect a termination of 
grant transfer under Section 203.  Under this “key 
member” approach, reversion rights under Section 
203 may not be exercised by those individuals that 
contribute less than a major contribution of copy-
rightable expression to sound recordings and who are 
not the but for cause of the existence of the record 
contract from which the sound recording arose. 
These criteria would exclude former non-key band 
members, back-up singers, studio musicians, engi-
                                                             
78 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
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neers and producers from the eligible class of Section 
203 authors.  Vesting only key members with sound 
recording authorship status for purposes of Section 
203 terminations effectuates Congress’ intent of 
“safeguarding authors against unremunerative 
transfers”79 by giving a practical compromise that 
would further the objectives of the copyright law 
while recognizing that the statutory right of termina-
tion should only be given to recording artists that de-
serve it the most. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 At the heart of the proposition that the record-
ing artist is the true author of a sound recording is 
the intuitive notion that a sound recording is more 
than a mere mechanical contrivance.  To deny the 
recording artist authorship of the sound recording 
would be to dismiss their creative originality.  Be-
cause originality is the sine qua non of copyright, it 
would be counterintuitive to grant sound recording 
authorship status to individuals charged with cap-
turing sounds instead of the performers who are orig-
inators of the creative performance expressed in 
those sounds.  Additionally, by applying the public 
policy rationale of guarding against unremunerative 
transfers, we come to the reasonable conclusion that 
the key member is the party that should be able to 
recapture sound recording copyrights under Section 
203 of the 1976 Copyright Act because this performer 
is the heart of the work. 
                                                             
79 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
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Abstract 
This Note seeks to examine the evolution of 
sex and sexuality in the media, by critically examin-
ing how the prevalence of sex and more recently the 
prevalence of topics and issues related to sexuality in 
television, literature, electronic media, and art have 
and continue to impact societal views and notions on 
obscenity.  This Note will also examine the Miller 
test for obscenity, and the long term effects of socie-
tal value evolution on the application of the Miller 
test.  This Note concludes by positing that at some 
point, the line between what is deemed sexually of-
fensive and what is socially acceptable will become so 
blurred that the Miller test will no longer be defini-
tively able to differentiate between the two, ultimate-
ly rendering it inapplicable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SEX.  Arguably, no other singular word has 
the ability to describe one of the most fundamental 
aspects of what it is to be human, while simultane-
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ously maintaining an air of tabooism, shame, embar-
rassment, secrecy, and repression.  Whether because 
of religion, the viewpoints of society at the time, or 
ignorance, throughout the ages sex has endured a 
certain level of taboo because of its consistent associ-
ation with impurity and immorality.  Within the last 
twenty to thirty years, however, topics on sex and 
sexuality have taken center stage, and society has 
done away with the days of silence and conservatism.  
Society has come a long way, from frowning upon 
pre-marital sex to sexual education becoming a man-
datory requirement in most upper level public school 
systems.1  The sex discussion has become pervasive 
and society’s viewpoints ever more radical. 
This Note seeks to examine the evolution of 
sex and sexuality in the media, and how this evolu-
tion has transformed societal notions of what is and 
what is not considered obscene.  It will critically ex-
amine how the prevalence of sex and more recently 
the prevalence of topics and issues related to sexuali-
ty in television, literature, electronic media, and art 
have and continue to impact societal views and no-
tions on obscenity. 
Additionally, this Note seeks to examine the 
Miller test for obscenity.  The Note posits the theory 
that there are fundamental issues with the Miller 
test, namely that the community standards criteria 
conflicts with societal viewpoints and values because 
specified communities are in no way reflective of so-
ciety’s viewpoints as a whole.  This Note seeks to ex-
amine the long term effects of societal value evolu-
                                                             
1 GLADYS MARTINEZ, JOYCE ABMA & CASEY COPEN, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 44, 
EDUCATING TEENAGERS ABOUT SEX IN THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2010). 
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tion, (i.e., the norms and values and what is deemed 
socially acceptable and what is not deemed socially 
acceptable) on the application of the Miller test.  
That is, whether at some point, the line between 
what is deemed sexually offensive and what is social-
ly acceptable may become so blurred that the Miller 
test will no longer be definitively able to differentiate 
between material that is obscene and material that is 
not obscene, ultimately rendering it inapplicable. 
 
I. LITERATURE 
Perhaps one of the most readily available as-
pects of the media which illustrates the drastic shift 
in society’s views on sexuality is literature.  The most 
infamous book to date, collectively recognized and 
associated with obscenity is John Cleland’s Fanny 
Hill - Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure.2  Published 
in England in 1749, the book chronicles the sexual 
dalliances of Francis Hill, and her rise from English 
prostitute to reformed high society woman.3 Argua-
bly one of the most prosecuted books in history, 
Memoirs was banned in Europe4 and upon making 
its grand entry into the United States, became the 
subject of countless litigious actions,5 most notably 
the trilogy of actions from the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts up through the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
In Attorney General v. A Book named “John 
                                                             
2 Katy Steinmetz, Fanny Hill, by John Cleland, TIME (Mar. 
28, 2012), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2
110281_2110282_2110290,00.html. 
3 Att’y Gen. v. A Book Named ‘John Cleland’s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure,’ 206 N.E.2d 403, 404 (1965). 
4 Steinmetz, supra note 2. 
5 John Cleland’s Memoirs, 206 N.E.2d at 404. 
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Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the 
then test for obscenity set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Roth v. United States.6  In applying the 
three part Roth test7, the Court found that the book 
appealed to the prurient interest for its “series of epi-
sode involving Lesbianism, voyeurism, prostitution, 
flagellation, sexual orgies, masturbation, fellatio, 
homosexuality, and defloration . . . .”8  Convinced 
that Memoirs violated both local and community 
standards because its graphic content went “substan-
tially beyond customary limits of candor in describ-
ing or representing such matters,”9 the Court held 
the book to be obscene. 
In an interesting turn of events, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Massachusetts Court, holding 
that Memoirs was entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection.10  In so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the Massachusetts Court misapplied the Roth 
test with regard to the “social value” criterion;11 spe-
                                                             
6 Id. at 404. 
7 Id. (stating the test enumerated in Roth: “whether to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest.”) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 
(1957)).  Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent 
cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that 
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole 
appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently 
offensive because it affronts contemporary community 
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual 
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming 
social value.  Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 A Book Named ‘John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure’ v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 421 (1966). 
11 Id. at 419. 
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cifically they addressed the fact that a book need not 
be “unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed 
obscene.”12  This ruling stood for the proposition that 
if a book has some literary and social value, however 
de minimis that value may be, it is enough to place 
the book within the protections of the First Amend-
ment.13 
In rendering Memoirs obscene, it is evident 
that the Massachusetts judiciary felt compelled to do 
so because they believed the book went beyond the 
bounds of what was socially acceptable at the time.  
Indeed they noted this fact stating “we hold Memoirs 
to be such an affront to current community stand-
ards as to constitute ‘patent offensiveness’ . . . .  We 
would reach this result whether we applied local 
community or national standards.”14 
Present day literature presents an interesting 
contradiction, however.  The evolution of society’s 
valuation on sex has had an interesting impact on 
the works that are produced by authors, but also on 
the judiciary’s attempts to censor sexually explicit 
literature.  For example, consider the recent success 
that author E.L. James has enjoyed in relation to her 
erotica novels, more commonly referred to as the Fif-
ty Shades of Grey trilogy.  The novels have gained 
notoriety for their graphic erotica scenes involving 
many of the same themes15 which were present in 
                                                             
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Att’y Gen. v. A Book Named ‘John Cleland’s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure,’ 206 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1965). 
15 The Fifty Shades trilogy includes themes of voyeurism, 
flagellation, bondage, discipline, dominance, submission, and 
sadomasochism.  Linda Bloom, What’s So Special About Fifty 
Shades of Grey? It’s Not Just About the Sex, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 9, 2013, 2:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/linda-
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Memoirs.  In fact, the books have enjoyed interna-
tional success, selling 65 million copies worldwide,16 
becoming the fastest selling paperback book ever,17 
and catapulting previously relatively unknown au-
thor E.L. James to international fame. 
Contrasted with Memoirs, not only have there 
been no challenges brought against the Fifty Shades 
novels to get them banned or to have them rendered 
obscene, but the aforementioned statistics surround-
ing the Fifty Shades trilogy suggests that society, far 
from deeming sexually explicit works that delve into 
topics like those in Memoirs obscene, find them to be 
fascinating and interesting.  The fact that the Fifty 
Shades trilogy is lauded rather than the subject of 
litigation lends further credence to the notion that 
works that would have been deemed obscene by soci-
ety nearly 50 years ago, are now a topic of interest 
and discussion.  
 
II. TELEVISION 
Likewise, television presents a perfect exam-
ple of society’s ever changing and consistently pro-
gressive views on sex and sexuality.  Sex on televi-
sion has endured a lengthy evolution to get to its 
current state where simulated oral sex between both 
adults and teenagers is common place18 and televi-
                                                                                                                             
bloom-lcsw-and-charlie-bloom-msw/fifty-shades-of-
grey_b_3038504.html. 
16 Id. 
17 Kirsten Acuna, BY THE NUMBERS: The ‘50 Shades of 
Grey’ Phenomenon, BUS. INSIDER MAG. (June 27, 2012, 5:30 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/by-the-numbers-the-50-
shades-of-grey-phenomenon-2012-6?op=1. 
18 Study Reveals 70 Percent of TV Shows Contain Sexual 
Content, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J. (Nov. 10, 2005), 
http://lubbockonline.com/stories/111005/nat_111005043.shtml. 
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sion shows tackle issues concerning lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual and transgendered individuals.19  To place 
this evolution in context, it is necessary to examine 
the history of sex on television.  
 From the outset, sex as portrayed on television 
and in films was incredibly reserved and conserva-
tive.  For example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
only actors that were married on and off screen 
shared a bed on screen,20 so as to uphold the notions 
of wholesomeness and to maintain an image of mari-
tal fidelity and morality.  Any references to sex or in-
timacy were scarce, and carefully designed to main-
tain an image of wholesomeness and decency.  For 
example, when the screenwriters chose to write 
pregnancy into the script, the actors were not al-
lowed to use the term “pregnancy.”21  Notwithstand-
ing the fact that these actors were married off screen, 
and did indeed procreate with one another, the use of 
the term “pregnancy” was considered too harsh and 
offensive.  Instead the actors were made to use the 
                                                             
19 Sophie Laubie, Gay Parents on TV: Why the ‘New Normal’ 
Is No Longer Just the Nuclear Family, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 
7, 2013, 3:51 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/07/gay-parents-
tv_n_4402297.html.  More recently, popular Netflix series 
Orange is the New Black garnered rave reviews from the Gay & 
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) for its 
prominent feature of a transgendered woman as a standout 
character.  Natalie Meier, Laverne Cox and “Orange is the New 
Black” Get Rave Reviews, GLAAD BLOG (Jul. 16, 2013), 
http://www.glaad.org/blog/laverne-cox-and-orange-new-black-
get-rave-reviews. 
20 The History of Sex on Television, EXTRA (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://www.extratv.com/2010/08/15/the-history-of-sex-on-
television/#first_married_couple_on_tv_to_share_a_bed.  
21 A Brief History of Sex on TV: I Love Lucy, TIME, 
http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2045043_223
1128,00.html (last visited May 25, 2014). 
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term “expecting” and phrases like “she has a bundle 
of joy on the way” to express the pregnancy.22 
The conservatism in television programming 
was merely a mirror for the attitudes and societal 
norms at that time.  In the 1950s, a woman’s place 
was in the home tending to her children and hus-
band, and premarital sex was frowned upon so much 
so that most young women who became pregnant be-
fore marriage were sent away to live with relatives or 
placed in homes for promiscuous girls.23  With these 
views being dominant in that era, it is hardly sur-
prising that the television shows of the time refused 
to use the term “pregnancy,” much less had any sig-
nificant or overt references to sex. 
In a somewhat surprising turn, the reserva-
tions of television programming in the 1940s and 
1950s continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  It 
is often noted that the 1960s brought about a sexual 
liberation and revolution due to the advent of readily 
available birth control pills,24 however this was not 
evidenced in the popular television shows of that era.  
For example, Leave It to Beaver and The Brady 
Bunch, two of the most popular television shows of 
the 1960s and 1970s respectively, contained no overt 
references to sex,25 with the only physical interaction 
                                                             
22 Id.  
23 Mrs. America: Women’s Roles in the 1950s, PBS AM. 
EXPERIENCE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/p_mrs.html 
(last visited May 25, 2014).  
24 Id. 
25 Caley Murphy, Sex Sells: An Analysis of Sexual Content on 
Prime Time TV over the Past 50 Years (Apr. 30, 2012) 
(unpublished B.A. honors thesis) (on file with Carroll College 
Library), available at 
https://www.carroll.edu/library/thesisArchive/MurphyC_2012fin
al.pdf. 
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being limited to rare chaste kisses between the ac-
tors who portrayed the married couples on the 
shows.26 
While the television programming of the 1960s 
and 1970s did nothing to substantially further the 
notion that society’s viewpoint on sex and sexuality 
had changed, the 1980s and 1990s brought about the 
most dramatic of shifts.  The days of separate beds 
and chaste kisses were replaced with men living with 
promiscuous women,27 the first ever airing of a kiss 
between two women,28 the first depictions of nudity 
and sexual content in prime time television,29 the 
story of four single women in New York City and 
their trials and tribulations regarding sex and da-
ting,30 and an Emmy winning television show cen-
tered around the relationship lives of two openly gay 
men.31  The television of the 1980s and 1990s not on-
ly reflected society’s changing views on sex, but also 
introduced a previously taboo subject into prime 
time: homosexuality. The 1980s and 1990s evidenced 
                                                             
26 Id. 
27 See Todd Jacobs, Top 10 Television Sitcoms of the 80s, 
YAHOO (May 5, 2010), http://voices.yahoo.com/top-10-television-
sitcoms-80s-5957726.html (noting the plot of Three’s Company, 
in which John Ritter portrays a man pretending to be gay in 
order to live with two single women.). 
28 The History of Sex on Television, EXTRA (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://www.extratv.com/2010/08/15/the-history-of-sex-on-
television/#first_televised_girlongirl_kiss. 
29 Id. 
30 Katie J.M. Baker, Sex and the City Was Actually A Great 
Show, You Know., JEZEBEL (July 22, 2013, 12:00 PM),  
http://jezebel.com/sex-and-the-city-was-actually-a-great-show-
you-know-865569793.  
31 Reid Wilson, Will, Grace and A Decade of Change on Gay 
Rights, NAT’L J. (Jun. 26, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/on-the-trail/will-grace-
and-a-decade-of-change-on-gay-rights-20130626.  
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society’s first foray into progressivism and ac-
ceptance, with shows prominently featuring gay and 
lesbian characters into the storylines.32 
As the sexual content in television program-
ming tends to most closely mirror the views of society 
during that time, it is not surprising that the 1980s 
and 1990s evidenced a dramatic viewpoint shift from 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Approval for cohabitation be-
tween males and females was at an all-time high in 
the 1980s33 and the viewing of X-rated movies 
climbed rapidly.34  Society’s attitude on issues such 
as premarital sex, sex education, birth control infor-
mation for teenagers and engaging in skinny dipping 
saw dramatic shifts in favor of approval.35  Further-
more, the days of women being creatures of the home 
had all but dissipated with more than thirty million 
women in the workforce in 1990,36 and nearly 20% 
women having obtained a bachelor’s degree or high-
er.37 
Like the television programming of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the last and most current era of television 
has mostly closely mirrored society’s views on sex 
and sexuality.  Television shows pushed the envelope 
more than ever before, with nearly 80% of television 
shows including sexual content (averaging almost six 
                                                             
32 See generally Sex and the City (HBO television broadcast 
1998-2004); Will & Grace (NBC television broadcast 1998-
2006); Soap (ABC television broadcast 1977-1981); Ellen (ABC 
television broadcast 1994-1998). 
33 Tom W. Smith, A Report: The Sexual Revolution?, in 54 
PUB. OPINION Q. 415, 417 (1990). 
34 Id. 
35 Smith, supra note 33 at 418-19. 
36 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE at slide 2, 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/women_workforce_slides.p
df. 
37 Id. at slide 9. 
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sex scenes per hour),38 the advent of a television se-
ries devoted to chronicling the lives of teens who be-
came pregnant and their journeys into motherhood,39 
the tackling of hard-hitting issues such as teens 
struggling with their sexuality and the epidemic of 
gay teen suicide,40 shows popular amongst teenagers 
prominently featuring simulated oral sex among the 
main characters41 and threesomes,42 shows which 
chronicle the lives of teenagers prominently feature 
eroticized sex scenes and drug use,43 and shows delv-
ing into the human sexuality fascination whilst 
prominently displaying nudity in every episode.44 
Closely mirroring the 1980s and 1990s view-
point shift, the 2000s were likewise one of the most 
dramatic decades to date.  The social stigmas associ-
                                                             
38 Murphy, supra note 25. 
39 Melissa Henson, MTV’s ‘Teen Mom’ Glamorizes Getting 
Pregnant, CNN (May 4, 2011, 7:06 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/05/04/henson.teen.mom.sho
w/. 
40 Rory Barbarossa, GLEE Tackles Gay Suicide, FLA. AGENDA 
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://floridaagenda.com/2012/03/01/glee-tackles-
gay-suicide/. 
41 Tim Graham, ‘90210’ Oral Sex Episode: The ‘Sarah Palin of 
TV Shows’?, NEWS BUSTERS (Sept. 5, 2008, 9:45 PM), 
http://newsbusters.org/blogs/tim-graham/2008/09/05/90210-oral-
sex-episode-sarah-palin-tv-shows. 
42 A threesome is when three people engage in sexual 
intercourse together.  See A Brief History of Sex on TV: Gossip 
Girl, TIME, 
http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2045043_223
1127,00.html (last visited May 25, 2014). 
43 Skins on MTV, PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL, 
http://www.parentstv.org/ptc/campaigns/skins/ (last visited May 
25, 2014). 
44 Scott Collins, Showtime’s ‘Masters of Sex’ Tackles Taboos, 
L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/31/entertainment/la-et-st-
tca-showtime-20130731. 
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ated with premarital sex and speaking about sex 
openly of the earlier half of the century had all but 
dissipated.  The 2000s saw nearly 50% of high school 
students engaging in sexual intercourse in 2011,45 
hundreds of thousands of babies being born to teen-
age mothers,46 the advent of gay rights47 (most nota-
bly the legalizing of same-sex marriage,48 the over-
turning of Lawrence v. Texas,49 and Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA) being ruled unconstitutional50), 
high schools making contraceptive methods readily 
available to their students,51 and the abortion rights 
debate brought to the forefront of discussion.52  
 
III. CASE LAW REFLECTS THE SOCIETAL 
VIEWPOINTS ON SEXUALITY 
 While each era of television examined has 
                                                             
45 Sexual Risk Behavior: HIV, STD & Teen Pregnancy 
Prevention, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/sexualbehaviors/ (last 
updated Aug. 26, 2013). 
46 Id. 
47 The American Gay Rights Movement: A Timeline, 
INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0761909.html (last 
visited May 25, 2014). 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003) was a notable 
Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional.  
50 Id.  The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was enacted in 
1996 and was a federal law which allowed states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages granted under the laws of other 
states.  
51 Keri J. Dodd, School Condom Availability, ADVOCATES FOR 
YOUTH (Feb. 1998),  
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/publications/449. 
52 History and Debate of Abortion, DEBATE.ORG, 
http://www.debate.org/abortion-debate/ (last visited May 25, 
2014). 
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closely mirrored the societal views on sexuality dur-
ing the relevant period, so too have the seminal ob-
scenity cases.  In the 1940s and 1950s for example, of 
the eight obscenity cases heard by the United States 
Supreme Court, only two considered whether or not 
the challenged material was in fact obscene.53  Not-
withstanding the fact that majority of the remaining 
cases were resolved in favor of finding an obscenity 
violation, the material challenged in the two afore-
mentioned cases concerned materials which were 
thought to violate societal notions on decency and 
morality.54  Furthermore, the challenged material 
was in fact resolved as being obscene.55  The remain-
ing cases focused specifically on the legality of state 
statutes which forbid the publication and dissemina-
tion of obscene materials,56 and while there was no 
real legal analysis done as to determine whether the 
materials in these cases were in fact obscene, almost 
overwhelmingly the statutes were upheld as valid 
regulations on obscenity. 
 Furthermore of the cases which did delve into 
whether or not the challenged material was obscene, 
                                                             
53 See Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of 
the State of New York, 360 US 684 (1959); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
54 Id. 
55 Note that the challenged material in Kingsley International 
Pictures Corporation v. the Regents of the University of the State 
of New York was actually found not to be obscene but instead an 
assault on morality and an incitement to sexual impurity.  
Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 686-87. 
56 See Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); United States v. Alpers, 338 
U.S. 680 (1950); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 
(1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 
(1959). 
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one of them set forth the first universally recognized 
test for obscenity. In Roth v. United States, the issue 
concerned whether or not certain photographs and 
mailings were properly considered obscene under the 
standards set forth by the trial court judge.57  In 
finding that the trial court judge had indeed applied 
the correct standards, the Supreme Court set forth 
the following test for obscenity: “whether to the aver-
age person, applying contemporary community 
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken 
as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”58 The Court 
ultimately held the mailings of Mr. Roth to be ob-
scene and upheld the constitutionality of the federal 
statutes which outlawed them.59 
Notwithstanding the fact that Roth set forth 
the first universally recognized test for obscenity, it 
is important to note the outcome of the case. Namely, 
that the challenged material, which included certain 
pornographic photographs was held to be obscene.  
Here is a prime example of societal norms reflected 
in the cases brought before the judiciary.  The 1940s 
and 1950s, if nothing more reflected an era of con-
servatism with a high emphasis placed upon the 
sanctity of marriage60 and family life.61  Not surpris-
ingly, in reflecting society’s attitudes and value sys-
tem, the one case which addressed the issue of 
whether or not the material was in fact obscene, 
dealt with an assault on the aforementioned value 
system.  The fact remains, though, that as society’s 
                                                             
57 Roth, 354 U.S. at 480. 
58 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. 
59 Roth, 354 U.S. at 492. 
60 Mrs. America: Women’s Roles in the 1950s, supra note 23. 
61 The Pill and the Sexual Revolution, PBS AM. EXPERIENCE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_revolution.ht
ml (last visited May 25, 2014). 
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values have evolved, so too has the subject matter of 
obscenity cases put before the judiciary, as is seen 
with the cases in the present day. 
As with the cases brought before the judiciary 
in the 1940s and 1950s, the subject matter of the 
cases in the 2000s evidenced the dramatic changes of 
society’s views on sex and sexuality.  From the outset 
of the twenty-five cases dealing with obscenity heard 
by the Supreme Court between 2000 and 2013, eight 
cases sought a determination of whether or not the 
challenged material was in fact obscene.  The subject 
matter of those cases dealt mostly with whether cer-
tain depictions could be considered child pornogra-
phy and therefore rendered obscene.62  Depictions of 
minors engaged in sexually explicit acts is a far cry 
from the mailings of erotica books and pictures, but 
again, the sentiments and views on sex and sexuality 
had shifted greatly between the 1940s and 1950s and 
present day. 
Furthermore, the outcome of the cases evi-
denced the change in viewpoints as well. In Roth v. 
United States, the mailings of erotica books and pic-
tures were held to be obscene and in violation of fed-
eral obscenity statutes.63  However in Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, sexually explicit photos that 
depicted what appeared to minors engaged in sex 
acts were held not to be obscene because the photos 
were not actually produced using children.64  It is 
hard to imagine a more ripe example of material ap-
pealing to the prurient65 interest than sexually ex-
                                                             
62 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
63 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). 
64 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 234. 
65 Prurient as defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary 
means marked by or arousing an immoderate or unwholesome 
interest or desire.  Prurient Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
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plicit photos depicting persons appearing to be mi-
nors engaged in sex acts, regardless of whether the 
material was created using minors or not, and yet 
the Supreme Court found them not to be obscene.  
The change in the subject matter of the cases 
put before the judiciary, along with the evolution of 
societal values and notions on sex appears to occur 
concurrently.  Furthermore, society’s views at the 
time seem to be reflected in the outcomes of the sem-
inal obscenity cases.  During the 1940s and 1950s, 
when societal views on sexuality were very conserva-
tive, the seminal obscenity case found the challenged 
material to be obscene.  However in present day, 
where society’s views on sex and sexuality are argu-
ably more liberal, one of the seminal obscenity cases 
found the challenged material not to be obscene.  
Furthermore, the decision in Ashcroft adds support 
to the notion that the obscenity line comes ever clos-
er to being obsolete.  If simulated child pornography 
falls within the protections of the First Amendment, 
a startling question is left in its wake: is anything 
really obscene anymore?  
 
IV. ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE INTERNET & VIDEO 
GAMES 
Perhaps the notion that the obscenity doctrine 
is becoming obsolete due to society’s views on sex and 
sexuality finds the most support in the advent of 
electronic media.  Never before has sexually explicit 
material become as readily available as it is today 
through the Internet.  Certainly material which ap-
peals to the prurient interest is not more than a few 
key strokes and a mouse click away. 
                                                                                                                             
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/prurient (last visited May 25, 2014). 
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For example, in Miller v. California, the Su-
preme Court, in an attempt to further give the lower 
courts guidance as to what may be deemed obscene 
material, gave the following example: “patently of-
fensive representation or descriptions of masturba-
tion, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the 
genitals.”66  A simple search on Google using the 
terms “masturbation” and “lewd,” brings up over 5 
million related sites,67 with some sites brazenly dis-
playing their sexually explicit content.68  The advent 
of the internet has availed access to virtually any 
type of potentially offensive material, from crush 
videos69 to child pornography.70 
With such easy availability of such material to 
anyone, it would be very difficult, if not wholly im-
possible, to bring obscenity challenges for every web-
site which contained material found to be in poten-
tial violation of the Miller test.  Not to mention the 
more obvious fact, easy and readily available access 
to the material evidences society’s ever changing no-
tions on sex and sexuality once again. 
                                                             
66 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). 
67 I performed a search on my computer and nearly 4 million 
related sites were returned.  Search Results, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (search “masturbation AND lewd” 
without quotes). 
68 “Gorgeously-Lewd Footage Hardcore Masturbation by Hot 
Girls,” and “Taiwan pretty girls at home masturbation lewd” 
are a few of the website titles displayed, enticing users to enter 
their sites.  Id. 
69 I performed another Google search on my computer for 
“Crush Videos” and nearly 105,000 related sites were returned. 
Search Results, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search “crush 
videos”). 
70 I performed another Google search on my computer and 
nearly 32 million related sites were returned. Search Results, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search “child pornography”). 
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Furthermore, society’s ever evolving and 
changing viewpoints are evidenced quite prominently 
in video games; most notably with the release of the 
popular video game series Grand Theft Auto.  Out-
side the overarching themes of larceny and vio-
lence,71 the most recent game in the series has been 
lauded for its realistic and blatant depictions of sex.72  
Grand Theft Auto V includes various depictions of 
sexual activity.  In fact, in the synopsis of the game 
provided by the Entertainment Software Rating 
Board (ESRB), it was noted that the following sex-
ually explicit material is found prevalently through-
out the game:  
 
implied fellatio and masturbation; various sex acts 
that the player’s character procures from a prosti-
tute – while no nudity is depicted in these se-
quences, various sexual moaning sounds can be 
heard.  Nudity is present, however, primarily in 
two settings: a topless lap dance in a strip club and 
a location that includes male cult members with 
exposed genitalia . . . .  Within the game, TV pro-
grams and radio ads contain instances of mature 
humor: myriad sex jokes; depictions of raw sewage 
and feces on a worker’s body; a brief instance of 
necrophilia . . . .73 
 
In an attempt to make the game more realistic with 
respect to the soliciting of prostitutes for sex, players 
have the ability to pay the prostitutes for their ser-
vices,74 and subsequently contact them for additional 
                                                             
71 Grand Theft Auto V, ENT. SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, 
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=33073.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 The game allows players to pay $50 for oral sex, and $100 
for sexual intercourse. WikiGameGuides, Grand Theft Auto 5 –
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encounters. 
The reason that Grand Theft Auto V evidences 
society’s evolving notions on sex and sexuality is not 
because the game contains such sexually explicit ma-
terial, but because the public demand for the game is 
astonishing. The release of Grand Theft Auto V has 
been lauded by Forbes.com as the “biggest enter-
tainment launch in history,”75 with the game making 
more than one billion dollars in sales after being on 
the market for just three days.76  Additionally, while 
the game’s mature rating is meant to establish that 
the game is marketed to more mature audiences, the 
reality is that the majority of the game’s player de-
mographic is made up of young males,77 some as 
young as age 8.78 
While the game has only been on the market 
for a short period of time,79 its sexually explicit 
                                                                                                                             
How to Get a Prostitute, YOUTUBE, 
http://n4g.com/news/1356227/gta-5-how-to-get-a-prostitute (last 
visited May 26, 2014). 
75 Erik Kain, ‘Grand Theft Auto V’ Crosses $1B In Sales, 
Biggest Entertainment Launch In History, FORBES (Sept. 20, 
2013, 1:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2013/09/20/grand-theft-
auto-v-crosses-1b-in-sales-biggest-entertainment-launch-in-
history/. 
76 Id. 
77 John S. Dickerson, Grand Theft Auto V Sales Set Record –
Why Are We Surprised When Virtual Violence Becomes Reality, 
FOX NEWS (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/09/19/grand-theft-auto-v-
sales-set-record-why-are-surprised-when-virtual-violence/. 
78 Id. 
79 The game was released on September 17, 2013.  Grand 
Theft Auto V Is Coming 9.17.2013, ROCKSTAR GAMES (Jan. 31, 
2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.rockstargames.com/newswire/article/48591/grand-
theft-auto-v-is-coming-9172013.html. 
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themes coupled with the public’s uncanny demand 
resulting in extreme popularity tend to not only es-
tablish society’s views on sexuality and sex, but also 
tend to establish society’s fascination with the topics.  
The days of conservatism and shyness have been re-
placed with intrigue and liberation.  No less than 
thirty years ago, the material included in Grand 
Theft Auto V would have been ripe for an obscenity 
challenge; it would be difficult to imagine a better 
example.  The game’s blatant sexually explicit con-
tent could easily have been viewed as a violation on 
societal values and views on immorality, sex and 
sexuality during an earlier time.  And yet in current 
times, such material is not challenged as obscene, 
but rather in apparent heavy demand by society.  
The reality is astounding and further lends support 
to the notion that the line between obscene material 
and material that is universally accepted by society, 
has and continues to become ever closer to being 
blurred. 
 
V. ART 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech or of the press . . . .”80  It is 
through these words that countless types of expres-
sion have found the mechanism through which they 
can be, and indeed are, afforded protection from cen-
sorship.  Not surprisingly, art, which has been de-
fined as the expression or application of human crea-
tive skill,81 has also found a home in the protections 
of the First Amendment.82  As an initial matter, the 
                                                             
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
81 Definition of Art, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/art 
(last visited May 25, 2014). 
82 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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embodiment of art may be found in many mediums 
and expressed through several forms, making it 
somewhat difficult to categorize. 
As questions regarding what types of art 
would be protected under the First Amendment be-
came increasingly more prevalent, the Supreme 
Court issued a series of opinions addressing these 
questions, serving as a means for clarification and 
direction.83  Perhaps one of the most infamous cases 
in this series was Texas v. Johnson, in which the Su-
preme Court proclaimed that non-verbal as well as 
verbal forms of expression are protected under the 
First Amendment;84 and it is through this holding 
that the most abstract forms of art have found pro-
tection from censorship. 
Through the First Amendment, the broadest 
protection of an artist’s ability to create works has 
been developed.  Indeed, the First Amendment can 
be construed as providing a broad latitude for artists 
to express their ideals and opinions without fear of 
censorship.85  And indeed, many believe some of the 
best art is produced when its creator is free and un-
encumbered by societal and governmental restraints.   
Not all forms of art are protected though. One 
very prevalent art form which is not afforded protec-
tion under the First Amendment is art that is classi-
fied as obscene.86  The purpose of the First Amend-
ment and its necessity to preserve public discourse 
through the free exchange of ideals and expression, 
                                                             
83 See e.g. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972); Hamling v. United States, 418 
U.S. 87 (1974). 
84 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398 (1989). 
85 See JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, ARCHITECTURE, 
AND MUSEUM LAW 37 (2012). 
86 Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. 
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contrasted with the fact that the First Amendment 
inhibits public discourse by excluding certain forms 
of expression from protection, remains a very inter-
esting and perplexing contradiction. 
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court aptly 
noted that the “bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment . . . is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea-
ble.”87  Art, in and of itself, is perhaps one of the best 
examples of expression which may be deemed offen-
sive or disagreeable, and yet like its predecessors has 
been subject to the same inhibitor of obscenity. 
Obscene art, if nothing more, creates public 
discourse, whether positive or negative. This class of 
art evokes and upsets certain sensibilities in the so-
ciety at large, which in turn stimulates healthy con-
versation regarding these sensibilities.  For example, 
the Contemporary Arts Center’s exhibition of the late 
Robert Mapplethorpe’s work garnered a great deal of 
attention, most notably resulting in a judicial pro-
ceeding.88  The Museum faced an overwhelming 
amount of criticism for its exhibition of Mapple-
thorpe’s photos, which included seven photos of men 
in sadomasochistic poses,89 however, the fact remains 
that the exhibition generated public discourse re-
garding the display of those photos.  Further, Andres 
Serrano’s “Piss Christ” also garnered a substantial 
amount of public attention.90  Some argued that the 
                                                             
87 Texas, 491 U.S. at 414. 
88 Contemporary Arts Center v. Ney, 735 F.Supp 743, 745 
(1990). 
89 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 
566 N.E.2d 207 (1990). 
90 Jennifer Schuessler, Who’s the Shockingest of Them All?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2012), 
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work was offensive and an attack on religious sensi-
bilities,91 while others have praised his work as being 
“a disturbing and challenging artistic statement, 
which explores how spiritual belief has been exploit-
ed and spiritual values debased.”92 
Is not this type of public discourse the very 
kind that the First Amendment seeks to protect?  
Does not the First Amendment seek to foster discus-
sion on such topics?  Does not obscene art garner at-
tention, which in turn generates debate, thus stimu-
lating the intellectual state of the country?  The an-
swer to these questions is that the very category of 
art which has been outlawed serves the fundamental 
purpose of the First Amendment quite clearly and 
distinctly.  Despite this seemingly apparent contra-
diction in the purpose of the First Amendment and 
the fact that certain types of art must pass a test 
largely based on specified community standards to 
obtain first amendment protection, the fact remains 
that not all art is afforded First Amendment protec-
tion.93 
 
VI. THE CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION OF OBSCENITY 
FROM FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The government has offered several explana-
tions for not allowing obscenity to fall within any 
constitutionally protected category of speech.  The 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/arts/art-shock.html?_r=0.  
91 Elissa Hunt, Andres Serrano ‘Piss Christ’ Triggers Religious 
Fury and Court Battle in 1990s Trials, HERALD SUN (Mar. 6, 
2013, 6:38 PM), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-
order/andres-serrano-piss-christ-triggers-religious-fury-and-
court-battle-in-1990s-trials/story-fnat7dag-1226591823318. 
92 GRANT H. KESTER, ART, ACTIVISM AND OPPOSITIONALITY: 
ESSAYS FROM AFTERIMAGE 126 (1998). 
93 Id. 
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main reasons being that the government has a signif-
icant interest in protecting minors and unwilling 
passerby from being exposed to obscene materials,94 
that the government has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting and preserving societal mores and values,95 
and lastly that obscenity “utterly lacks any redeem-
ing social importance.”96  The fundamental notion is 
that these interests outweigh any benefit (and indeed 
the argument that there is no benefit) that obscenity 
may have on society, and as such it is subject matter 
upon which regulation is important and proper. 
Each one of these arguments overlooks and 
grossly misinterprets the purpose of the First 
Amendment.  The First Amendment serves as a cata-
lyst to promote the exchange of ideas and public dis-
course.97  As David Cole argues, 
 
Ordinarily, attempts to regulate speech be-
cause of its content are subjected to exact-
ing judicial scrutiny and require a compel-
ling justification. When it comes to sexual 
expression, however, the state is not obliged 
to offer a compelling rationale, and the 
Court’s decisions proceed by assertion ra-
ther than by logical reasoning.98  
 
Further in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the Su-
preme Court recognized such stating: 
 
                                                             
94 People v. Neumayer, 275 N.W.2d 230, 233 (1979). 
95 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20, 21. 
96 Id. at 20. 
97 JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, ARCHITECTURE, AND 
MUSEUM LAW 37 (2012). 
98 David Cole, Playing By Pornography’s Rules: The 
Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113 
(1994). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Let’s Talk About Sex 
518 
Accordingly a function of free speech under 
our system of government is to invite dis-
pute. It may indeed best serve its high pur-
pose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger. 
Speech is often provocative and challenging. 
It may strike at prejudices and preconcep-
tions and have profound unsettling effects 
as it presses for acceptance of an idea.99 
 
Indeed the public interest in the First Amendment 
has been held to outweigh any other consideration,100 
however the First Amendment concerns regarding 
obscenity do not hold such weight. 
 
VII. OBSCENITY AND THE MILLER TEST 
“I shall not today attempt further to define the 
kinds of material I understand to be embraced within 
that shorthand description; and perhaps I could nev-
er succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it 
when I see it . . . .”101  This now infamous passage 
was written by Supreme Court Justice Stewart in 
recognition of the near impossibility in defining what 
obscenity is.  Interestingly enough, elusive though it 
may be, the judicial system has made several whole-
hearted, nevertheless confusing attempts to define 
obscenity, with the culmination of course being the 
landmark case Miller v. California.102  Despite the 
best efforts of the Supreme Court, the elusiveness in 
the definition remains, in large part due to the fact 
                                                             
99 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
100 Contemporary Arts Center v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743, 745 
(1990). 
101 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
102 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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that society’s views on sexuality continue to progress 
and evolve.  
Fundamentally, there is an issue of which 
types of speech qualify as obscene.  Over the years 
the Supreme Court has found it difficult to define 
what obscenity is, making it impossible to decide 
which types of speech qualify.  In 1973, however, the 
Supreme Court, in the landmark case Miller v. Cali-
fornia, made its best attempt to set forth a three part 
test describing what types of speech qualify as ob-
scene. The test consists of the following: 
 
(1) whether “the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community stand-
ards” would find that the work, tak-
en as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest;  
 
(2) whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and 
 
(3) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value. 103 
  
The purpose of this test was to bring clarifica-
tion to the courts in solving the “intractable obsceni-
ty problem”104 and to “formulate standards more con-
crete than those in the past.”105  The three prongs of 
the test sought to incorporate the necessary and rel-
evant inquiries when determining whether a work 
                                                             
103 Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted). 
104 Id. at 16. 
105 Id. at 20. 
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has fallen outside the constitutional protections of 
the First Amendment.  While the Miller test is argu-
ably clearer than Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I 
see it” definition for obscenity, the courts have re-
mained decisive in the application of the test to sub-
sequent obscenity issues. 
For example the “community standards” prong 
of the test has brought about a considerable split 
among the courts, with some advocating that the 
prong should be one of a national standard106 and 
some advocating that the standard should be re-
stricted to the community in which the fact finder 
resides.107  The split was recognized by Judge Gabri-
elli in People v. Heller: 
 
The connotation of the term “community” 
appears to have brought about a great deal 
of hand wringing by concerned libertarians 
who have tended to interpret the term as 
meaning local or provincial so as to open 
the door to censorship by local authorities 
or even constables who would be free to 
form their own notions as to what consti-
tuted patently offensive material.108 
 
In addition the courts have also had to deal 
with the undeniable reality that societal and com-
munity standards with respect to sexuality have and 
continue to evolve since the time in which the Miller 
test was enumerated.  In United States v. McCoy, the 
court refused to find the fictional writings on child 
sex abuse by a Minnesota author obscene, stating: 
“in light of the evolution of community standards 
                                                             
106 United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 502-03 (1974). 
107 People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314, 322 (1973). 
108 Id. at 322. 
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since the Court decided Miller, this Court is unpre-
pared to conclude that the depraved fictional stories . 
. . are obscene.”109  Further, the court stated “[w]hile 
many persons, including this Court, find the materi-
als at issue depraved and disturbing, community 
standards have significantly evolved since Miller.”110  
McCoy was decided in 2009, nearly forty years after 
the Miller test was set forth.  The unwillingness of 
the McCoy Court to find graphic descriptions of the 
sexual abuse, rape and assault of children obscene 
represents not only the recognition by the courts that 
societal views on sexuality continue to evolve but al-
so an understanding that the standards enumerated 
in the Miller test must be amenable to this continu-
ous evolution.  
As viewpoints regarding sexuality may be 
viewed as progressive for society as a whole, they 
remain a problem and potential threat to the Miller 
test.  Why?  Well, put simply, at its core the test is 
meant to lessen the difficulty courts have faced in 
correctly identifying those works that are categorical-
ly exempt from First Amendment protection. This 
functions as a mechanism to protect an unwilling 
and unexpected passerby from being exposed to sex-
ually explicit and offensive material.111  The concern 
then becomes, how is it possible to correctly identify 
those works categorically exempt from First 
Amendment protection if the viewpoints of the very 
class the test is intended to protect constantly 
change with respect to what is sexually offensive.  
Some would seek to downplay this problem, claiming 
                                                             
109 United States v. McCoy, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1341 
(2009). 
110 Id. 
111 Miller, 413 U.S. at 28. 
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that the viewpoint shift is a gradual and progressive 
change that has no real implication on the applica-
tion of the test. 
The statistical data regarding such viewpoints, 
however, presents a different story.  Society’s ever 
changing views on sexuality can be found across all 
forms of popular culture including television, film, 
music, literature and art.  For example, society has 
gone from classifying homosexuality as a mental dis-
order in 1952112 to legalizing gay marriage in nine-
teen states in present day.113  In 2011, roughly 85% 
of the population approved of premarital sex.114  To-
day nearly 80% of television shows include sexual 
content,115 including graphic depictions of nudity,116 
as well as simulated oral sex acts between teenag-
ers.117  In 2011, 92% of the Top Ten Songs on Bill-
                                                             
112 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161092/Diagnostic-
and-Statistical-Manual-of-Mental-Disorders-DSM (last visited 
May 25, 2014). 
113 Nineteen States with Legal Gay Marriage and Thirty-One 
States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans, PROCON, 
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/ 
view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last updated May 21, 
2014). 
114 Premarital Sex: The Waiting Game, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/17956905. 
115 Sex on TV 4: Executive Summary 2005, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. REP., 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/sex-
on-tv-4-executive-summary.pdf. 
116 Collins, supra note 44. 
117 Alice Park, Sex on TV Increases Teen Pregnancy, Says 
Report, TIME (Nov. 3, 2008), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1855842,00.h
tml.  
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board Music Charts were about sex.118  The erotica 
novels by E.L. James, more commonly referred to as 
the Fifty Shades of Grey trilogy sold over 200,000 
copies in its first week.119  In 2013, the popular video 
game series Grand Theft Auto V, in which gamers 
can actively engage strippers and prostitutes for sex, 
became the biggest entertainment launch in history, 
garnering more than one billion dollars in sales in its 
first three days on the market.120 
 These examples indicate both a dramatic 
change in the way society views sex, but also a de-
mand for sex by the masses.  The evolution of socie-
ty’s viewpoint on sex is important in demonstrating 
the ability of society to become more accepting of 
things which in the past offended sensibilities and 
were taboo to speak about.  As society becomes in-
creasingly more accepting there becomes less of a 
compelling justification to protect society against 
that which offends.  That is, the necessity of shield-
ing an unwilling passerby from being exposed to cer-
tain material becomes less prevalent if the passerby 
becomes accepting (and demanding) of that material.   
If the numbers are indicative of any type of 
unwavering trend, then changes in viewpoints will 
only continue to occur and in ever more dramatic 
fashion.  The line between obscenity and what is so-
cially acceptable continues to become increasingly 
more blurred, and as a result, the need for a test 
which categorically exempts sexually offensive 
speech becomes ever more questionable. 
                                                             
118 Dino Grandoni, 92% of Top Ten Billboard Songs Are About 
Sex, WIRE (Sept. 30, 2011, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.thewire.com/entertainment/2011/09/92-top-ten-
billboard-songs-are-about-sex/43182/. 
119 Acuna, supra note 17. 
120 Kain, supra note 75. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Let’s Talk About Sex 
524 
VIII. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE MILLER TEST 
The most readily apparent problem with the 
Miller test is that it is inherently subjective.  At the 
outset, the test itself does not specify which commu-
nity the “contemporary standards” should be as-
sessed in lieu of.  Is the test referring to the national 
community standards, or a specific state’s communi-
ty standards, or a specific town’s community stand-
ards?  The recognition of the need for a definition re-
garding community standards was noted in the Mil-
ler opinion by Chief Justice Berger.  He stated, “[i]t is 
in this context that we are called on to define the 
standards which must be used to identify obscene 
material . . . .”121  Despite this acknowledgment, the 
standards remained undefined. 
Opting instead to provide a more generalized 
analysis of what criteria should be used to determine 
obscenity, the Supreme Court articulated a few sub-
jective examples of what may be deemed obscene.  
Those examples included:  
 
(a) Patently offensive representations or de-
scriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated. 
 
(b) Patently offensive representation or de-
scriptions of masturbation, excretory func-
tions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.122 
 
The examples, while informative, failed to ad-
dress one of the main issues that Chief Justice Burg-
er so readily proclaimed would be addressed in the 
opinion: the definition of which standards to apply 
when determining whether a work should be classi-
                                                             
121 Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 
122 Id. at 25. 
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fied as obscene. 
As the Miller opinion left the courts with min-
imal direction as to which contemporary standards to 
apply, subsequent case law emerged in an attempt to 
clarify which community standards to be used in as-
sessing potentially obscene works.  For example, in 
Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court noted 
“contemporary community standards must be ap-
plied by jurors in accordance with their own under-
standing of the tolerance of the average person in 
their community . . . .”123  Further, in Hamling v. 
United States, Supreme Court noted:  
 
Miller rejected the view that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
proscription of obscenity be based on uni-
form nationwide standards of what is ob-
scene . . . .  A juror is entitled to draw on his 
own knowledge of the views of the average 
person in the community or vicinage from 
which he comes for making the required de-
termination.124  
 
While the subsequent attempts to clarify 
which community standards to use gave guidance 
and direction to the lower courts, they nevertheless 
did not solve the problem of the inherent subjectivity 
of the test.  The glaring issue remains that communi-
ty standards vary greatly from geographic region to 
geographic region.  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized this issue but has refused to adequately ad-
dress it, instead noting “the fact that distributors of 
allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to 
varying community standards in the various federal 
                                                             
123 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). 
124 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
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judicial districts into which they transmit the mate-
rials does not render a federal statute unconstitu-
tional because of the failure of application of uniform 
national standards of obscenity.”125 
It seems apparent that the Supreme Court has 
refrained from enumerating which community 
standards to apply, and has further refused to speci-
fy any national standards for the application of the 
test, for the following reasons: (1) there is inherent 
difficulty in defining such standards and (2) in enu-
merating a standard the test would become more rig-
id and less flexible.  Indeed, the Supreme Court not-
ed those very facts stating “our Nation is simply too 
big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably ex-
pect that such standards could be articulated for all 
50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the 
prerequisite consensus exists.”126  The fundamental 
issue with this rationale is that it fails to adequately 
take into account the harm that the lack of guide-
lines places on those against whom obscenity chal-
lenges are being brought. 
In essence, the lacking definition of which 
communities’ standards will be applied allows for 
much too much subjectivity.  When confronted with 
applying the Miller test to a specific type of material, 
the trier of fact has no direction in determining 
which contemporary standards to apply and is in-
stead allowed to apply the standards of their specific 
community.  While the Supreme Court subsequently 
refused the notion of articulating a national commu-
nity standard in Miller, the fact remains that a na-
tional standard would serve to clarify some of the 
most ambiguous parts of the test, and also more ade-
                                                             
125 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. 
126 Id.  
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quately address the issue that applying contempo-
rary standards of a particular community may in 
many cases, may not be reflective of society’s views 
as a whole.  The development of a national contem-
porary standard for assessing obscene works appears 
to be a more attractive option than allowing for the 
subjectivity of the local standards which currently is 
the precedent.  The national standard would allow 
for less confusion in the application of the test, as 
well as greater fairness.  A national standard, would 
arguably, create a mechanism of uniformity among 
the courts, while simultaneously allowing for works 
to be assessed against the back drop of society’s 
standards and not those of a particular community.  
Allowing works to be assessed against society’s 
standards is inherently fairer, because it takes into 
account multiple viewpoints and synthesizes them 
into a standard that is reflective of the majority, as 
opposed to looking specifically at the viewpoints of an 
isolated community. 
To be sure, the development of a national 
standard would by no means be a perfect solution to 
the problem, however it would be more adequate in 
terms of addressing the concerns of subjectivity.  The 
national standard would of course take care to take 
into account both liberal and conservative sensibili-
ties.  This necessity lies in the fact that a national 
standard advocating either more conservative sensi-
bilities or more liberal sensibilities would have the 
overwhelming potential to have an astonishing num-
ber of material either rendered obscene or not ob-
scene.  The national standard approach, while not 
without its issues, remains a much more adequate 
option for giving courts and juries more adequate di-
rection in the application of the Miller test. 
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CONCLUSION 
The discussion of obscenity in relation to First 
Amendment protections remains an interesting and 
perplexing question that society will continue to 
struggle with as societal value evolution continues to 
progress.  Without adequate attention being directed 
to the fundamental problems within the Miller test 
for obscenity, the issue will remain challenging and 
debatable.  The inherent tension between evaluating 
challenged material under the factors set forth in the 
Miller test and within the context of society’s views 
on sex and sexuality will continue to present issue 
for the judiciary as societal values continue to evolve 
and develop.  Indeed, there very well may come a 
time when the Miller test will be rendered inapplica-
ble because of the societal notions and viewpoints. 
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Abstract 
This Note argues that courts’ emphasis on the 
ordinary observer test to prove illicit copying in film 
is misguided.  The ordinary observer test relies on 
whether the accused work captures the total feel of 
the copyrighted work, but overlooks an essential as-
pect of unlawful appropriation and copyright law – 
the idea that only particular elements of a work are 
copyrightable.  If a jury is exposed to expert testimo-
ny regarding probative similarity before making 
their evaluation, it is unlikely they will forget such 
evidence when evaluating the illicit copying. 
A better test for infringement would be one 
that allows the ordinary observer, representative of 
the intended audience, to detect whether there is a 
similarity in the works, exclusive of an expert’s opin-
ion.  The focus should then shift to the more compli-
cated issue of unlawful appropriation by permitting 
the inclusion of analytic dissection and expert testi-
mony. 
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“[A]s a matter of triable fact, . . . there are only 
twenty-nine basic plot ideas in the world.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
All writers think that their ideas are unique, 
and no single writer is usually willing to admit that 
the same idea can be independently thought of twice.  
For this reason, copyright infringement suits are 
quite popular in Hollywood.  However, for this very 
same reason, an overwhelming amount of such suits 
fail.2 
To prove copyright infringement, the Second 
Circuit test requires that the claimant show, (1) 
ownership of the copyright, (2) that the defendant 
copied from claimant’s copyrighted work, and (3) that 
the copying constitutes improper, or unlawful appro-
priation.3  Ownership is a “statutory formality,” 
which is easily satisfied.4  However, proving that the 
defendant copied a copyrighted work as a matter of 
fact, which may consist of evidence of admission by 
the defendant or circumstantial evidence of access to 
the work, is more involved.5  Thus, factual copying 
                                                             
1 Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin’ Becomes a 
Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright Infringement and the Motion 
Screenplay: Toward an Improved Framework, 10 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 359, 360 (2003) (quoting RON SUPPA, THE BUSINESS OF 
SCREENWRITING 66 (1999)). 
2 Id. 
3 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2012). 
4 See Gladden, supra note 1 (noting registration of a copyright 
is a prerequisite to copyright infringement, but the 
requirements for registration are minimal: the registered work 
may simply be an independent creation of the copyright owner). 
5 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69. 
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involves proof of similarity, in addition to access.6 
Access is established if there was a reasonable 
opportunity to view the copyrighted work, as “[i]t is 
obvious that one cannot copy a work unless he reads, 
sees, or hears it,” thus establishing a reasonable in-
ference of copying.7  However, access alone will not 
suffice if no similarities between the two works ex-
ist.8  Once access and similarities have been estab-
lished, an analysis is required to determine whether 
such similarities necessarily prove copying.9  Here, 
expert testimony is permitted to aid the trier of 
facts.10  Furthermore, unless the similarities are 
“striking,” an absence of access will usually preclude 
a finding of copying.11 
Nonetheless, the more complex issue tends to 
fall within the third part of the Second Circuit’s test 
for copying: that of unlawful appropriation.12  The 
unlawful appropriation standard for screenplays cur-
rently remains somewhat underdeveloped.13  Howev-
er, in considering what constitutes an illicit copying, 
courts apply the test of the ordinary observer.14  For 
sufficient actionable appropriation, a film must 
“leave the impression it was based on or used plain-
tiff’s work” from the point of view of the average per-
                                                             
6 Id. 
7 M.L. Cross, Literary and Artistic Rights for Purposes of, and 
Their Infringement by or in Connection with, Motion Pictures, 
Radio, and Television, 23 A.L.R.2d 244, § 28(a) (1952); Arnstein, 
154 F.2d at 468. 
8 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 See Gladden, supra note 1. 
14 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
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son.15 
This Note argues that the courts appear to al-
low expert testimony where none is needed, but then 
exclude such testimony where it is necessary.  Ac-
cording to Judge Learned Hand, copying is illicit 
where “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to de-
tect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook 
them.”16  If a jury is exposed to expert testimony re-
garding probative similarity, it is unlikely they will 
forget such evidence when evaluating the illicit copy-
ing.  The ordinary observer test relies on whether the 
accused work captures the “total concept and feel” of 
the copyrighted work.”17  The “total concept and feel” 
overlooks an essential aspect of unlawful appropria-
tion and copyright law – only particular elements of 
a work are copyrightable.18 
One reason for the lack of successful suits 
against movie studios is the fact that many suits are 
misguided, and the parties alleging infringement do 
not necessarily understand how to dissect an unlaw-
ful appropriation.19  A better test for infringement 
would be one that allows the ordinary observer, rep-
resentative of the intended audience, to detect 
whether there is a similarity in the works, exclusive 
of an expert’s opinion.  The focus should then shift to 
the more complicated issue of unlawful appropriation 
                                                             
15 Cross, supra note 7, at § 2[b]. 
16 Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright 
Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 727 (2010) 
(quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468). 
17 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977). 
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
19 K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the 
Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the 
Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 
173, 182 (1999); Lemley, supra note 16, at 719. 
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by permitting the inclusion of analytic dissection and 
expert testimony.  Although a layperson may easily 
detect an overall similar theme, the separation of 
copyrightable material and elements should be de-
tected by expert testimony, or perhaps is better ana-
lyzed as a matter of law. 
Furthermore, the qualifications of the ordi-
nary observer have been a source of dissent.20  Can 
the average moviegoer truly differentiate between an 
original and unoriginal work?  Is the lay observer 
equipped to differentiate between protectable and 
unprotectable elements of a copyright?  Does the lay 
observer understand that copyright protection does 
not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied?”21  Should the 
courts allow expert testimony of dramaturges and 
literary agents, or does that make the infringement 
too trivial to be actionable? 
Comparatively, trademark infringement cases 
rely on consumer confusion and the judgment of the 
reasonably prudent purchaser to determine actiona-
ble infringement.22  The reasonably prudent pur-
chaser is akin to the ordinary observer in copyright 
infringement cases.  However, a reasonably prudent 
                                                             
20 Cross, supra note 7, at § 28(a). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
22 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (setting forth the 8-factor test for consumer 
confusion, which includes: (1) Strength of the mark; (2) 
Proximity of the goods; (3) Similarity of the marks; (4) Evidence 
of actual confusion; (5) Marketing channels used; (6) Type of 
goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the 
purchaser; (7) Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; (8) 
Likelihood of expansion of the product lines). 
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purchaser watching a film can easily identify the 
product, and thereby any confusion as to the origin of 
the product is more explicit than the confusion of an 
ordinary observer identifying copyright infringe-
ment, where she must be told that there is an issue 
of authorship or copyright ownership. 
Alternatively, copyright infringement in film 
requires the “ordinary observer” to be highly knowl-
edgeable about the art of filmmaking.  The complexi-
ties involved in making a film set it apart from the 
art of music and literature, which also employs the 
ordinary observer test.23  Where the expression of 
music is analyzed by patterns of notes, film employs 
multiple mediums, which may cause confusion for 
the ordinary observer in identifying the copyrighta-
ble elements. 
The court employs the ordinary observer test 
to determine copyright infringement in film through 
the “eyes of men generally.”24  Yet, this test is flawed 
because the average observer of a movie is not accu-
rately represented if they are influenced by expert 
testimony initially.  Furthermore, the ordinary ob-
server is not necessarily one who can properly differ-
entiate between what may and may not be copied.  
The confusion of the observer watching a film should 
relate to the question of whether similarities of copy-
rightable material exist.  Courts should therefore al-
low extrinsic evidence of experts to support the tes-
timony of the “average” quasi-expert that make up 
                                                             
23 The medium of computer software, which is also covered 
under the Copyright Act, will not be addressed as I intend to 
focus on mediums that employ artistic expression. 
24 See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) 
(establishing that the “ordinary observer” test is the judgment 
of a design, which is to be to be made by men generally “of 
ordinary intelligence”). 
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the juries of the Ninth and Second Circuits. 
 
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF INFRINGEMENT 
IN MOTION PICTURES 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Con-
stitution grants Congress the power to enact copy-
right legislation in order to promote and protect the 
works of authors.25  The Copyright Act, codified in 17 
U.S.C., vests protection “in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and 
lists “motion pictures” as a category to be protected.26  
The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to 
reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative 
works, distribute copies, and perform or display the 
work publicly.27 
By way of limitation, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) speci-
fies that protection will not extend to any “idea, pro-
cedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery.”28  Thus, in the seminal 
case Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court found that 
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves, could 
be copyrighted.29  This is where the ordinary observ-
er test becomes somewhat complicated.  In Baker, 
plaintiff alleged copyright infringement of his book 
that consisted of a unique double entry bookkeeping 
system made up of a particular arrangement of col-
umns.  Defendant’s book used a similar system with 
                                                             
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
26 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
28 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
29 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“The description 
of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, 
lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The 
object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. 
The former may be secured by copyright.”). 
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a different arrangement of columns.30  The court 
ruled that defendant was free to use the art of the 
system described in the book, as long as the book it-
self was not copied.31  The court acknowledged that, 
although the system of the art described in the book 
may be protected, no exclusive claim existed in the 
art of the system itself.32 
The idea/expression dichotomy is particularly 
important in the business of Hollywood filmmaking.  
Even more so, the idea/expression dichotomy creates 
complications for the ordinary observer in identifying 
copyright infringement.  Producers are at liberty to 
find an idea and quickly make a motion picture on 
the same subject or idea.33  Although copyright law 
assumes that the author will be the owner of the 
work, generally, in Hollywood, the author sells his 
idea and assigns all his rights to a producer who cre-
ates the expression.34  Nonetheless, directors and 
producers will be held contributorily or vicariously 
liable.35 
The complication of the idea/expression di-
chotomy is partly attributed to the complexity of a 
making a Hollywood film.  Hollywood films are argu-
ably the single most expensive art of modern times.36  
The phases of creation include pre-production, pro-
duction, post-production, and distribution, with hun-
dreds of negotiations contracted for each phase, pro-
ducing hundreds of additional transaction costs.  Due 
to these costs, only one in ten motion pictures will 
                                                             
30 Id. at 100. 
31 Id. at 105. 
32 Id.  
33 Cross, supra note 7, at § 13. 
34 Greene, supra note 19, at 178. 
35 Id. at 179. 
36 Id. at 180. 
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ever yield a profit.37  Because of the risk and expense 
involved in creating a movie, production companies 
usually spend millions of dollars on “clearance ex-
perts” who will calculate the risk of potential legal 
action surrounding any infringement risks.38 
Yet, despite such efforts, copyright infringe-
ment suits continue to be brought in large num-
bers.39  This is because writers tend to believe in the 
originality of their ideas, failing to understand that 
an idea is not cause for a claim of copyright in-
fringement.40  If the creator of the art is confused as 
to what is copyrightable and what is not, won’t the 
ordinary observer feel similarly if not more confused? 
Litigation related to motion pictures can arise 
based on theories of law ranging from contract, to 
trademark, to right of publicity.  Yet, the most popu-
lar of the claims tends to be based on copyright in-
fringement.41  The allure of suing the makers of Hol-
lywood films is apparent: lots of equity and the great 
fear of bad publicity.  Nevertheless, actions against 
motion pictures rarely ever succeed.42  Possible rea-
                                                             
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 180. 
39 Id. at 180-81. 
40 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
41 Greene, supra note 19, at 180-81. 
42 Id. at 182; see Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform Commercial 
Code to Protect the “Ideas” That Make the Movies, 27 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 693, 694 (1987) (arguing that screenwriters face 
a “high risk of appropriation” under copyright law); Columbia 
Wins TV-Show Copyright Case, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1999), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/10/business/fi-25924; Eriq 
Gardner, Judge: Writer Must Pay Fox $40,000 for Claiming 
“Alien vs. Predator” Stole His Script, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 24, 
2011, 8:32 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/judge-writer-pay-fox-40000-227204; Eriq Gardner, You Sue 
a Studio, They Make You Pay, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 2, 2011, 
9:48 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sue-studio-
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sons for this lack of success are threefold – either 
movie studios rarely appropriate copyrighted works – 
hence the reason behind clearance experts; the suits 
are misguided because the claimant lacks the ade-
quate copyright knowledge; or, the courts are hostile 
to such claims, and thus employ more exacting 
standards, making it extremely difficult to prove 
copyright infringement.43 
 
II. PROVING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 Copyright infringement relating to motion pic-
tures typically falls into three scenarios: (1) an au-
thor claims its literary work has been used as the ba-
sis of a film; (2) an author of a work of visual art al-
leges that his work was used in a film; or (3) an au-
thor of a visual work sues a film maker for digitally 
manipulating the author’s image for use in a film.44 
The doctrine of scènes à faire puts forth the theory 
that there are only a limited amount of basic plot 
ideas in the world, and as a result, writers are bound 
to create parallel, if not identical ideas.  Due to this 
fact, it is not surprising that the most popular area 
for infringement suits is the allegation of plot appro-
priation.45 
 For a writer to prove copyright infringement 
they must show: (1) copyright ownership, (2) copying 
of the work, and (3) that such copying relates to cop-
                                                                                                                             
pay-95267; Frances Grandy Taylor, In Filmmaking, Lawsuits 
Thicken Plot, HARTFORD COURANT (June 24, 1998),  
http://articles.courant.com/1998-06-
24/news/9806240194_1_writers-truman-show-lion-king (stating 
plagiarism and copyright cases brought by writers “are 
extremely difficult to win”). 
43 Greene, supra note 19, at 182. 
44 Id. at 183. 
45 Gladden, supra note 1, at 360. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
The Copyright Infringement Test 
540 
yrightable material and is therefore deemed improp-
er appropriation.46  Under common law, an author of 
a literary work (before publication) possesses the 
same rights as in any other property he possesses.  
Mainly, the author has full control over his work in 
terms of first publication, and may prevent others 
from using such work.47  The common law right to 
one’s creative work is not exactly a copyright, since it 
includes the right to refuse, to perform, publish, 
dramatize, or copy.48  Once an author obtains a copy-
right under federal statute, their common law liter-
ary rights are abandoned.49  Accordingly, proving 
copyright ownership in a copyright infringement ac-
tion depends on proof of ownership in compliance 
with the Copyright Act.50  
 
A. The Two-Step Test 
 Copyright infringement consists of the follow-
ing elements: (1) copying and (2) improper appropria-
tion.51  Copying can be shown by either admission or 
reasonable opportunity to access the material, and 
similarity between the works.  If there is evidence of 
both access and similarity, an inference of copying is 
established.52  Still, not all copying is illegal.  Only 
copying that includes more than a de minimis 
amount of copyrightable expression will constitute 
copyright infringement.53  This further refinement of 
                                                             
46 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977). 
47 Cross, supra note 7, at § 3. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1162; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
51 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1162. 
52 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
53 Lemley, supra note 16, at 720. 
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identifiable copying is improper appropriation.54 
 The two-step test may be proven in court 
based on the majority approach, defined by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter and the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, 
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.55  The Second Circuit an-
swers the question of who evaluates the copyright 
infringement in two parts.  First is the analysis and 
dissection stage, which receives the aid of expert tes-
timony and asks whether the defendant copied from 
a copyrighted work.  Second is the “ordinary observ-
er” test to determine if such copying was illicit, and 
is apparent to the layperson.56  The Ninth Circuit re-
fers to the same two steps, but as extrinsic and in-
trinsic analyses.57 
 
1. Copying 
 Much time seems to be spent in courts analyz-
ing both access and probative similarity, which make 
up copying.  Yet, the courts place the most emphasis 
on the circumstantial evidence of access, which pre-
sumably allows the trier of facts to “reasonably infer 
copying,” but also requires analytic dissection.58  The 
dissection seems misplaced, as it is not the access 
that the law protects, but rather the copyrightable 
elements of an idea.  The extrinsic evidence used to 
establish access is focused on so much that it inevi-
tably falls over to the probative similarity part of 
copying, the second element of the first step, and to 
the entire second step, finding a misappropriation.  
                                                             
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 721-22. 
56 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
57 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
58 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
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 In Arnstein, the court found, after listening to 
the compositions of Ira Arnstein and defendant Cole 
Porter, that similarities existed.  Together with ac-
cess, the court suggested, a reasonable jury may infer 
copying.59  This test seems to correspond to that of 
the ordinary observer test, which depends “on the re-
sponse of the ordinary reasonable person.”60  The 
court in Arnstein does not explain the relevance of 
the analytic dissection element of the copying step, 
only stating that it is.61 
 This inevitably influences courts to focus on 
the dissection of copying and the access that Arnstein 
allows to infer such copying, and focus less on decid-
ing whether or not the copying was permissible.  The 
access hurdle can be overcome if and when it is 
shown that a plaintiff’s work was available to the 
public, or specifically available to the defendant.62  
Yet, the courts make it difficult to establish access 
and may never get to the more crucial elements of 
copyright infringement: that of misappropriation.   
 Courts require a reasonable possibility of ac-
cess to the work, rather than a mere possibility.63  
Plaintiffs must prove a chain of events, which leads 
to a reasonable possibility of defendant viewing the 
work.64  Usually, there is an intermediary in between 
the author and alleged infringer, yet courts demand 
a showing of a close relationship in order to establish 
a reasonable opportunity of access.65  What consti-
tutes a close relationship for the courts has been ex-
                                                             
59 Id. at 469. 
60 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
61 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
62 Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 582 (4th Cir. 1996). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 583. 
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tremely strict.  Courts want to see an overlap of sub-
ject matter in the dealing between the intermediary 
and infringer, and will not assume a close relation-
ship without evidence of closeness related to the sub-
ject of the infringement.66  The requirement of find-
ing evidence of a reasonable possibility of viewing the 
work is more closely related to a reasonable oppor-
tunity to actually view the work.67  Already, the ap-
pearance of misappropriation seems diluted by ex-
trinsic evidence, which may or may not prove sub-
stantial copying. 
 One example of the courts placing too much 
emphasis on the evidence of a close relationship ex-
ists in Towler v. Sayles, in relation to the film Pas-
sion Fish.68  Virginia Towler had submitted her 
screenplay, Crossed Wires, to SCS Films, a successor 
company to Cinecom, who had previously released 
two films of John Sayles, and also shared a chair-
man, an office, and employees.  A representative of 
the company had told Towler that her screenplay 
would be forwarded to Sayles.  Of course, they later 
denied receiving the screenplay and the court found 
as a matter of law that there was no way for a jury to 
find that Sayles denied the truth.69  The court held 
that the dealings between SCS and Sayles needed to 
involve more of an overlap in subject matter to find 
access.70  Yet, it seems quite likely, or at least rea-
sonable, that a jury might find that someone from 
Cinecom would have given the script to Sayles, con-
sidering Towler’s request for such and testimony that 
such an agreement between Towler and a repre-
                                                             
66 Gladden, supra note 1, at 367. 
67 Id. 
68 Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 1996). 
69 Id. at 582-83. 
70 Id. 
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sentative of SCS was made.71 
 Similarly, in Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertain-
ment, the aforementioned Sayles and his film Lone 
Star were the subject of an alleged infringement of a 
script written by a high school teacher for her thesis, 
entitled Concealed.72  Herzog had given her script to 
William Cosford, a renowned film critic, and asked 
him to serve on her thesis committee.  Although he 
declined due to time constraints, he had retained a 
copy of Herzog’s thesis in his possession.73  Both 
Cosford and Sayles had attended the Miami Film 
Festival that same year.  Evidence showed that the 
two had a personal relationship where they had as-
sociated on many occasions and had been seen to-
gether at the festival in previous years.74  Although it 
seemed quite probable that Cosford could have 
passed along the script to Sayles, the court found 
that it was unreasonable to presume that Cosford, as 
a respected film critic, could have given Sayles the 
script, acting as a “conduit for the film industry.”75 
 It seems as though some courts get caught up 
with the access factor and stray too far away from 
the importance of copyright infringement: the actual 
unlawful copying.  Perhaps courts tend to eliminate 
cases within the access stage because most cases that 
get past this barrier still end in failure during fur-
ther evaluation in the illicit copying phase, examin-
ing similarities.  Yet, more often than not, courts will 
“dispense the access requirement altogether if the 
two works are so strikingly similar as to preclude in-
                                                             
71 Gladden, supra note 1, at 367-68. 
72 Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
73 Id. at 1244. 
74 Id. at 1245. 
75 Id. at 1251. 
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dependent creation.”76  
 In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions 
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., copyright infringement of 
the Krofft’s television series by McDonald’s television 
commercials was the issue at hand.77  Here, access 
was unnecessary to prove, since the similarities were 
not only striking, the defendant also admitted to cop-
ying the idea from the plaintiff.78  Instead, courts 
now focused on whether the copying constituted mis-
appropriation.  Krofft’s television series, Pufnstuf, 
consisted of a fantasyland that was inhabited by fan-
ciful costumed characters, talking books, and moving 
trees.  McDonald’s then released an advertising cam-
paign for McDonaldland, which was based on the se-
ries and even employed the same set and costume 
designers used for Pufnstuf.79  After the campaign 
launched, the Kroffts lost their licensing agreement 
with various toy manufacturers.  In addition, the Ice 
Capades replaced the use of the Pufnstuf characters 
with the McDonaldland characters.80 
 
2. Improper Appropriation 
 McDonald’s, the defendants in Sid & Marty, 
contended, albeit unsuccessfully, that although the 
ideas of McDonaldland and Pufnstuf were similar, 
the expressions of the idea were too dissimilar to find 
liability.81  Likewise, the difficulty in comparing 
similarities between two works of literary art is that 
elements such as plot and theme may seem similar 
                                                             
76 Id. at 1248. 
77 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977). 
78 Id. at 1165. 
79 Id. at 1161. 
80 Id. at 1162. 
81 Id. at 1165. 
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in the abstract, yet the law will only protect the ex-
pression of an idea and not the idea generally.82  The 
court in Sid & Marty relied on the ordinary observer 
test and undoubtedly found that the “total concept 
and feel” of McDonaldland’s characters were similar 
to the characters of Pufnstuf and so infringement ex-
isted.83  Yet, the court overlooks the defendant’s ar-
gument about separating the idea from the expres-
sion.  If an extrinsic test was allowed, and dissection 
of the protected and unprotected elements was pur-
sued, it is likely that the finding would not have re-
sulted in liability. 
 To help clarify where the line is drawn be-
tween an idea and an expression of an idea, Judge 
Learned Hand articulated the “abstractions test.”  
The abstractions test states that with any work 
many general patterns can be found, “as more and 
more of the incident is left out.”84  Rather, it easy to 
find similarities in two pieces of art when you ignore 
the differences.  This is why decisions of substantial 
similarity cannot help much in new cases and must 
inevitably be made ad hoc.85  Although there is no set 
standard for copyright infringement cases dealing 
with art, when courts dissect the elements of a liter-
ary work by character, plot, theme, and mood – a 
move from the abstract to the specific – this helps es-
tablish a valid assessment of an improper appropria-
tion.86  
 The plot of a screenplay is the crux of all copy-
right infringement claims.  As mentioned previously, 
                                                             
82 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d 
Cir. 1930). 
83 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1167. 
84 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.; Gladden, supra note 1, at 365. 
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writers easily find their ideas in films they watch, 
but may not understand the difference between an 
idea, which is unprotected, and the expression of the 
idea, which may be protected.  In the seminal case, 
Nichols v. Universal Corporation, Judge Learned 
Hand used his abstraction test to determine whether 
appropriation was improper regarding defendant’s 
film The Cohens and the Kellys and plaintiff’s play 
Abie’s Irish Rose.87  Judge Hand searched through 
each level of the stories, looking for the place to draw 
the line between the expression and the idea.  By fo-
cusing on the theme, plot, and character, the court 
concluded that there was no misappropriation. 
  Both stories revolved around a Jew and an 
Irish Catholic, living in New York, who marry 
against their parents’ will.  Yet, the theme of differ-
ent backgrounds converging was both unoriginal 
and, even assuming it was novel, uncopyrightable.88  
Likewise, the characters of each play are mere stock 
characters, which the court describes as the “low 
comedy Jew and Irishman.”89  Judge Hand explained 
that “the less developed the characters, the less they 
can be copyrighted.”90  By not allowing extrinsic evi-
dence in determining misappropriation, the ordinary 
observer may miss the similarities of stock charac-
ters, or they may automatically deem them to be ex-
actly the same. 
 
B. The Ordinary Observer in Film 
 The court in Arnstein leaves the issue of im-
proper appropriation to the jury and categorizes it as 
                                                             
87 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120. 
88 Id. at 122. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 121. 
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an issue of fact.91  The concern is summed up as 
“whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so 
much of what is pleasing to ears of lay listeners, who 
comprise the audience for whom such popular music 
is composed , that defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”92  Lay lis-
teners are relevant because they make up the rele-
vant audience in the Arnstein case. 
 For film, the relevant testimony would there-
fore rely on the general audience, which films are in-
tended for.  Perhaps it is easy to test the reaction of a 
general audience to determine similar overall con-
cepts between two films, as suggested by Arnstein.93  
However, this does not seem to complete the test of 
improper appropriation.  The elements that deserve 
protection are overlooked when improper appropria-
tion is left in the hands of the lay observer who is not 
properly educated on the differences between pro-
tectable and unprotectable elements.94 
 Audience members who make up the jury are 
prone to evaluating the art as they see fit, or, more 
likely, as was described by any expert testimony giv-
en during dissection of the copying elements.  How 
can they truly ignore the facts already established?  
The question is more likely focused on what they see 
as copied art, rather than deciding whether the art 
copied falls under the law’s protection. 
 For example, scènes à faire are exceptions to 
copyright protection because they are scenes that are 
a necessary result of a certain situation.95  Once an 
                                                             
91 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946). 
92 Id. at 473. 
93 Id. 
94 Lemley, supra note 16, at 739. 
95 See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (holding that “[e]lements such as drunks, prostitutes, 
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author chooses a situation, “it calls for certain se-
quences in the methods of treatment, which cannot 
be avoided, because they are, in the very nature of 
the development of the theme, and are used by every 
writer who knows his craft.”96  Although such scenes 
flow from a common idea, they are likely to be ex-
pressed in a stereotyped form.97  Separating out such 
scenes is helpful in determining whether there is im-
proper appropriation and actionable copyright in-
fringement.98  Yet courts do not elaborate on what 
makes such stock scenes necessary and how the or-
dinary observer is to determine these scenes in copy-
right infringement evaluations.99 
 The phrase “every writer that knows his craft” 
suggests that evidence of expert testimony is neces-
sary to determine the true elements of similarities of 
a work.  While expert testimony is permitted in de-
termining copying, the test of the ordinary observer 
                                                                                                                             
vermin and derelict cars would appear in any realistic work 
about the work of policemen in the South Bronx” and thus were 
unprotectable scènes à faire); CBS Broad., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. 
02-CIV-8813-LAP 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
14, 2003) (establishing that stock devices in reality television 
game shows, such as, a million dollar prize, dividing 
contestants into teams, highlighting the surroundings where a 
competition takes place, and depriving contestants of basic 
human needs, all fall under scènes à faire, and are not 
protected); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 
(S.D. Cal. 1942) (establishing a scene where two characters take 
refuge in a church after a storm is an uncopyrightable, 
incidental scene). 
96 Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 276 
(S.D. Cal. 1945). 
97 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 
1986).  
98 Id.  
99 Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scènes à Faire Doctrine, 41 
FLA. L. REV. 79, 88 (1989). 
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for illicit copying does not.  Nonetheless, jurors may 
hear evidence, whether expert or lay, that may skew 
their judgment of improper appropriation.  While 
they may be instructed to ignore the evidence, they 
still are aware that such evidence exists and there-
fore may apply that, and its unprotectable nature, to 
the work as a whole.  Where a work is a combination 
of protectable and unprotectable elements, a more 
discerning ordinary observer test is necessary, which 
requires that the court first filter out from considera-
tion any non-protectable elements.100 
 Perhaps using the ordinary observer of the in-
tended audience is inappropriate.  If courts will not 
allow extrinsic evidence to determine the more criti-
cal aspect of copyright infringement, then perhaps 
the intended audience should be replaced with the 
view of the writer. 
 
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT COMPARED TO 
TRADEMARK 
More appropriately, trademark infringement 
cases use the average consumer to fulfill the ordinary 
observer test.  Trademark infringement is defined as 
a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the 
source of the product.101  The ordinary consumer can 
thus more easily identify trademark infringement 
than the ordinary observer can identify copyright in-
fringement.  With copyright infringement, the aver-
age observer may not understand the origin of the 
copyright, as it is not marked by a brand and is not 
as easily identifiable as a trademark would be.  
Therefore, copyright infringement should be held to a 
                                                             
100 Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg, 748 F. Supp. 
2d 200, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
101 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). 
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higher standard than that used for trademark in-
fringement by focusing on illicit copying and allowing 
extrinsic evidence for the same.  
Where copyright seems to place more empha-
sis on the art and its expression, trademarks help aid 
consumerism and thus, extrinsic evidence may not be 
required because the ordinary observer is now the 
ordinary purchaser.  The general rule is that no more 
of the trademark should be used than necessary for 
the legitimate purpose.102  A fair use must be artisti-
cally relevant and not explicitly misleading.103  Since 
a major relevant factor includes the consumer and 
their impression, the reasonable prudent purchaser 
is likely more competent than the ordinary observer, 
allowing a lesser need for experts.  
Under the Lanham Act, it is the likelihood of 
confusion that is the standard for liability, rather 
than actual confusion.104  To determine such likeli-
hood courts have relied on “similarity of appearance,” 
which is examined by “sight, sound, and meaning.”105  
Evidence of confusion is usually presented in the 
form of consumer surveys.  Thus, trademark cases 
are “fact-driven” and “necessarily subjective and im-
pressionistic.”106  Trademark infringement cases in-
                                                             
102 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 
868 F.Supp.2d 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
103 Id. 
104 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
105 K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the 
Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine – Trademark Abuse in 
the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620 (2004) (quoting JANE C. GINSBURG ET 
AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 398 (3d ed. 
2001)). 
106 Id. (quoting Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of 
Confusion in Trademark Law, in 2 PLI’S SIXTH ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 85, 96). 
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volving motion pictures, therefore, have a more iden-
tifiable “ordinary observer” than the copyright in-
fringement case, i.e., anyone who goes to the movies. 
Another reason why the reasonable prudent 
purchaser is more competent than the ordinary ob-
server in a copyright infringement case against a 
filmmaker is because, with trademark infringement 
claims, the allegation does not involve an abstract 
idea, but rather an unauthorized use of a concrete 
mark.107  The line between copyright and trademark 
claims is quite distinctive in that way.  However, on 
occasion, the line may become blurred.  Such blurred 
lines further demonstrate how the ordinary observer 
is confused as to what constitutes copyrightable ele-
ments, and therefore requires extrinsic elements to 
aid them. 
For instance, in Comedy III Productions, Inc. 
v. New Line Cinema, the defendant brought a trade-
mark infringement claim for use of a clip of The 
Three Stooges in New Line’s film, The Long Kiss 
Goodnight.108  Even the court had trouble under-
standing how the use of a clip was the subject of a 
trademark infringement claim and not a copyright 
infringement claim.109  Yet, the plaintiff insisted that 
the clip was an enforceable, cognizable trademark 
because the clip itself was indicative of The Three 
Stooges comedy.110  They claimed that their protected 
right was in the “name, characters, the likeness, and 
overall act.”111  Still the court found no cognizable 
trademark, one that the public can recognize as a 
                                                             
107 15 U.S.C. § 1114.  
108 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 138-39 (3d ed. 2004). 
109 Id. at 139. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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symbol of The Three Stooges, either by inherent dis-
tinctiveness or acquisition of a secondary meaning.112 
Another example of how the reasonable pru-
dent purchaser is a more reliable test than that of 
the ordinary observer exists in the 2012 decision of 
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Enter-
tainment Inc., in relation to film The Hangover Part 
II.  The plaintiff alleged trademark infringement for 
display of counterfeit Louis Vuitton bags, used in an 
airport scene by one of the main characters.113  The 
character refers to the bags as a “Lewis Vuitton” and 
that is the last reference made in the film.  Louis 
Vuitton complained that many consumers believed 
that the counterfeit bags used in the film were genu-
ine Louis Vuitton products.114 
Using the Rogers test,115 the court noted that 
finding artistic relevance “merely must be above ze-
ro.”116  “Above zero” is a standard that is not availa-
ble to the ordinary observer.  The courts defer the re-
sponsibility of determining “how meaningful” a con-
nection between a trademark and artistic work must 
be.117  The artistic relevance prong simply establish-
es the intent of a non-commercial association with 
the trademark, eliminating any bad faith effort to 
                                                             
112 Id. 
113 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 
868 F.Supp.2d 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
114 Id. at 175. 
115 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (1989) (holding that the 
copyright act should be construed to apply to artistic works only 
whet the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
outweighs the public interest in free expression). 
116 Louis Vuitton, 868 F.Supp.2d at 178 (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t 
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th 
Cir. 2008)). 
117 Id. 
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exploit the mark.118  Again, the ordinary observer 
does not have the luxury of dismissing bad faith for 
artistic expression.  The scene in which the counter-
feit Louis Vuitton bag appears is used for comedic 
effect and displays the character’s socially inept 
traits.  The court finds such use genuinely relevant 
to the film’s story and thus, the first prong of the 
Rogers test is satisfied.119 
The second prong of the test relates to con-
sumer confusion, which is the ultimate consideration 
in trademark infringement allegations.  If the use of 
a mark is so misleading as to induce the public to be-
lieve the use was “prepared or otherwise authorized 
by the plaintiff” the use will be denied First Amend-
ment protection.120  This is an immediate recognition 
upon the judgment of the reasonable prudent pur-
chaser, an immediacy that is unavailable for the or-
dinary observer. 
The Lanham Act is purposefully strict in its 
accommodation of free expression.  This is achieved 
by limiting restriction of its application to those cases 
that present the “greatest risk of consumer confu-
sion: namely, when trademarks are used to ‘dupe[ ] 
consumers into buying a product they mistakenly be-
lieve is sponsored by the trademark owner.’”121  
Therefore, if a trademark is not directly used to des-
ignate the source of the defendant’s work then the 
interest in avoiding deception is slight.  And if the 
defendant is not using the mark as its own trade-
                                                             
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 179 (quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 
Ltd., 996 F.2 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
121 Id. at 180 (quoting Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d at 1100, 
quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 
806 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alterations in original). 
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mark, then the viewer is not “confus[ed] . . . into be-
lieving that the two marks identify a single 
source.”122 
In the film, the counterfeit Louis Vuitton bags 
appear for a few seconds in the background of a sin-
gle scene, making it highly unlikely for a viewer to 
even notice the difference in bags.  Furthermore, it is 
nearly implausible to presume that viewers would 
take the character’s comments about designer bags 
and attribute those views to the filmmakers them-
selves.123  Because there is no evidence of a “particu-
larly compelling” likelihood that consumers will be 
confused as to the source of the counterfeit bag as a 
genuine Louis Vuitton, the First Amendment defense 
and the public interest in protecting free expression 
of noncommercial speech ultimately prevails.124 
Simply put, if the reasonably prudent pur-
chaser is confused as to Louis Vuitton’s connection 
with the film, then there is an infringement.  Yet, if 
the ordinary observer is confused as to the source of 
two works, this does not equate to infringement.  
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Although avoiding frivolous suits is imperative 
in maintaining a streamlined court system, to retain 
the essence of the copyright law, more emphasis 
should be placed on determining misappropriation.  
To do so, dissection of copyrightable elements should 
be left out of the first part of the Arnstein test, where 
similarities are analyzed, and placed in the second 
factor where illicit copying is determined.125  
                                                             
122 Id. (quoting 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:11.50 (4th ed.)). 
123 Id. at 182. 
124 Id. 
125 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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To show infringement, the main concern is 
whether a defendant copied more than a de minimis 
amount of protectable expression.  The first inquiry, 
therefore, is whether a defendant copied from the 
plaintiff.  The Ninth Circuit describes this inquiry of 
substantial similarity as a simple one.126  Yet, dissec-
tion of the work into protectable and unprotectable 
elements is employed.  Similarities of two works are 
probative of copying regardless of whether the simi-
larities lie in protected elements or not.   
Here is where defendants backed by expensive 
lawyers overrun the small time writer: defendant 
Hollywood producers and writers have the resources 
to pick apart the elements which are questionably 
copyrightable without having to give credit to the 
original source.  For this reason it appears more use-
ful to employ the ordinary observer, instead of expert 
testimony, to determine whether the “total concept 
and feel” is similar to the copyrighted work and thus 
probative of copying. 
The second part of the test, which the Ninth 
Circuit describes as more complex, is more appropri-
ate for both analytical dissection and expert testimo-
ny.127  The line between the uncopyrightable idea 
and the copyrightable expression of an idea is rather 
thin and quite difficult for courts to decipher.128  
Nonetheless, the ordinary observer is unlikely to un-
derstand precisely which elements fall under copy-
right protection and will likely not be able to sepa-
rate them from unprotected elements.  Such concepts 
are generally out of the purview of the public at 
                                                             
126 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
127 Id. 
128 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d 
Cir. 1930). 
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large.  Therefore, dissection of the work in question 
is required to determine misappropriation, and often, 
expert testimony is necessary to aid such determina-
tion. 
Perhaps substituting extrinsic analysis for in-
trinsic analysis, and vice versa, for all copyright in-
fringement cases may be problematic as most circuits 
have already implemented the Arnstein-Krofft test of 
the Second and Ninth Circuits.  However, by allow-
ing dissection and expert testimony in both prongs of 
the test, courts can avoid the difficult problem of ju-
ries attempting to ignore evidence already heard.  
Further, this would allow juries to understand what 
elements should be analyzed as an ordinary observ-
er. 
Moreover, if the misappropriation prong is 
better served by dissection of copyrightable elements, 
it seems best if this was considered a factor to be de-
cided as a matter of law.  The very principle behind 
illicit copying is an incident of copying that reaches 
beyond the point of unlawful appropriation, or the 
copying of the protected expression itself.  Because 
the line between idea and expression is already so 
blurred, it seems appropriate for courts to be the de-
terminer. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Most plaintiffs of infringement cases targeting 
filmmakers and studios are not prepared to face the 
realities and complexities of copyright law.  After a 
thorough evaluation of the elements above it is easy 
to see why so many copyright infringement suits 
tend to fail.  It seems that courts are “intuitively hos-
tile” to claims against films either because of the be-
lief that too often these cases are based on a misun-
derstanding of what copyright in fact does protect or 
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on an “obsessive conviction” prevalent in the minds 
of many authors and artists alike, “that all similari-
ties between their work and any other which appear 
later must inevitably be ascribed to plagiarism.”129  
The proposal above will aid the courts in determining 
more accurate decisions in copyright infringement 
cases, thusly educating writers and juries alike in 
what actionable copyright infringement actually en-
tails. 
                                                             
129 Greene, supra note 19, at 185. 
 559 
 
PACE UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
PACE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT 
LAW FORUM 
 
Volume 4 Spring 2014 Issue 2 
 
Note 
 
Protecting a Celebrity’s Child From 
Harassment: Is California’s 
Amendment Penal Code § 11414 
Too Vague to be Constitutional? 
 
 
Michelle N. Robinson* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
* Michelle N. Robinson is a 3L at Pace Law School. She 
graduated from University of Maryland-College Park with a 
degree in Sociology and Criminology/Criminal Justice.  
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Protecting a Celebrity’s Child From Harassment 
560 
Abstract 
This Note will describe a brief history of the 
legal attempts to restrict the paparazzi and the legis-
lative history behind A.B. 3592 and its amendment, 
S.B. 606.  The bills are controversial and have re-
ceived a significant amount of criticism, due to the 
fact that they restrict speech by essentially prohibit-
ing paparazzi, known for their harassing behavior, 
from taking pictures of the children of celebrities.  
The Note will conclude with an analysis utilizing the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine of whether the bill is in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a young child who is terrorized be-
cause of her parents’ occupation by peers, neighbors, 
or even strangers.  They are constantly asking her 
questions, making derogatory comments about her 
parents, physically attacking her, and even jumping 
from behind trees or cars to frighten her.  She is 
emotionally traumatized and terrified to go outside 
to play with her friends, go to school, or visit the local 
shopping mall.  It is hard to imagine how a parent 
can cope with this situation.  One way for parents to 
prevent this is by changing their occupations.  But 
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for most parents, this is not an option.  Something 
should be done to prevent this type of harassment. 
California recognized that children are har-
assed because of their parents’ occupations.  This is 
especially the case for parents who are entertainers, 
public officials, or law enforcement officers.  Since 
the advent of America’s fascination with celebrities 
in the press and social media, there have been nu-
merous reports of members of the media doing al-
most anything in their power to capture and publish 
the image of a celebrity’s child.1  For example, many 
tabloid magazines are willing to pay millions of dol-
lars to feature the first image of a celebrity’s new-
born baby on the cover of their magazine.  In July 
2013, Newsday reported that Brad Pitt and Angelina 
Jolie received $15 million for the first images of their 
twins, Knox Leon & Vivienne Marcheline.2 
The media chases and harasses celebrity par-
ents who want to keep their child out of the spotlight 
so that they can photograph the celebrity’s child.  For 
example, Beyoncé Knowles and Jay-Z decided not to 
sell the image of their daughter, Blue Ivy, to the me-
dia.3  As a result, the media relentlessly tried to pho-
                                                             
1 “Celebrity” is a broad term that describes a famous person.  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 231 (4th ed. 
2004). 
2 Lacey Rose, In Pictures: Most Expensive Celebrity Pictures, 
FORBES (July 1, 2009, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/01/michael-jackson-magazine-
business-media-jackson_slide_2.html; Celebrity Baby Scoop, 10 
Most Expensive Celebrity Photos to Date, NEWSDAY (July 10, 
2013, 7:00 AM) http://long-island.newsday.com/kids/long-island-
parent-talk-1.3679226/10-most-expensive-celebrity-baby-
photos-to-date-1.5612593. 
3 Sarah Fitzmaurice & Nadia Mendoza, ‘She Wanted to Do It 
This Way’: Beyoncé’s Friend, Celebrity Stylist June Ambrose, 
Reveals Why Singer and Jay-Z Chose to Forfeit Price Tag on 
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tograph the baby girl.  To protect her child from the 
paparazzi,4  Beyoncé covered little Blue’s face with a 
blanket or pressed her daughter’s face into her chest 
when out in public.5  These images are seen in al-
most every candid image posted of the mega-star and 
her daughter.6 
For the most part, there are no reports of Be-
yoncé or her child being physically harmed by the 
paparazzi in their unrelenting attempts to photo-
graph her daughter.  But the media can be overly ag-
gressive and cause severe damage, which was unfor-
tunately demonstrated in 1997 when Princess Diana 
was killed.7  More recently in 2011, Tori Spelling, 
who was pregnant at the time, was chased by the pa-
parazzi while driving her children to school and 
crashed into the wall of her children’s school.8  How-
                                                                                                                             
First Pictures of Blue, MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 12, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2100081/Blue-Ivy-
Carter-pictures-Beyonce-Jay-Z-chose-forfeit-price-tag-baby-
photos.html. 
4 The term “paparazzi” is the plural word for paparazzo. A 
paparazzo is a “freelance photographer who pursues celebrities 
to take candid pictures for sale to magazines and newspapers.” 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1006 (4th ed. 
2004). 
5 Nadia Mendoza, Cute Feet – But We Want to See Her Face! 
Jay-Z Keeps Blue Ivy Covered Up as Her Little Legs Poke Out 
Beneath Protective Blanket, MAIL ONLINE (June 4, 2012, 10:32 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2154460/Jay-
Z-keeps-Blue-Ivy-covered-little-legs-poke-beneath-protective-
blanket.html. 
6 Id. 
7 The Learning Network, Aug. 31, 1997 Princess Diana Is 
Killed Car Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011, 4:41 AM), 
http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/aug-31-1997-
princess-diana-is-killed-in-car-crash/. 
8 Nancy Dillon, Tori Spelling Gets in ‘Pretty Big’ Car Crash: 
Pregnant Star Blames Paparazzo for Causing Accident, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2011, 9:23 AM), 
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ever, the crash did not stop the aggressive photogra-
phers.  The photographers continued to snap pictures 
after she collided with the building.9  They were 
eventually chased away by other parents.10  Fortu-
nately, the damage was minimal. 
Children of celebrities are not the only chil-
dren targeted by overzealous individuals.  Families 
of law enforcement officials are also threatened with 
violence and harassed by individuals who are resent-
ful towards law enforcement officers.11  For example, 
in February 2013, Christopher Dorner targeted po-
lice officers and their families, stating in his manifes-
to that he intended to “destroy, exploit and seize des-
ignated targets.”12  Dorner was a former Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) Officer whose employ-
ment was terminated after he accused his training 
officer of assaulting a mentally ill man.13  A year af-
ter the LAPD disciplinary panel terminated his em-
ployment, the Los Angeles County Superior Court 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/tori-spelling-
pretty-big-car-crash-pregnant-star-blames-paparazzo-causing-
accident-article-1.131844; Tim Kenneally, Pregnant Tori 
Spelling Survives Accident After Paparazzi Chase, WRAP (June 
13, 2011, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.thewrap.com/tv/article/pregnant-tori-spelling-
survives-accident-after-paparazzi-chase-28199. 
9 Kenneally, supra note 8. 
10 Id.  
11 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Pub. Safety, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2013). 
12 Joel Rubin et al., Investigators Focus on What Makes 
Dorner Tick, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/11/local/la-me-dorner-hunt-
20130211. 
13 Jack Leonard et al., Dorner’s LAPD Firing Case Hinged on 
Credibility, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/10/local/la-me-lapd-dorner-
20130211. 
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reexamined his case and determined that the disci-
plinary committee did not have sufficient evidence to 
terminate Dorner’s employment.  However, the court 
did not overturn the disciplinary panel’s decision to 
fire Dorner.14  As a result, Dorner vowed to seek re-
venge in his online manifesto.  In the manifesto he 
claimed that he was “unjustly fired” and that “[the 
disciplinary panel members] lack of ethics and 
conspir[acy] to wrong a just individual are over.”15  
He further stated that the panel members’ unjust 
behavior would result in “deadly consequences” for 
them and their loved ones.16  Dorner killed several 
people, including a police officer, a sheriff’s deputy 
and the daughter of a former LAPD Captain, who de-
fended Dorner at the disciplinary hearing.17  Other 
police officers, such as Phil Tingirides, a LAPD Cap-
tain who was a member of the disciplinary panel that 
                                                             
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Jens Erik Gould, After Christopher Dorner, What Next for 
the LAPD?, TIME (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/14/after-christopher-dorner-
what-next-for-the-lapd/ (“Dorner is suspected of killing a total of 
four people,, including a Riverside, Calif., police officer, a San 
Bernardino sheriff’s deputy and the daughter of a former police 
captain, all part of a one-man war against the Los Angeles 
Police Department over what he called the force’s ‘lying, racism’ 
and ‘cover-ups.’”); Jack Leonard et al., Police Say Ex-Cop Was 
Bent on Exacting Revenge, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013),  
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/07/local/la-me-dorner-
profile-20130207/2 (“Dorner spent the next couple of years 
unsuccessfully appealing his termination. Then, this week, 
police say, Dorner made good on his threat to seek revenge 
when he fatally shot the daughter of an ex-LAPD captain who 
represented him at his discipline hearing. He also allegedly 
shot her fiancé. Dorner went on to fatally shoot one officer and 
injure two others, police say.”). 
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terminated Dorner’s employment, had round-the-
clock protection for his six foster children during the 
hunt for Dorner.18 
Despite the outrageousness of this type of be-
havior, the law does not offer much protection from 
obsessive individuals who threaten and harass chil-
dren because of their parents’ identity.  There are 
statutes that punish threats that result in a felony, 
such as Section 422 of California’s Penal Code.19  But 
parents do not want to wait until their child is physi-
cally harmed.  They want to deter individuals from 
behaving in a manner that would cause their chil-
dren emotional and psychological harm.  Whether it 
is unwarranted attention from the media or threats 
from individuals seeking revenge, parents want legal 
protection that will deter others from harassing their 
children. 
Almost twenty years ago, California passed 
A.B. 3592, codified as Penal Code Section 11414, to 
protect children from individuals who harassed them 
because of their parents’ occupations.20  However, 
many argued that this law was not effective in deter-
ring individuals because of its “relatively weak pen-
alties.”21  As a result, a California senator presented 
a bill, S.B. 606, to amend Penal Code Section 11414 
in early 2013.22  This amendment is very similar to 
the existing law as it prohibits harassment of a child 
                                                             
18 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the S. Rules Comm., 2013-
14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3-4 (Cal. 2013). 
19 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2013). 
20 A.B.. 3592, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal.1994) (enacted). 
21 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Pub. Safety, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2013). 
22 S.B. 606, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (enacted). 
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because of his parent’s occupation.23  However, the 
biggest difference between the existing law and the 
amendment is that the criminal penalties are en-
hanced.24  In September 2013, the California State 
Legislature passed the amendment and the Governor 
signed it into law.25 
This Note will focus on whether Penal Code 
Section 11414, as amended, will protect children, 
specifically children of celebrities, from the paparaz-
zi, without violating the press’ right to due process.  
According to critics of the amendment, the new law 
violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which de-
rived from the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment.26  Under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute will be void if 
it does not provide clear notice of the prohibited be-
havior.27  Without clear notice, the law will not be 
                                                             
23 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 2 (Cal. 2013). 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Patrick McGreevy and Melanie Mason, Gov. Brown Signs 
Bills Aimed at Paparazzi, Family Leave and Quakes, L.A. TIMES 
(Sep. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/24/local/la-
me-brown-bills-paparazzi-20130925. 
26 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (holding that 
“[t]he statute, as drafted and as construed by the state court, is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to 
clarify what is contemplated [. . . ].”). 
27 Connally v. General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)(stating “[t]hat the terms of a penal statute creating a 
new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who 
are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them 
liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, 
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the 
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
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enforced. 
In this Note, I will first describe a brief history 
of the legal attempts to restrict the paparazzi in sec-
tion I. Next, I will discuss the legislative history be-
hind the existing law and its amendment in sections 
II and III.  Finally, I will analyze whether the bill 
fails the void-for-vagueness doctrine in section IV. 
 
 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT 
CELEBRITIES 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
protects the press’ right to photograph celebrities, 
and to some extent, those associated with them.  It 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or the press.”28  Leg-
islators must balance the press’ First Amendment 
rights with the celebrity’s right to privacy when 
drafting a bill that protects celebrities from the pa-
parazzi.29  Some justifications for enumerating a 
                                                                                                                             
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law.”) (citing International Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1926)). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
29 Although the “right to privacy” is not expressly stated in 
the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 
right to privacy was a fundamental right in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  According to Justice Douglas, 
“[t]he foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substances.  
Various guarantees create zones of privacy [. . .]. We have had 
many controversies over these penumbral rights of privacy and 
repose.  These cases bear witness that the right of privacy 
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.” Id. at 
480.  As such, Justice Douglas held in this case that a 
Connecticut statute banning married couples from using 
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separate right for the press in the First Amendment 
are that the press has a very unique role in inform-
ing the public and, according to the Supreme Court, 
without separate protection, the public would be de-
nied access to significant information.30 
Although the Constitution recognizes separate 
protection for the press, the federal and state courts 
have taken the approach that the press is not enti-
tled to special protection from generally applicable 
laws.31  For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the 
Court refused to create a shield that protected re-
porters from revealing their sources.32  While courts 
are reluctant to create special privileges for the 
                                                                                                                             
contraceptives was unconstitutional because it violated their 
right to privacy.  Id. at 485-86. 
30 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (stating that 
“[w]e do not question the significance of free speech, press, or 
assembly to the country’s welfare.  Nor is it suggested that 
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment 
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICES 
1214 (Vicki Been et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011) (discussion of Hayes). 
31 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-683 (according to Justice White,  
“[i]t is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate 
every incidental burdening of the press that may result from 
the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general 
applicability.  Under prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving 
substantial public interests may be enforced against the press 
as against others, despite the possible burden that may be 
imposed.  The Court has emphasized that the publisher of a 
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of 
general laws.”). 
32 Id. at 709 (holding that where the reporter refused to reveal 
his sources before a grand jury, the “petitioner must appear 
before the grand jury to answer the questions put to him [. . 
.].”); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30 at 1214-20 (discussing 
cases in which the Court refused to grant the press special 
privileges.). 
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press, they recognize that the press has the right to 
report on matters of public significance.33  When the 
matter of public significance involves a public person, 
including a celebrity, the Court has expanded the 
First Amendment to protect the press’ freedom to 
publish information.34 
Unlike the average person, celebrities have a 
limited right to privacy.  In 1974, the U.S. Supreme 
Court articulated in a defamation action, that 
“[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their 
achievements or the vigor and success with which 
they seek the public’s attention, are properly classed 
as public figures [. . .].” 35  The Court recognized that 
there are different types of public figures by stating 
that an all-purpose public figure was one who 
“achieve[s] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he 
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all 
contexts.”36  However, a limited public figure is “an 
individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is 
drawn into a particular public controversy and 
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of 
                                                             
33 Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) 
(stating that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state 
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the 
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.”). 
34 See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) 
(stating that “[i]n our continuing effort to define the proper 
accommodation between [the need for a vigorous and 
uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing 
wrongful injury], we have been especially anxious to assure to 
the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ 
essential to their fruitful exercise.”) (citing NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 351. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Protecting a Celebrity’s Child From Harassment 
570 
issues.”37  These figures have relinquished their right 
to privacy and can recover damages if they satisfy 
the elements for one, or more, of the four separate 
categories of invasion of privacy.  The categories are 
an “(1) intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or soli-
tude; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publici-
ty that places a person is a false light; and (4) misap-
propriation of a person’s name and likeness.”38 
However, the elements of these categories can 
be difficult for a public figure to satisfy.  For exam-
ple, in Howard v. Antilla, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held that to establish a 
false light invasion of privacy action, the plaintiff 
had the burden of proving the statements were false 
and were made with actual malice.39  In this case, 
the defendant, a reporter for The New York Times, 
learned the plaintiff, Robert Howard, a chairman of 
two publicly traded companies, was in fact Howard 
Finkelstein.40  Finkelstein was convicted of “securi-
ties fraud, violation of the White Slave Act,41 con-
spiracy to defraud, and interstate transportation of 
                                                             
37 Id. 
38 Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 154 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 275, 279 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2013). 
39 Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 249 (2002) (holding that 
“only statements that are ‘provable as false’ are actionable. The 
plaintiff must also shoulder the burden of proving the falsity of 
each statement. Moreover, the plaintiff must prove that the 
offending statement was made with “actual malice”-that is, that 
the false statement was made intentionally or with reckless 
disregard as to whether it was false-and proof of that element 
must be established by the quantum of ‘convincing clarity.’”). 
40 Id. at 245. 
41 Also known as the Mann Act, this federal law prohibits the 
transportation of an individual in “interstate and foreign 
commerce for prostitution or other criminal sexual activity.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (9th ed. 2009). 
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stolen property.”42  The defendant investigated the 
rumor but was unable to confirm or refute it.43  The 
article, entitled “Is Howard Really Finkelstein? Mon-
ey Rides on It,” was published.44 
However, after the story was published, 
Finkelstein’s attorney contacted the defendant and 
told her that his client and the plaintiff were not the 
same person.45  The Times then published a corrected 
version of the article, apologizing for publishing the 
story and stating that there was “‘no credible evi-
dence’ to support the rumor.”46  However, three years 
after the story was published, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant for, among other things, false light inva-
sion of privacy.47 
As a limited public figure, the plaintiff needed 
to demonstrate that the article was written with ac-
tual malice.48  The Court of Appeals held that a 
plaintiff could not prove actual malice by merely 
demonstrating that the defendant’s behavior was “an 
extreme departure from professional standards.”49  
The plaintiff must show that there was “sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant 
in fact entertained serious doubts to the truth of his 
publication or acted with a ‘high degree of awareness 
of . . . probable falsity.”50  Furthermore, “where the 
plaintiff is claiming injury from an allegedly harmful 
                                                             
42 Antilla, 294 F.3d at 245-46. 
43 Id. at 246. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 247. 
46 Id. at 247.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 249. 
49 Id. at 252 (quoting  Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989)). 
50 Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)). 
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implication arising from the defendant’s article, ‘he 
must show with clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant intended or knew of the implications 
that the plaintiff is attempting to draw . . . .’. ”51 
The Court of Appeals did not agree with How-
ard that the article was capable of causing the public 
to believe that he was Finkelstein.52  The Court 
looked at the fact that article casted doubt on both 
the rumor and the defendant’s attempts to dispel the 
rumor.53  Furthermore, “the article remained ‘agnos-
tic’ with respect to the truth” of the rumor.54  As 
such, the Court held that actual malice was not es-
tablished because the “false accusation was not 
shown to be either intentional or treated with reck-
less disregard.”55 
As demonstrated in Antilla, it is difficult for 
public figures to bring a successful invasion of priva-
cy action against the paparazzi due to the “freedom 
of the press” clause.56  However, in a well-known pa-
                                                             
51 Id. (citing Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 
1314 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
52 Id. at 252. 
53 Id. (stating “it is questionable, even doubtful, that the 
article is actually capable of bearing the harmful implication 
charged by Howard – namely, that he is Finkelstein.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at  256. 
56 See Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a news show host did not make false statements about a 
public official recklessly or with actual malice); Bernstein v. 
National Broadcasting Company, 129 F.Supp. 817 (D.D.C 1955) 
(holding that the press did not invade a public person’s privacy 
if they reported on a matter that was public at one time); see 
also Lauren N. Follett, Taming the Paparazzi in the “Wild 
West”: A look at California’s 2009 Amendment to the Anti-
Paparazzi Act and a Call for Increased Privacy Protections for 
Celebrity Children, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 201, 211 (2010)(“While 
celebrities have successfully obtained restraining orders against 
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parazzi case, Galella v. Onassis, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit balanced a public person’s 
right to privacy with the media’s First Amendment 
right to gather news.57  As the wife of the late Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, Jacqueline Onassis was a 
public figure.58  Despite her status as a public figure, 
the press did not have unlimited access into her 
life.59  Furthermore, the press could not engage in 
behavior that was outside the reasonable bounds of 
newsgathering such as, jumping into Onassis’ son’s 
path as he rode his bike to capture his picture.60  The 
                                                                                                                             
paparazzi, practical issues make injunctive relief ineffective in 
curbing the majority of paparazzi issues in California.  Not only 
must celebrities be able to identify a particular paparazzo in 
court, but there must also already have been an identifiable 
incident of harassment, and the celebrities must be able to 
convince the court that they are likely to succeed on the merits 
of the case without introducing discovery.  This leaves most 
celebrities without effective injunctive recourse against the 
paparazzi who place them under constant surveillance.”). 
57 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
58 Id. at 995 (holding that “ legitimate countervailing social 
needs may warrant some intrusion despite an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy and freedom from 
harassment. However the interference allowed may be no 
greater than that necessary to protect the overriding public 
interest. Mrs. Onassis was properly found to be a public figure 
and thus subject to news coverage.”). 
59 Id. at 992. 
60 Id. (stating that “some examples of Galella’s conduct 
brought out at trial are illustrative.  Galella took pictures of 
John Kennedy riding his bicycle in Central Park across the way 
from his home.  He jumped out into the boy’s path, causing the 
agents concern for John’s safety.  The agents’ reaction and 
interrogation of Galella led to Galella’s arrest and his action 
against the agents; Galella on other occasions interrupted 
Caroline at tennis, and invaded the children’s private schools.  
At one time he came uncomfortably close in a power boat to 
Mrs. Onassis swimming.  He often jumped and postured around 
while taking pictures of her party notably at a theater opening 
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Court of Appeals held that the photographer’s con-
duct was outside of the “reasonable bounds of news-
gathering.”61  They also found that injunctive relief 
was appropriate but needed to be “tailored to protect 
Mrs. Onassis from the ‘paparazzo’ attack which dis-
tinguishes Galella’s behavior from that of other pho-
tographers” and “it should not unnecessarily infringe 
on reasonable efforts to ‘cover’ defendant.”62  The in-
junctive relief prohibited “(1) any approach within 
twenty-five (25) feet of defendant or any touching of 
the person of the defendant Jacqueline Onassis; (2) 
any blocking of her movement in public places and 
thoroughfares; (3) any act foreseeably or reasonably 
calculated to place the life and safety of defendant in 
jeopardy; and (4) any conduct which would reasona-
bly be foreseen to harass, alarm or frighten the de-
fendant.”63 
 Gallela demonstrates that there can be a bal-
ance between a celebrity’s right to privacy and the 
press’ right to gather and publish the news.  The 
Court recognized that Gallela’s methods was danger-
ous and outside of the reasonable bounds of news-
gathering.  As such, the Court structured the injunc-
tive relief to balance the rights of the media and that 
of the celebrity.  California’s amended law criminal-
izes the same methods Gallela used to capture Mrs. 
Onassis and her children’s images.  Whether the 
amended statute will be enforced, depends on wheth-
er the statute gives clear notice of the prohibited be-
                                                                                                                             
but also on numerous other occasions.  He followed a practice of 
bribing apartment house, restaurant and nightclub doormen as 
well as romancing a family servant to keep him advised of the 
movements of the family.”). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 995.  
63 Id. 
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havior.  If it fails to do so, that statute will be invalid 
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.  
 
II. DISCUSSION OF A.B. 3592, CODIFIED AS PENAL 
CODE § 11411 
In 1994, California passed A.B. 3592 to protect 
children of health care service workers from being 
harassed as a result of their parents’ occupation.  
The bill was drafted as a result of a 1993 Clinic Vio-
lence Survey Report that showed increasing anti-
abortion violence towards medical staff throughout 
the country.64 The violence was not only directed to-
wards medical staff but also their families.65 One 
abortion clinic reported that the life of a director’s 
child was threatened so that “she can see how it 
feels.”66 California recognized that this type of behav-
ior could not be tolerated and the bill was signed into 
law and codified as California Penal Code Section 
11414.  It read: 
 
(a) Any person who intentionally harasses 
the child or ward of any other person be-
cause of that person’s employment, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
 
(b) For purposes of this section, the follow-
ing definitions shall apply: 
(1) “Child” and “ward” mean a per-
son under the age of 16 years. 
(2) “Harasses” means knowing and 
willful conduct directed at a specific 
child that seriously alarms, annoys, 
torments, or terrorizes the child, and 
                                                             
64 Bill Analysis of A.B.. 3592 Before the Assemb. Comm. of 
Pub. Safety, 1993-94 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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that serves no legitimate purpose. 
The conduct must be such as would 
cause a reasonable child to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and 
actually cause the victim to suffer 
substantial emotional distress. 
 
(c) A second conviction under this section 
shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail for not less than five days. A 
third or subsequent conviction under this 
section shall be punished by imprisonment 
in a county jail for not less than 30 days.67 
 
In summary, under this statute, anyone in vio-
lation was guilty of a misdemeanor.68  In California, 
generally speaking, punishment for a misdemeanor 
could result in imprisonment, not exceeding six 
months, or a fine, not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars, or both.69  A second conviction resulted in man-
datory imprisonment in county jail for five days or 
more.70  For subsequent convictions, imprisonment 
for 30 days or more was mandatory.71 
Despite the purpose of the statute, the 1994 
California Legislature designed the law so that it ap-
plied to all children, not just children of health care 
service providers.72  As a result, this statute sought 
to protect children who were harassed, regardless of 
                                                             
67  CAL. PENAL CODE § 11414 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
68 Id. 
69 CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West, Westlaw through ch. 16 of 
2014 Reg. Sess.). 
70 PENAL § 11414 (Westlaw). 
71 Id. 
72 Bill Analysis of A.B 3592 Before S. Comm. on Judiciary, 
1993-94 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). 
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their parents’ employment.  Prior to its enactment, 
California’s Senate Committee on Judiciary 
acknowledged that this bill might be challenged be-
cause it criminalized First Amendment protected 
conduct.73  However, for the nineteen years the bill 
existed, it was never challenged. 
 
III. DISCUSSION OF S.B. 606 
Nineteen years after the enactment of Califor-
nia Penal Code Section 11414, some California resi-
dents did not believe the statute’s penalties were ef-
fective in deterring people from harassing their chil-
dren.  In early 2013, a very famous resident of Cali-
fornia, Halle Berry, met with California State Sena-
tor Kevin de Leon.74  At the meeting, Ms. Berry ex-
pressed the need for protection from paparazzi who 
“stalked and harassed” children of celebrities for 
their photographs.75  She also emphasized the need 
for a bill that would deter the paparazzi from harass-
ing children because “she and other parents had no 
real recourse to protect their children.”76 
Ms. Berry’s demand for protection was a result 
of her personal experience.  There are numerous sto-
ries in the media about Ms. Berry’s violent interac-
tions with the paparazzi because of their unrelenting 
attempts to photograph her and her daughter.  In 
May 2012, Ms. Berry lashed out on the paparazzi af-
                                                             
73 Id. 
74 Release: Paparazzi Harassment Deterrent Bill Signed by the 
Governor – Increases Penalties & Allows for Civil Action to 
Protect Children, STATE SEN. KEVIN DE LEÓN (Sept. 24, 2103), 
http://sd22.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-09-24-release-paparazzi-
harassment-deterrent-bill-signed-governor-increases-penalties-
allo. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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ter they camped out in front of her daughter’s pre-
school.77  In an interview with the television show 
Extra, regarding the incident, Ms. Berry said that 
she had been “struggling for years” to keep her 
daughter safe from the paparazzi.78  She also stated 
that “[t]here are no laws [. . .] that protect our chil-
dren and as a mom, coming to the school . . . not only 
my child, but all the children that are there. It’s just 
wrong, wrong, wrong.”79 
Senator de Leon ultimately agreed that the 
current law was ineffective in protecting children of 
public figures from harassment.  He introduced S.B. 
606, as an amendment to California’s Penal Code 
Section 11414, on February 22, 2013.80  In a press 
release, he stated that children should not be “sub-
jected to such unwarranted and harmful persecution” 
because of their parent’s occupations.81  He believed 
that by increasing the penalties and allowing parents 
to have access to a civil cause of action, the amended 
bill would deter “those who would consider torment-
ing the most vulnerable and defenseless members of 
our society.”82 
Ms. Berry aggressively advocated for the pas-
                                                             
77 Halle Berry on Paparazzi Blowup: ‘When It Comes to My 
Daughter, I’m Ferocious!’, EXTRA (May 14, 2012) 
http://www.extratv.com/2012/05/14/halle-berry-on-paparazzi-
blow-up-when-it-comes-to-my-daughter-im-ferocious/. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Release: Paparazzi Harassment Deterrent Bill Passes to 
Protect Children - SB 606 Increases Penalties & Allows for Civil 
Action, STATE SEN. KEVIN DE LEÓN, (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://sd22.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-09-06-release-paparazzi-
harassment-deterrent-bill-passes-protect-children-sb-606-
increases. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
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sage of the proposed amendment and sought the 
support of fellow thespians.  In August 2013, Jen-
nifer Garner joined Ms. Berry to testify in front of 
California’s Assembly Judiciary Committee and the 
State Assembly Committee on Public Safety to sup-
port the amendment.  Ms. Garner described how the 
paparazzi aggressively followed her and her children 
on a daily basis.83  She also stated that although she 
chose a public life, her children did not and she does 
not “want a gang of shouting, arguing, law-breaking 
photographers who camp out everywhere [her family 
is] all day, every day, to continue traumatizing [her] 
kids.”84  Ms. Berry testified that her daughter was 
terrified to go to school because the paparazzi were 
always watching her and jumping out of bushes and 
from behind vehicles to get a photo of her child.85  
She also stated that a photographer asked her 
daughter how she felt that she might never see her 
father again, after it was reported that Ms. Berry 
was seeking permission from a court to move her 
daughter to France.86  The paparazzi would also 
curse and call Ms. Berry names to provoke a re-
sponse from her while she was with her daughter, 
she testified.87 
Although media reports and legislative history 
show that the amendment was motivated by the 
                                                             
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Natalie Finn, Halle Berry & Jennifer Garner Join Forces to 
Support Anti-Paparazzi Bill That Would Make Photographing 
Their Kids a Crime, E! ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2013, 6:56 PM), 
http://www.eonline.com/news/448665/halle-berry-jennifer-
garner-join-forces-to-support-anti-paparazzi-bill-that-would-
make-photographing-their-kids-a-crime. 
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need to protect children of public figures, the statute 
was not only designed to protect children of celebri-
ties.  The statute protects all children who are har-
assed because of their parents’ occupations, especial-
ly law enforcement officials, who are big supporters 
of this amendment after the violence committed by 
Dorner.  The Chair of the Assembly Committee on 
Judiciary, Bob Wieckowiski, wrote that the author of 
the existing law, former Assemblyman Tom Umberg, 
“sees [S.B. 606] as a logical extension of the earlier 
legislation, since children of many other occupations 
– including law enforcement officers, psychologist or 
psychiatrists, or others engaged in high-profile or 
controversial occupations – could also be vulnera-
ble.”88  Some of the other supporters of this amend-
ment include the Screen Actors Guild, California 
Medical Association, and the California Psychological 
Association.  These organizations recognize that the 
law needs to protect children from the “dangerous 
actions of out of control members of the paparazzi” 
and, according to the Screen Actors Guild, S.B. 606 is 
“appropriately balanced and limited in that it ex-
empts legitimate activities, including transmission, 
publishing, and broadcasting.”89 
In September 2013, the amendment, S.B. 606, 
to Penal Code Section 11414 unanimously passed 
through California’s State Assembly and Senate.  On 
September 24, 2013, California’s Governor signed the 
                                                             
88 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2013). 
89 Id.; Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 
2013). 
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bill into law.90  Beginning January 1, 2014, Penal 
Code Section 11414 now reads: 
 
11414. SEC. 1. 
(a) Any person who intentionally harasses 
the child or ward of any other person 
because of that person’s employment 
shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail not exceeding one year, or by 
a fine not exceeding ten thousand dol-
lars ($10,000), or by both that fine and 
imprisonment. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the follow-
ing definitions shall apply: 
(1) “Child” and “ward” mean a person 
under 16 years of age. 
(2) “Harasses” means knowing and will-
ful conduct directed at a specific 
child or ward that seriously alarms, 
annoys, torments, or terrorizes the 
child or ward, and that serves no le-
gitimate purpose, including, but not 
limited to, that conduct occurring 
during the course of any actual or 
attempted recording of the child’s or 
ward’s image or voice, or both, with-
out the express consent of the parent 
or legal guardian of the child or 
ward, by following the child’s or 
ward’s activities or by lying in wait. 
The conduct must be such as would 
cause a reasonable child to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and 
actually cause the victim to suffer 
substantial emotional distress. 
                                                             
90 Release: Paparazzi Harassment Deterrent Bill Passes to 
Protect Children - SB 606 Increases Penalties & Allows for Civil 
Action, supra note 80; McGreevy & Mason, supra note 80. 
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(3) “Employment” means the job, voca-
tion, occupation, or profession of the 
parent or legal guardian of the child 
or ward. 
(c) A second conviction under this section 
shall be punished by a fine not exceed-
ing twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) 
and by imprisonment in a county jail for 
not less than five days but not exceeding 
one year. A third or subsequent convic-
tion under this section shall be punished 
by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand 
dollars ($30,000) and by imprisonment 
in a county jail for not less than 30 days 
but not exceeding one year. 
(d) Upon a violation of this section, the par-
ent or legal guardian of an aggrieved 
child or ward may bring a civil action 
against the violator on behalf of the 
child or ward. The remedies in that civil 
action shall be limited to one or more of 
the following: actual damages, punitive 
damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, 
costs, disgorgement of any compensation 
from the sale, license, or dissemination 
of a child’s image or voice received by 
the individual who, in violation of this 
section, recorded the child’s image or 
voice, and injunctive relief against fur-
ther violations of this section by the in-
dividual. 
(e) The act of transmitting, publishing, or 
broadcasting a recording of the image or 
voice of a child does not constitute a vio-
lation of this section. 
(f) This section does not preclude prosecu-
tion under any section of law that pro-
vides for greater punishment. 
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SEC. 2. No reimbursement is required by 
this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article 
XIII B of the California Constitution be-
cause the only costs that may be incurred 
by a local agency or school district will be 
incurred because this act creates a new 
crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or 
infraction, or changes the penalty for a 
crime or infraction, within the meaning of 
Section 17556 of the Government Code, or 
changes the definition of a crime within the 
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the 
California Constitution.91 
 
In summary, there are three major changes to 
the existing law.  First, the criminal penalties are 
harsher than a misdemeanor.  Anyone who violates 
this law could face up to a year in jail as well as a fi-
ne of up to $10,000 for a first conviction.  The penal-
ties increase for repeat violations.  The second 
change to the statute is that it allows a parent or 
guardian to bring a civil action against any viola-
tors.92  The third change, and a source of potential 
litigation, is that the amendment expands the defini-
tion of “harassment” to include “conduct occurring 
during the course of any actual or attempted record-
ing of the child’s or ward’s image or voice, or both, 
without the express consent of the parent or legal 
guardian of the child or ward, by following the child’s 
or ward’s activities or by lying in wait.”93  Further-
more, “[t]he conduct must be such as would cause a 
reasonable child to suffer substantial emotional dis-
tress, and actually cause the victim to suffer sub-
                                                             
91  CAL. PENAL CODE § 11414 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
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stantial emotional distress.”94 
 The amended law does not prevent the papa-
razzi from taking pictures of a celebrity’s child.95  Ra-
ther, it prohibits the dangerous methods the papa-
razzi use to photograph a child of a celebrity.96  As 
discussed in Part I of this paper, it is difficult to draft 
a bill that would prevent the paparazzi from taking a 
picture of a celebrity in a public place, even if that 
picture is of the celebrity’s child.  Lawmakers are 
very limited in how they can restrict the paparazzi 
when it comes to photographing public figures. There 
is a very thin line between protecting celebrities’ pri-
vacy and the paparazzi’s right to gather news. The 
California’s Legislature believes the amended law 
balances both the celebrity’s limited right to privacy 
and the press’ right to gather news. 
 
IV. CRITICISM OF S.B. 606 
However, the California Newspapers Publish-
ers Association (CNPA), the National Press Photog-
raphers Association (NPPA) and the California 
Broadcasters Association (CBA) argued that the 
amended law infringes on constitutional rights of the 
press.97  The CNPA raised First Amendment con-
cerns with amended law.  They argued that “the in-
                                                             
94 Id. 
95 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2013) (stating that 
“[a]lthough the bill creates enhanced criminal penalties and a 
new civil cause of action, it arguably makes no change as to 
what constitutes an underlying offense. To begin with, the bill 
does not – as some of the opposition letters suggest – make it 
misdemeanor harassment to simply take a photograph of a 
child without the consent of the parent or guardian, either by 
following the child or by lying in wait.”). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 7. 
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creased penalties and liabilities . . . improperly 
abridge First Amendment protected newsgathering 
activity that occurs in public places where a person 
normally has no reasonable expectation of privacy.”98  
The CNPA further argued that the amendment “per-
tain[ing] to photography and recording is overly 
broad [and] vague.”99 
The NPPA agreed with the CNPA but also 
raised two separate constitutional arguments.  The 
first is that the amended law “raises First Amend-
ment concerns by singling out attempts to take a 
photograph – an activity commonly done for valid 
newsgathering or expressive activities, especially if 
the attempt to take the photograph is in a public 
place where there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”100  The second argument is that the 
amendment’s definition of “harass” is vague and sub-
jective because the terms, “harassment,” “annoys and 
alarms,” and “no legitimate purpose,” which are used 
to define it, are vague.101  Furthermore, NPPA does 
not see a need for this amendment since California 
has laws on the books that address harassment con-
cerns.102  Along with the CNPA, the NPPA argued 
that the additional enhanced criminal penalties, 
along with a new civil cause of action, will “further 
chill free speech and create uncertainty.”103 
 In the legislative hearing reports, constitu-
tional law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky disagreed 
with the opponent’s vagueness and First Amendment 
                                                             
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. 
on Pub. Safety, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2013). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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arguments. In response to the First Amendment con-
cerns, Professor Chemerinsky, a renowned constitu-
tional law professor at University of California-
Irvine, argued that there is no substantial First 
Amendment issue “because the bill targets only har-
assing conduct, not constitutionally protected expres-
sion.”104  Professor Chemerinsky supported his claim 
by stating that there is no constitutional right to 
harass.105  However, he failed to explain his conclu-
sion that the amended statute was not vague. 
California’s Assembly Committee on Public 
Safety disagrees that the definitions of ‘harass’ sin-
gles out journalistic activity.106  The Committee be-
lieves that the statute merely lists a form of journal-
istic activity as an example of the kinds of conduct 
that could rise to the level of harassment.107  Essen-
tially, the phrase “any actual or attempted recording 
of the child’s or ward’s image or voice” is simply an 
example of the kind of activity that could be consid-
ered harassment.108  The Committee recognizes that 
if the statute singles out journalistic activity, the 
statute may be unconstitutional because the Su-
preme Court has previously held that statutes that 
single out journalistic activities and subject it to 
heightened punishment are unconstitutional.109  Ac-
                                                             
104 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. 
on Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2013). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 6. 
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11414 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
109 Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm’r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983) (holding that “the main 
interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of 
revenue. Of course that interest is critical to any government. 
Standing alone, however, it cannot justify the special treatment 
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cordingly, the statute was designed to punish anyone 
who violates it.  Not just members of the press.  
In addition to the First Amendment challenges 
that can be made to the amendment, the opponents 
argue that this amendment is unconstitutionally 
vague.  However, I contend that, despite the oppo-
nents’ arguments, this statute is not unconstitution-
ally vague as applied to the press.  The purpose of 
determining whether the statute is vague is not to 
rid the California law books of this crime.  Rather, 
because there is a need to protect children from the 
dangerous conduct of the paparazzi, it is very im-
portant that the statute is clear in what behavior it 
is prohibiting.  The amendment clearly articulates 
the type of conduct it prohibits.  In the remainder of 
this Note, I will demonstrate that this statute does 
not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
 
V. TOO VAGUE TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL 
The amended California Penal Code Section 
11414 terms “annoys,” “alarms,” “torments,” and 
“terrorizes,” despite the opponents’ claims, are not 
void under the vagueness doctrine because the terms 
provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct.  
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, “a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law,” especially if it is a criminal stat-
                                                                                                                             
of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same 
interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is 
clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing 
businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a 
tax that singles out the press.”). 
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ute.110  In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court used a two-
pronged test to determine whether a statute failed 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.111  Under the first 
prong, a criminal statute must define the offense 
with “sufficient definiteness” so that a layperson 
knows what conduct is prohibited.112  Under the sec-
ond prong, the statute must comply with the first 
prong “in a manner that does not encourage arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.”113  The 
Court, interpreted the second prong to “[require] that 
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement” and considered this to be the most 
important part of the test.114 
This test must be met so that a criminal stat-
ute provides for fair enforcement and notice of the 
prohibited conduct.115  In City of Chicago v. Morales, 
an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it 
failed to establish minimal guidelines for enforce-
ment.  In an effort to rid the city of gang activity, 
Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordi-
nance116 to prevent gang members from loitering in 
                                                             
110 Connally v. General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926). 
111 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574(1974)). 
115 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICES 970 (Vicki Been et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011) (“In, 
part, the vagueness doctrine is about fairness; it is to unjust to 
punish a person without providing clear notice as to what 
conduct was prohibited.  Vague laws also risk selective 
prosecution; under vague statutes and ordinances the 
government can choose who to prosecute based on their views of 
the policies.”). 
116 The ordinance provides that “[w]henever a police officer 
observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal 
street gang member loitering in any public place with one or 
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the public.117  The Supreme Court found that the 
statute covered additional activities besides the con-
gregation of gang members for the purpose of engag-
ing in illegal activity.118  It was this “uncertainty 
about the scope of [the] additional coverage [that] 
provide[d] the basis” of the vagueness claim.119  The 
Court applied the two-prong test articulated in 
Kolender to determine whether the statute was 
vague.120 
As to whether the ordinance provided “sufficient 
definiteness” or fair notice to a layperson, the Court 
looked to the meaning of the term “loiter,” which 
meant, “to remain in any one place with no apparent 
purpose.”121  According to the Court, the term “ap-
parent purpose” was unclear, stating that “[i]t [was] 
difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city of Chi-
cago standing in a public place with a group of people 
would know if he or she had an “apparent pur-
pose.”122  To illustrate its point, the Court asked two 
hypothetical questions: “[i]f she were talking to an-
other person, would she have an apparent purpose?  
If she were frequently checking her watch and look-
ing expectantly down the street, would she have an 
apparent purpose?”  The Court doubted the city 
meant to criminalize every instance in which a per-
son stands with a gang member.123  For that reason, 
                                                                                                                             
more other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse 
and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not 
promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.”  City 
of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 65 (1999). 
117 Id. at 45-46. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 56. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 57. 
123 Id. 
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the statute failed the first prong because the term 
“loiter” did not distinguish between loitering with a 
criminal purpose and loitering with an innocent pur-
pose.124 
Under the second prong, the Court held that the 
ordinance failed to provide minimum guidelines to 
govern law enforcement, which would prevent arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.125  As a result, 
a police officer could instruct a gang member stand-
ing in a public place to disperse without determining 
the person’s reason for standing in that public 
place.126  According to the Court, the language of the 
ordinance directing a police officer to issue an order 
without inquiry was too broad.  Furthermore, a stat-
ute that allowed too much discretion was prohibited 
because the “Constitution does not permit a legisla-
ture to ‘set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and 
say who could be rightfully detained, and who should 
be set at large.’”127  For example, the statute did not 
take into consideration that a gang member could be 
standing in front of a place with a relative for rea-
                                                             
124 Id. (The Court also stated that “[t]he Illinois Supreme 
Court emphasized the law’s failure to distinguish between 
innocent conduct and conduct threatening harm. Its decision 
followed the precedent set by a number of state courts that have 
upheld ordinances that criminalize loitering combined with 
some other overt act or evidence of criminal intent. However, 
state courts have uniformly invalidated laws that do not join 
the term ‘loitering’ with a second specific element of the crime.”) 
125 Id. at 60 (“The broad sweep of the ordinance also violates 
‘the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines 
to govern law enforcement.’ There are no such guidelines in the 
ordinance.”(quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358)). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 
(1876)). 
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sons that were not criminal.128  Under the ordinance, 
if a police officer ordered the gang member in the 
preceding example to leave the area and he refused 
to do so, he would be arrested, even though he was 
not loitering for criminal purposes.  Since there were 
no guidelines in the ordinance, the statute violated 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.129 
 As explained by the Supreme Court in Mo-
rales, a statute will be upheld under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine as long as the terms are not too 
subjective.  For example, in People v. Ewing, the Cal-
ifornia’s Court of Appeals for the Fourth District up-
held a harassment statute because the terms were 
clear, understandable and not subjective and it pro-
vided an objective standard to guide the public.130  In 
this case, the defendant argued that a stalking stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague because the terms 
“alarms,” “annoys,” “torments,” and “terrorizes” in 
the “harass” section of the statute “[were] subjective 
terms that [did] not provide adequate notice for an 
individual to avoid liability under the statute.”131  To 
determine whether that terms were vague, the court 
stated that it “must view a statute from the ‘stand-
point of the reasonable person who might be subject 
to its terms’ and uphold the statute if its meaning is 
                                                             
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 People v. Ewing, 90 Cal Rptr. 2d 177, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999). 
131 Id. at 181. (Section 649.9 provided that “[f]or the  purposes 
of this section, ‘harasses’ means a knowing and willful course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, 
annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no 
legitimate purpose. This course of conduct must be such as 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress 
to the person.”). 
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reasonably ascertainable.”132  This is required be-
cause the courts recognize that there will be some 
ambiguity in a statute because of the difficulty in 
“defining the subject matter with precision” and as 
long as the meaning is reasonably ascertainable, the 
statute will be upheld.133 
In Ewing, the Court look to Webster’s diction-
ary to define each of the terms and concluded, that 
along with the term “seriously” and the reasonable 
person standard, the definition of “harass,” provided 
a clear standard of conduct that a man of ordinary 
intelligence will understand the behavior the law 
prohibits.134  According to the court, the terms 
                                                             
132 Id. at 182 (quoting People v. Deskin, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 
392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
133 Deskin, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392. 
134 Ewing, 90 Cal Rptr. 2d at 182-83 (stating that, “[t]he 
definition of ‘alarm’ is “to strike with fear: fill with anxiety.  
‘Annoy’ is defined as ‘to irritate with a nettling or exasperating 
effect.’  The definition of ‘torment’ is ‘to cause (someone) severe 
suffering of body or mind: inflict pain or anguish on.’  The 
definition of ‘terrorize’ is ‘to fill with terror or anxiety’; ‘terror’ is 
defined as ‘a state of intense fright or apprehension.’  Moreover, 
these terms as they appear in the statute cannot be read in a 
vacuum.  First, we note they are preceded and qualified with 
the adverb ‘seriously.’  Thus, the statutory definition of 
‘harasses’ [. . .] refers to ‘a knowing and willful course of conduct 
directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, seriously 
annoys, seriously torments, or seriously terrorizes the person’ 
against whom it is directed.  Second, when the reasonable 
person standard is factored in, the statutory definition of 
‘harasses’ becomes ‘a knowing and willful course of conduct 
directed at a specific person that a reasonable person would 
consider as seriously alarming , seriously annoying, seriously 
tormenting, or seriously terrorizing the person.’ added.)  Third, 
[the statute] explicitly provides the ‘course of conduct must be 
such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial 
emotional distress to the person.’  Thus, a reasonable person 
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“alarms,” “annoys,” “torments,” and “terrorizes” and 
could not be read separately.135  First, the terms 
were “preceded and qualified with the adverb ‘seri-
ously.’”136  The word “seriously” limited the applica-
tion of the statute. As such, the statute would be en-
forced against a person who seriously, rather than 
trivially, annoyed, alarmed, tormented, or terrorized 
another.  In addition, whether a person seriously an-
noyed, alarmed, tormented, or terrorized another to 
the extent of causing substantial emotional distress 
depended on whether a reasonable person would find 
the defendant’s conduct offensive.137  According to 
the court, the objective standard served the purpose 
of eliminating “the spectrum of possible subjective 
reactions by a targeted person.”138  Construed in this 
light, the harassment statute is clear and certain.139 
Without ascertainable standards to limit the 
application of a statute, a statute will be invalid un-
der the void-for-vagueness doctrine.  For example, in 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the Court held that 
terms such as “annoys” are vague if they are not 
paired with an objective standard to determining 
whether the act is “annoying.”  In this case, the Cin-
                                                                                                                             
standard also applies to the victim, which eliminates the 
spectrum of possible subjective reactions by a targeted person to 
defendant’s course of conduct.  The result is the stalking statute 
prohibits a course of conduct directed at a specific person that a 
reasonable person would consider as seriously alarming, 
seriously annoying, or seriously tormenting a reasonable person.  
Given this context, the statutory definition of ‘harasses’—based 
on the four challenged words—is not uncertain.”) (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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cinnati ordinance prohibited “three or more persons 
[from] assemb[ling] . . . on any of the sidewalks, . . . 
and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying 
to persons passing by.”140  The Court held that the 
ordinance failed the void-for-vagueness doctrine “be-
cause it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly 
to an [unascertainable] standard.”141  The statute 
failed to consider that there were behaviors that an-
noy some people but do not annoy others.142  There-
fore, the ordinance violated the first prong of the 
Kolender test because “men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning.”143 
To determine whether Penal Code Section 
11414 provides “sufficient definiteness,” the terms 
must be clear enough for a man of ordinary intelli-
gence to understand what is prohibited.  The analy-
sis for determining whether Penal Code Section 
11414 is vague is similar to the analysis in Ewing.  
“Annoy” is defined as “to cause irritation to by irri-
tating acts.”144  “Alarm” is defined as “to fill with 
alarm; frighten.”145  “Torment” is defined as “to cause 
to undergo physical or mental torture.”146  Finally, 
“terrorize” is defined as “to fill or overpower with ter-
ror.”147  As stated in Ewing, these terms cannot be 
looked at in a vacuum.  The terms are preceded with 
the word “seriously.”  This term works to limit the 
                                                             
140 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (fourth 
alteration in original). 
141 Id. at 614.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
144THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 57 (4th ed. 
2004). 
145 Id. at 31. 
146 Id. at 1451. 
147 Id. at 1423. 
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application of the statute to only the offenses that 
seriously annoys, alarms, terrorizes, or torments a 
child.  Furthermore, as required by the Supreme 
Court in Coates, the statue provides an objective 
standard in determining whether a person violated 
this statute.  As such, the statute prohibits a person 
from seriously annoying, alarming, terrorizing, or 
tormenting a child to the extent that a reasonable 
child would suffer substantial emotional distress.  
Read in this context, the statue is clear and provides 
sufficient definiteness. 
The second prong of the Kolender test requires 
that the statute provide minimum guidelines to gov-
ern law enforcement to prevent arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement.  In Morales, the Court held 
that the statute failed the second prong of the void-
for-vagueness test because the statue provided law 
enforcement officers with too much discretion.  Penal 
Code Section 11414 instructs law enforcement offic-
ers to arrest anyone who knowingly and intentionally 
harasses a child because of his or her parents’ occu-
pations.  Unlike the statute in Morales, the amend-
ment specifically explains what conduct is criminal-
ized: harassing a child because of her parents’ occu-
pations.  In Morales, the statute prohibited standing 
in a public place for no apparent purpose, but the 
statute did not instruct law enforcement officers to 
determine whether they had an innocent reason for 
standing around.  Unlike harassment, there is a con-
stitutional right to assemble.148  A statute cannot in-
                                                             
148 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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fringe on that right.  As stated by Professor Chemer-
insky, there is no constitutional right to harass.149  
Therefore, states can criminalize the conduct.  In this 
case, a police officer is instructed to arrest someone 
who is engaging in criminal conduct: harassment.  
The amended statute does not provide unlimited dis-
cretion like the statute provided in Morales.  As a re-
sult, it is very likely that a court will determine that 
Penal Code Section 11414, as amended, complies 
with the second prong of the Kolender test. 
 There are additional constitutional challenges 
that may impact the enforcement of the amendment.  
However, it is very unlikely that a court will void 
this statue because the terms used to define “harass” 
are vague.  The amended statute is very similar to 
the statute in Ewing.  The opponents of the amend-
ment argue that the terms used to define “harass” 
are vague.  However, as demonstrated, the terms 
“annoys, ” “alarms,” “torments,” and “terrorizes,” 
read in context of the entire statute, clearly identifies 
the prohibited conduct so that a layperson under-
stands what conduct is prohibited and it provides 
minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
California has a legitimate concern to protect 
the emotional, psychological, and physical well-being 
of a child.  In recent years, there have been violent 
interactions with the press that result in injury and 
even death.  California has made numerous attempts 
to curb the behavior of the press, however, many of 
these attempts infringed on the press’ constitutional 
rights.  This statute criminalizes conduct that is not 
                                                             
149 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. 
on Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2013). 
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protected by the Constitution: harassment.  The 
Statute is currently in effect.  Time will tell whether 
this statute is effective in deterring the paparazzi 
and other overzealous individuals. 
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Abstract 
This Essay examines the taxation of crickets 
in the context of Indian law. It examines the concept 
of non-resident “star” companies created by Indian 
cricketers as a mechanism to avoid the taxation of 
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INTRODUCTION: 
EATING CRICKET, SLEEPING CRICKET BUT 
DEFINITELY TAXING CRICKET 
Usain Bolt cancelling his run and the Europe-
an Football Union threatening to move its Final out 
of London1 are some recent examples of sportsper-
sons basing professional choices solely on issues re-
                                                             
1The Taxation of Athletes in the UK, HARBOTTLE & LEWIS, 
http://www.harbottle.com/hnl/pages/hnl09_eb_view/9117.php 
(last visited May 21, 2014). 
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lated to taxation.2 Cricket in India is no different, 
and today though a resident Indian cricketer will be 
taxed on the profits and gains of his profession under 
section 28 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (here-
inafter “ITA”), there are numerous ways by which he 
may reduce or even eliminate such tax liability. 
 
I. HIT WICKET! 
 
A. Argument 
This Essay studies the creation of non-resident 
“star” companies by resident Indian cricketers as a 
means to avoid taxation of their global income in In-
dia. The Essay argues that the current computation 
regime and the anti-avoidance mechanisms as envis-
aged under the ITA and the Direct Tax Code, 2010 
(hereinafter “DTC”) fail to tackle the issue of taxa-
tion of star companies comprehensively enough and 
hence the Essay proposes the introduction of a sepa-
rate tax provision for this purpose. 
 
B. Scope, Methodology & Limitations 
This Essay does not examine taxation issues 
related to non-resident cricketers who might come 
and play in India. Further, the Essay does not ana-
lyze the implications of Article 17 of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development Model 
Law (hereinafter the “OECD Model Law”) for taxing 
athletes, nor does it address bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties that seek to avoid the double taxation of 
athletes. The researcher is limited by the non-
                                                             
2 Mike Warburton, Stupid Agassi Tax Rule Prevents Usain 
Bolt From Running, TELEGRAPH  (July 13, 2010, 11:37 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumerti
ps/tax/7887331/Stupid-Agassi-tax-rule-prevents-Usain-Bolt-
from-running.html. 
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availability of information and empirical data on how 
specific resident Indian cricketers actually plan their 
tax structures. 
 
III. THE INCORPORATED CRICKETER: 
UNDERSTANDING THE “STAR” COMPANY STRUCTURE 
Contemporary Indian cricketers, now mobile 
and global in their activities, don’t want to be taxed 
on their cross border earnings and employ the device 
of an interposed company to stand between them and 
their income so as to minimize their tax burden in 
India. Under such a “star” company model, an Indian 
cricketer sets up a company in a very low tax country 
and enters into an employment contract with that 
company.3 Consequently all agreements with endors-
ers, sports authorities and other types of sponsors 
are concluded with the company rather than the 
cricketer himself, thereby enabling the cricketer to 
plan how he receives income from the company in tax 
efficient ways.4 
The star company structure is attractive not 
only because it may directly help reduce the applica-
ble tax rate on the cricketer but also because income 
can be saved in the company without distribution, 
thereby ending up in a tax deferral.5 The cricketer 
may pay tax only on the nominal salary he draws 
from the star company, or his performance income 
may be converted into dividend income, which may 
be taxed more favorably under the Indian system. 
Further, the star company structure may enable the 
                                                             
3 MICHAEL LANG ET AL., TAXATION OF ARTISTES AND 
SPORTSMEN IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 251 (2008). 
4 Bret M. Kanis, Comment, The Utility of Personal Service 
Corporations for Athletes, 22 PEPP. L. REV 629, 632 (1995). 
5 DICK MOLENAAR, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONALLY 
PERFORMING ARTISTES 6 (2006). 
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cricketer to claim large corporate deductions for ex-
penses such as accident relief and insurance.6  
There is no fixed star company model and the 
biggest challenge faced by Revenue authorities lies in 
being able to establish the existence of such a corpo-
ration. The cricketer could be the majority or the sole 
shareholder of the star company, or could also only 
be a beneficiary without ownership. Under the “loan 
out” model for instance, the cricketer’s services would 
be “lent out” for an event on the company’s behalf 
and thus effective management and control might 
still be deemed to rest with the cricketer.7 By way of 
analogy for example, in Gordon Sumner v. The 
Queen, Sumner unsuccessfully sought to escape tax 
in Canada by establishing his company in a low tax 
jurisdiction and only drawing a nominal percentage 
of its profit.8  Similarly, in the X AG case, a Swiss 
company contracted with third parties on behalf of 
certain non-Swiss entertainers in return for a modest 
commission.9 The Swiss Court held that the con-
tracts with the company were mere “shams,” aimed 
at avoiding foreign withholding tax that the enter-
tainers would have otherwise had to pay.10  
Yet, in many cases the star company may gen-
uinely fulfill a larger role of acting like an “organiz-
er” for cricket in general, being responsible for ar-
                                                             
6 LANG ET AL., supra note 3, at 250.  
7 Andrew D. Appleby, Levelling the Playing Field: A Separate 
Tax Regime for International Athletes, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
605, 609 (2011).   
8 Gordon Sumner v. The Queen, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 2359 (Can. 
Tax. Ct.). 
9 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] April 27, 
1990, 116 Entscheidungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts 
(Amtliche Sammlung) [BGE] Ia 81 (Switz.). 
10 Id. 
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rangements other than only the hire of the cricketer. 
In such cases, since business relations by third par-
ties conducted with the company are explicitly at an 
arm’s length from the cricketer, it may not be possi-
ble for Revenue authorities to attribute the earnings 
of the company to that of the cricketer for the pur-
poses of taxation.11  
It is in this backdrop that Revenue authorities 
world over have often tried to apply the “look 
through the company” approach when taxing ath-
letes and have held, for example in Agassi v. Robin-
son, that payments made to an athlete’s service com-
pany shall be characterized and taxed as if such 
payments were made to the athlete himself.12  
 
IV. DROPPED CATCH! AVOIDANCE DUE TO A 
COMPUTATION PROBLEM 
Under the current ITA regime a resident Indi-
an cricketer would be taxed on all his income under 
section 28 if he plays cricket with regularity, or un-
der section 56 if the game is played only as a hobby. 
Seen in an “ease of computation” perspective howev-
er, it is proposed that without a residuary provision 
such as section 56, the all-encompassing nature of 
section 28 by itself is likely to create difficulties in 
the specific context of taxing professional Indian 
cricketers.  
Unlike Article 17 of the OECD Model Law 
which specifically takes into account the various nu-
ances of a sportsperson’s income, including individu-
al player liability for his star company,13 in the ab-
                                                             
11 LANG ET AL., supra note 3, at 251. 
12 Agassi v. Robinson, [2006] UKHL 23 (U.K.). 
13 OECD Model Tax Convention art. 17(2), Jan. 28, 2003, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf 
(last visited May 21, 2014). 
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sence of a distinct charging head for cricketer income 
in the ITA, the nature of the cricketer’s economic ac-
tivities being so dissimilar to that of any other pro-
fession, makes tax avoidance a real possibility. Not 
only does a cricketer receive prize money, match fees, 
gifts, endorsement income and other types of bonus 
earnings,14 the number of matches he plays and the 
manner in which his schedule operates is necessarily 
different from any other business activity ordinarily 
captured under section 28.  
Even though it might be argued that the re-
siduary charging of section 56 technically covers all 
the forms of a cricketer’s earnings, from a policy per-
spective such heavy reliance on the residuary provi-
sion is perhaps undesirable in the long run. Having 
said this, unfortunately section 28 by itself proves 
inadequate because it can only be invoked if it can be 
established that all the cricketer’s earnings accrue to 
him only by virtue of him being a star in his cricket 
profession, thereby also making his allied income at-
tributable to his professional income under “profits 
and gains of any profession” in section 28. 
 
V. OVER THE BOUNDARY!  ANTI-AVOIDANCE UNDER 
SECTIONS 93 AND 61 
Explanation (b) to section 93(3) of the ITA, 
supported by case law, says that a corporate entity 
incorporated outside India shall be treated as if it 
were a non-resident, and therefore the resident 
transferor (the cricketer) may be responsible for tax-
es assessed on transferred assets, such as income 
                                                             
14 See generally Carole C. Berry, Taxation of U.S. Athletes 
Playing in Foreign Countries, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1 
(2002). 
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from the company.15  
In the star company framework, where the 
resident Indian cricketer sets up a company outside 
India, which consequently enters into its own trans-
actions with third parties, and only employs the 
cricketer, there is technically no transfer for the pur-
poses of section 93. Yet, it may be argued that since 
the resident Indian cricketer ought to have been the 
one to contract with the third parties, and if section 
93(4)(a) is given its widest interpretation, since “as-
set” includes “property rights of any kind” and 
“transfer” includes “the creation of those rights,” 
Revenue authorities may take the view that the 
transfer of the “right to contract with third parties” 
(for endorsements, etc.) by the Indian cricketer to his 
non-resident star company itself amounts to a trans-
fer which invokes section 93. This is because, for in-
stance, if the resident cricketer is the exclusive em-
ployee of his star company, he is in fact giving up his 
right to contract for playing cricket and earning en-
dorsement fees in favor of his non-resident company. 
In the context of section 61,16 transfers 
through settlements or arrangements made by the 
resident cricketer to his star company will be taxable 
in his hands, if it can be proved that the transfer was 
revocable in nature. Though such an inference can 
ultimately only be drawn by an examination of the 
terms and conditions of a particular contract between 
the cricketer and his company, in a general sense, 
cases where the cricketer transfers his earnings to 
                                                             
15 Kadar Mohideen v. CIT, A.I.R. 1960 (Mad.) 302 (India); 
Chidambaram Chettiar v. CIT, (1966) 2 S.C.R. 761 (India); see 
also NANI PALKHIVALA ET AL., 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INCOME TAX 1543 (9th ed. 2004). 
16 VINOD K. SINGHANIA & KAPIL SINGHANIA, TAXMANN’S 
DIRECT TAXES: LAW AND PRACTICE 560 (38th ed. 2007). 
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the company with a right to revoke the same at any 
time would be covered by section 61, though trans-
fers with a right to re-transfer the earnings back at a 
different value or under certain new terms, would 
perhaps not invoke section 61.  
 
VI. SUBSTITUTE FIELDER:  IS THE DTC “CFC” 
STRUCTURE MORE EFFECTIVE? 
 Under the proposed DTC,17 a controlled for-
eign corporation (“CFC”) is a company that has been 
incorporated in a low tax jurisdiction, but is con-
trolled by an Indian resident, who will have to pay 
tax in India.18  Unlike section 93 of the ITA, the CFC 
model taxes the resident controlling the CFC on the 
passive income earned and even taxes undistributed 
dividends as the “deemed dividends” of the CFC. 
CFC liability hinges on being able to establish 
that the resident in India controls the company by 
holding no less than fifty percent of the voting power 
or income. Further, control is also proved if the resi-
dent “exercises a dominant influence on the compa-
ny” due to a special contractual relationship.19 Thus, 
with such a wide construction given to the term “con-
trol,” it is proposed that in the context of resident In-
                                                             
17 Shyamal Mukherjee, Regulations on Controlled Foreign 
Corporations: Are We Ready?, BUS. STANDARD (Jun. 21, 2010, 
12:56 AM), available at http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/regulations-on-controlled-
foreign-corporations-are-we-ready-110062100065_1.html. 
18 Avantika Govil, Introduction of the Controlled Foreign 
Corporations Regime in India: Necessity and Limitations, 
Indian Legal Space (Jul. 14, 2010, 8:53 PM), available at 
http://indianlegalspace.blogspot.com/2010/07/introduction-of-
controlled-foreign.html. 
19 The Direct Taxes Code, No. 110, Acts of Parliament, 2010, 
Twentieth Schedule, cl. 5(b)(iii), p. 286, available at 
http://www.finmin.nic.in/dtcode/index.asp. 
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dian cricketers, the CFC model appears likely to 
bring more star company situations within the tax 
net. Not only can Revenue authorities pierce the veil 
of the company in cases where cricketers cross the 
fifty percent marker, but they may also do so if other 
factors cumulatively establish that the cricketer ex-
erts a “dominating influence.” Yet, given the concep-
tualization of control, perhaps this provision too may 
not be sufficient to cover all the techniques that may 
be employed by the Indian cricketer in his efforts to 
evade tax. For example, where the resident Indian 
cricketer is the sole beneficiary of a trust without 
meeting the statutory thresholds of the CFC’s defini-
tion of owner, income received by him from the com-
pany would continue to go scot-free.  
A CFC has interestingly been defined as one 
that “is not engaged in any active trade or busi-
ness.”20 This creates uncertainty in the context of 
taxing star companies of cricketers, because unlike a 
holding company that is passively earning dividends, 
the star company is actively entering into all sorts of 
contracts on behalf of the cricketer. Though a restric-
tive definition has been provided for the term “active 
trade,” it is proposed that entering into contracts on 
behalf of the cricketer could legitimately fall within 
its definition that reads, “[The CFC] actively partici-
pates in commercial or financial undertakings 
through employees or other personnel in the econom-
ic life of the territory of which it is resident.” This 
could thereby enable the cricketer to successfully ar-
gue that his company is not a CFC for tax purposes.21  
 
 
                                                             
20 Id. at cl. 5(a)(iv), p. 286. 
21 Id. at cl. 5(e)(i), p. 287. 
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CONCLUSION: 
RELAYING THE PITCH TOWARDS A SPECIFIC 
CHARGING PROVISION FOR CRICKETERS IN INDIA 
 It is evident, both from a computation and an-
ti-avoidance perspective, that the taxation of resident 
Indian cricketers requires specific categorization. 
Whilst an all-encompassing charging provision like 
section 28 is unlikely to cover all forms of the crick-
eter’s economic activity, sections 93, 61 and the CFC 
model also have their limitations.  
 Recognizing that resident Indian cricketers 
are scarce and possess a significant amount of bar-
gaining power, signals the urgent need to create a 
distinct charging head for their taxation. This provi-
sion must be inclusive and yet comprehensive 
enough to embrace the various sources of income 
that cricketers may accrue. 
The law must also explicitly recognize and tax 
different models of the star company structure. The 
researcher submits that the law must seek to distin-
guish between companies that genuinely do more 
than just act as a sham for cricketers from those 
which are created only for tax avoidance purposes. 
Unless it can be established that there is some sub-
stance to the star company in as much as it is per-
forming a function the resident Indian cricketer 
could not otherwise do, such as professional man-
agement or organizational activities by an independ-
ent group of persons trained in the field, the star 
company must be seen only as method of diverting 
the cricketer’s stream of income. In cases of such di-
version, a separate tax provision must enable Reve-
nue authorities to pierce the company’s veil based on 
the specific facts of each case, irrespective of a trans-
fer being established under section 93, or the fulfill-
ment of the specified formal thresholds of the CFC. 
